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Local governance is highly relevant to the social welfare of citizens and the 
legitimacy of a polity. Previous research tends to examine how cooperation among 
citizens and bureaucratic organizations helps to develop social capital to facilitate 
local governance and community development. But these studies have ignored the 
other side of community life—social conflicts and their implications for local 
development. And little attention has been paid to the potential negative influence of 
social capital on local governance. 
A longitudinal study conducted in Shanghai from 2000 to 2005, this research 
combines qualitative field research and quantitative survey to examine the 
consequences of community building and to explore the main institutional and 
cultural factors that affect local governance and democratization. In particular, this 
study probes the dynamics of neighborhood governance by investigating community 
building projects in the context of China’s rapid socio-economic transformation. 
Since the 1990s, with post-Mao urban reforms and the decline of communist ideology, 
the command economy-based work-unit (danwei) system, with which the party-state 
used to control citizens, has been gradually dismantled. To maintain a stable society, 
the state launched comprehensive community building projects to revitalize the 
territorial administrative system constituted by neighborhood-based organizations. 
The projects included neighborhood renovation, the reconstruction of local 
management bodies and grassroots democratic reforms. The state also encouraged 






governance. Consequently, this renewed effort of state-making has had great impact 
on neighborhood governance and community power structure.  
Unlike existing studies focusing on one aspect or the other of local politics in 
China, this thesis adds to the literature by comprehensively examining neighborhood 
politics in Shanghai. Specifically, it examines the domination of local pro-growth 
coalitions of local government and business groups, collective resistance from citizens 
against the coalitions, elections of civil associations, and local faction politics.  
The study finds that the political structures of Shanghai’s neighborhoods range 
on the continuum from total domination by local authorities to relatively autonomous 
bodies that I call “quasi-civic communities”, which can resist the absolute power of 
local authorities but face the problem of oligarchy of a few privileged residents. Both 
formal state institutions and informal social networks have differential and contextual 
influence on the performance of local governance. Furthermore, this study finds that 
the shared experiences of citizens participating in social conflicts or collective 
resistance against political forces outside their community could result in the 
enhancement of positive social capital within the community. This research thus 
proposes a broader and more inclusive approach incorporating social conflicts into the 
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Chapter One：State, Guanxi Networks and the Transformation of Local 
Governance in Urban China 
 
 “No development will more deeply affect global peace and prosperity in 
the twenty-first century than the outcome of democratic reform in the 
People’s Republic of China…one crucial ingredient in the performance of 
democratic institutions is the vitality of grassroots activity by ordinary 
citizens in civil society.”--Robert D. Putnam (2001：pp.i-ii) 
 
Introduction 
Ms. Long Jun, a 52-year old former factory cadre, was appointed Secretary of the 
Party Branch (dang zhibu) in Green Sub-neighborhood I (GI hereafter) in the 
beginning of 2001. She was very reluctant to accept this appointment. To take the 
position meant that she would have to, on behalf of the local government, supervise 
the Residents’ Committee (jumin weiyuanhui or juweihui, RC hereafter) and to be 
responsible for governance in this sub-neighborhood. Before the new appointment, 
she held the same position in Green Sub-neighborhood III (GIII hereafter). The 
situation of governance there was quite good. Few residents challenged the authority 
of the Party branch, and she could manage the neighborhood smoothly. Therefore, she 
enjoyed working in GIII, and was going to spend the rest of her career life there 
before retiring three years later.  
However, the new appointment crushed her wishful thinking. In contrast to 
GIII, governance in GI was “disorderly”: residents there launched a large-scale 
community movement to resist attempts by the local government to occupy their 
community park. Civil associations like Home-owners’ Committees (yezhu 
weiyuanhui or yeweihui, HCs hereafter) always led their followers to challenge the 






community movement was one HC head. Therefore, the local government agency 
called Street Office (jiedao banshichu) was dissatisfied with the performance of the 
former Secretary at the GI Party Branch. Consequently, the Party Secretary of the 
Street Office instructed Ms. Long to restore “order” in GI. Ms. Long realized it was 
going to be a tough task, having heard that residents in GI were “fierce”, and she felt 
that the new position placed her in a very uncomfortable situation.  
Ms. Long believed that she had been appointed to this new position because 
the Party Secretary of the Street Office wanted to take revenge on her-- the Secretary 
was in bad relationship with her husband, who had been a former official in this Street 
Office. However, since her husband had been removed from the Office, Ms. Long 
was not in a position to argue against the powerful Party Secretary, and had to accept 
the appointment. Over the next three years, she struggled greatly to manage the sub-
neighborhood of GI. She complained, during my interview on 9 March 2004, that 
compared to the situation in GIII, it was really hard to manage GI because there were 
many conflicts in this sub-neighborhood and residents here reacted quite differently to 
local authorities from GIII residents. She believed that the main factor responsible for 
such a difference was the “quality” (suzhi) of residents: there were many well-
educated residents in GI, who used to argue with local authorities by citing laws and 
state policies in order to represent their interests; in contrast, most residents in GIII 
were not so well-educated, and they did not know how to employ laws and state 
policies to challenge local authorities.  
Actually, the problems that Ms. Long faced were not unusual to her 
counterparts. In recent years, urban neighborhoods have become increasingly unstable; 
and these sub-neighborhood “governors”, most of whom were formerly low-level 






neighborhoods. According to them, while in factories, they could use their positions 
to influence workers by distributing rewards and imposing punishments; in contrast, 
in neighborhoods, they did not have such power; they had to gain cooperation from 
residents through their personal networks (guanxi) with them. Generally, most of 
them attributed their problems to a changing external “situation”, which made the 
power relations in neighborhoods too complex for them to handle. What these local 
management call “the changing external situation”, especially its influence on urban 
neighborhood governance and local power relations in urban China, is the subject of 
this study. 1  
 
Community Building and the Transformation of Local Governance 
Globalization and market-oriented reforms have greatly affected socio-
political life in urban China. Under the pressure led by institutional inefficiency and 
the collapse of communist regimes worldwide, the party-state has initiated many new 
institutional changes to improve efficiency and to consolidate its rule. These huge 
social transformations have greatly impacted China’s urban politics, triggering heated 
academic exploration on local governance and related issues like civil society, social 
movements, democratization and modernization (e.g. Davis et al. eds 1995; Perry and 
Selden eds 2000; Saich 2001; Wu 2002).  
Local governance is an important dimension of contemporary socio-political 
life because it is highly related to the concerns and interests of both the state and 
citizens. The situation of local governance affects the legitimacy and stability of the 
                                                 
1 The concept of “governance” here refers to “the mode of conduct of specific institutions or 
organizations with multiple stakeholders, the role of public-private partnerships, and other kinds of 






regime on the one hand, and the social welfare of citizens on the other. Therefore, 
most countries do their utmost to attain “good governance” in grassroots 
communities.2 The achievement of local governance is affected by community power 
structure. Within a pyramid-type power structure where a few elites monopolize 
power, it is difficult for the powerless citizens under the lowest layer to cooperate 
earnestly with the ruler to promote governance. Only within democratized and shared 
community power structures can good governance be realized. Existing influential 
research suggested that large quantity of social capital can promote governance and 
democracy (e.g. Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2000). However, this neo-Tocquevillean 
propose has also been criticized (e.g.Berman 1997a, 1997b). 
In contemporary China, constructing political order for good governance in 
cities is high on the national agenda. Cities are the focus and the engine of China’s 
modernization. Since the 1990s, there have been fundamental changes in social 
environments. Before the 1980s, economic decline and social disorder caused by the 
former Maoist development strategy, which was characteristic of command economy 
and class struggle, radically undermined the legitimacy of the Party-state. Some new 
China Communist Party (CCP) leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, tried to build 
legitimacy on “performance”, such as promoting financial development and raising 
living standards, instead of political ideology, since the end of the 1970s (Tang 2001). 
The state no longer sought to remake the society with class struggle and communist 
ideology; instead, it initiated economic reforms. To promote economic development 
and to consolidate the regime, the state hoped to maintain a stable and governable 
                                                 
2 According to the World Bank, "Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened 
policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, 








urban society. Furthermore, having personally suffered from the Cultural Revolution, 
which was one result of the charismatic rule of Mao Zedong and Maoist class struggle, 
Deng also favored a legal-rational rule. The state began to propagate and emphasize 
the policy of “rule by law” instead of Maoist class struggle since the early 1980s. 
The fundamental change of the modernization strategy of state has greatly 
influenced governance and community power structure at the base level. 3 Economic 
reforms had not only led to rapid economic growth, which has further changed the 
formation of the urban landscape and neighborhood environments, but they have also 
greatly influenced neighborhood governance. In particular, due to the 1990s economic 
reforms, the command economy-based Work-unit (danwei) System, through which 
the Party-state carried out urban administration and control over citizens before the 
1990s, gradually disintegrated. The governing capacity of the state in cities through 
work-units has thus been greatly weakened. Consequently, as Wu Fulong puts it, “The 
changes in the organization of people, capital, production materials, infrastructure and 
space fundamentally demand new urban governance” (Wu 2002: 1071). To maintain 
its close control over urban society, and to provide some services to citizens, the state 
revitalized territorial organizations such as urban districts, Street Offices and RCs 
instead of ‘hierarchical’ work-units (e.g. Hua 2000; Xu ed 2000; Read 2000; Wu 
2002). Specifically, the state launched comprehensive community building projects in 
                                                 
3 Community power structure usually refers to the relatively stabilized power relations or interaction 
patterns, or the hierarchy of social positions, which reflects the distribution of power among political 
actors within a given community. According to Dennis H. Wrong (1993: 13), there are mainly two 
kinds of power structure: intercursive power and integral power. “The term intercursive power has been 
suggested for relations characterized by a balance of power and a division of scopes among the parties. 
It is contrasted with integral power in which decision making and initiatives to action are centralized 
and monopolized by one party alone. Intercursive power exists where the power of each party in a 
relationship is countervailed by that of the other, with procedures for bargaining of joint decision 
making governing their relations when matters affecting the goals and interests of both are involved.” 
In the intercursive power relations, actors control others in some scopes and are controlled by them in 
other scopes. However, in integral power relations, the power holder retains an irreducible autonomy, 






neighborhoods to strengthen the territorial system instead of using the work-unit 
System as the main pillar of its grassroots management after the mid-1990s.  
The core contents of community building are as follows. First, the state 
endeavors to penetrate grassroots communities, and it restructured local bureaucratic 
agencies, especially Street Offices, in neighborhoods and granted them much more 
power than before so that they could reinforce management in grassroots communities. 
Secondly, to utilize market forces to promote local development, the state encourages 
commercial organizations, such as estate development companies and property 
management companies, to participate in development and management programs. 
Thirdly, the state also encourages citizens to participate in local governance through 
formal channels and ways outlined by the government. In other words, the state 
requires local governments, commercial organizations and citizens to cooperate with 
them in neighborhood governance.    
Community building in contemporary urban China resembles modern 
European state making in the eighteenth century and the Chinese version in the early 
twentieth century in the following important respects: the impulse towards 
bureaucratization and rationalization of local administration and the drive to extract 
financial resources from local communities, which have resulted in the rise of 
collective resistance and the formation of new power relations in grassroots 
communities. 4 The community building can be traced to the earlier attempts at state 
                                                 
4 Prasenjit Duara (1988) was the first to compare the state making of China in the early twentieth 
century with that of modern Europe in the eighteenth century in these aspects.  
    The concept of “state” generally refers to a set of institutions that has the authority, which is granted 
by the constitution, to rule the society. According to Max Weber, the state has a “monopoly on 
legitimate violence” within a particular territory. In the broad sense, the state is composed by “such 
institutions as the armed forces, civil service of state bureaucracy, judiciary, and local and national 
councils of elected representatives (such as a parliament) (Marshall ed 1998: 635). In the narrow sense, 
the state usually refers to the central government, which is in contrast to the local government agencies. 
In terms of local governance, the interests of provincial and municipal governments are relatively in 






making initiated by the CCP regime after the 1949 Revolution. But the current ways 
of implementing it are unlike those adopted by the state before the Reform. Early state 
making practices were characterized by brutal coercion. For instance, in the 1950s, to 
consolidate its rule, the CCP regime launched many political campaigns to purge and 
liquidate a large number of “anti-revolutionary elements”, including former 
Kuomintang agents, gangs, and religionists who had been in charge of neighborhood 
administration during the Kuomintang regime (Zhang 2004). In present community 
building, the government employs much softer means to implement its policies. 
Therefore, with Reform and Opening, the state has turned to new means to dominate 
society. 
The reforms had also led to changes in social values, which in turn influenced 
grassroots governance. In particular, to promote economic reforms, the state has 
actually declared preference for utilitarianism instead of communism, as is typically 
expressed in Deng Xiaoping’s influential words: “A cat that can catch rats is 
definitely a good one, regardless whether it is white or black” (Deng 1993:211). The 
propaganda of the state and the commercialization practices promoted the rapid 
change of the main values of China society towards utilitarianism. As one 
consequence, the communist ideology has been on the wane (Walder ed 1995b). 
There is also evidence that utilitarianism has gradually prevailed and become the 
primary criterion for social evaluation; and people are increasingly becoming 
materialistic or interest-oriented in their own actions and their interactions with 
                                                                                                                                            
government agencies as the representative of the state in this study. In other words, in this study, state 
power refers to the government authority fulfilled by the central government and the municipal 







others.5 Consequently, as Zheng Yongnian (2001) argued, that Chinese society has 
been transformed into an “interest-based society”.  
The propaganda of “rule by law” and the citizens’ increasing communication 
with Western liberal states through many ways like personal visits and internet have 
also greatly enhanced their consciousness of rights (Pei 2003). In addition, with 
economic reforms, there are an increasing number of channels for people to access 
economic and other kinds of resources. Together, these new social conditions made 
people less afraid of government authorities as before; consequently, in present-day 
China, citizens respond to the authorities very differently from how they did in the 
past. Therefore, the changed social values and the new reaction patterns also affect 
neighborhood governance (discussed later).  
The initiation of community building has led to great changes of political 
scenario in urban neighborhoods. It has also brought about new elements for 
neighborhood governance: firstly, the restructuring of the local bureaucracy and the 
grassroots administrative system; secondly, the rise of commercial organizations and 
their involvement in local development programs; and thirdly, the new reaction 
patterns of citizens to the authorities and the grassroots politics. During the process of 
community building, besides previous government agencies – such as the Street 
Office, the police station, the estate and  property management office (fangchanban), 
the mass associations under government supervision such as the RCs and women 
                                                 
5 According to a survey of 3000 Shanghai citizens conducted by the Social Investigation and 
Consultation Center of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in June 2000, many citizens have 
realized the problem with communist ideology. The survey results showed that even more than a half 
(54.0%) CCP members agreed with the view that “our understanding of communism in the past was 
partly impractical”, the percentage of ordinary citizens was 58.3% (Yin ed 2001a: 66). The survey 
results also revealed that nearly a half of citizens (48.7%) agreed that “Presently, human relationships 
in the society are generally money-oriented and of mutual utilizing, and there is less and less love 
among people” while only around a quarter of them (25.9%) disagreed with this view (ibid: p72). The 
survey results also revealed that nearly a quarter of (25.1%) Shanghai citizens were dissatisfied with 







unions, new commercial organizations (e.g. estate development companies, property 
management companies), formal civil associations (e.g. HCs), as well as informal 
citizen groups, such as chorus teams and physical exercise teams, have emerged in 
neighborhoods. Some of them are exclusive to local residents; others are inclusive. 
They have different governance functions that address most aspects of community life. 
The state expects these organizations, associations and groups to cooperate with one 
another to achieve good governance. In interacting with one another, these actors also 
develop all kinds of networks and ties among them. These organizations, associations 
and informal networks constitute what I call “local governance web”, which makes up 
the organizational foundation for neighborhood governance. 6  Most of these 
organizations and associations are by-products of contemporary state making in terms 
of their origins, although some of them also reflect citizens’ expectations. “Local 
governance web” also includes personal ties among neighbors, friends and factions, 
which substantially affect neighborhood governance (e.g. Read 2003a). These 
organizations and associations, informal networks and personal ties interact and 
intersect with one another. They not only help community members communicate 
with one another within their community and the outside world, but also provide 
channels for the state to penetrate neighborhoods. Through its agents in this web, the 
state attempts to impose control over urban neighborhoods. To maintain their interests 
and exercise power, other actors also spare no efforts to expand their influence in this 
web. The power structure within this web is subject to the interactions among the 
main political forces. By analyzing the specific operation of this web, we can probe 
the power relations in it and their influence on neighborhood governance. 
                                                 
6 The invention of the concept of “local governance web” and related analysis were inspired by 






Against this background, this study looks at the performance of community 
building in terms of grassroots governance, e.g. whether or not its initiation would 
lead to good governance and democratization in grassroots communities. The study 
explores the dynamics of neighborhood politics in urban China. In particular, it shows 
how grassroots political order is reconstructed and how power relations in 
neighborhoods are changed under the context of the macro social changes. In the 
following sections of this chapter, I first discuss the concerns of political forces and 
their reactions in neighborhoods towards community building in order to provide the 
setting for further analysis. Next, I review previous studies on communist 
administration at the base level and examine the relevance of these theories to present 
practice. Finally, I will introduce my research perspective and theoretical hypothesis. 
 
The concerns of main actors and their interactions in the local governance web 
Community building involves the substantial interests of political forces in 
neighborhoods. Their reactions and their interactions with others are subject to their 
concerns. Primarily concerned with economic development and social stability, the 
state currently prefers to achieve its objectives through “soft” means, such as 
propaganda and implementing laws instead of coercion. Since local officials in China 
obtain jobs from superior officials rather than from local elections, they are generally 
concerned with demonstrating good “political performance” and meeting the 
expectations of higher government officials (Zhang 2002: 498). In the reforms related 
to community building, Street Offices are allowed to share tax revenue with the state . 
They thus endeavor to promote local economic growth to enhance income. Because 






Street Offices are really willing to support the implementation of democratic reforms 
in neighborhoods; many Street Offices even clandestinely manipulate the reforms.  As 
commercial organizations, the main objective of estate development companies and 
property management companies is to make profits in neighborhoods.  
According to the law, RCs are self-governance associations comprising 
residents, and should therefore be concerned with serving other residents. In reality, 
since they rely on Street Offices for resources, RCs have to work mainly for the 
Offices. Especially, with the initiation of community building, the state has 
empowered Party branches in sub-neighborhoods to be in charge of their governance. 
Since each Party branch shares offices with the RC, it can thus closely supervise the 
latter. Therefore, the RC has nearly been transformed into the executive arms of the 
Party branch, and it has to follow the directives from both the Street Offices and the 
Party branch. In recent years, many cities have conducted RC elections to restore their 
autonomy. Some RC members elected by residents are thus quite concerned about 
residents’ interests. However, since RCs are still under the supervision of Party 
branches that are themselves under the leadership of the Street Office, the RCs still 
have to primarily deal with the task distributed to them by local government agencies 
(Read 2003a; Shi 2005). 
Since the mid-1990s, many HCs have been established in Shanghai 
neighborhoods. The main obligation of these civil associations is to manage the 
housing management funds of their respective buildings and to ensure that property 
management companies provide good services. The HCs are supposed to represent the 
interests of home-owners, who constitute the largest component of residents. Since 
housing is the most important property for most citizens in China, efficient HCs can 






financially dependent on the interests produced by the facilities attached to their 
residential buildings, such as car parks and bicycle parks, they do not need to rely on 
government agencies for financial support. Therefore, some HCs would challenge 
local authorities that force management arrangements upon residents (Read 2003b). A 
few HCs have even tried to prevent Street Offices from establishing new RCs in their 
residences, claiming that they could adequately represent the interests of residents, 
and that they did not need RCs that would only serve local government agencies. HCs 
have also served as the main channel by which citizen protestors have mobilized other 
residents in some forms of local collective resistance (Read 2003b; Cai 2005). 
Furthermore, since the environments of neighborhoods affect the value of local estate 
and conditions of life as well, many HCs are beginning to care more about the 
surroundings of their neighborhoods.  
Before the 1990s, social status of citizens and the quality of their life depended 
on their work units. They, as well as the rise and fall in the value of citizens’ houses, 
are now closely related to the socio-economic changes in their neighborhoods due to 
the initiation of community building and the reform of housing property. Therefore, 
many residents care more about the development of their community. But their 
specific concerns, which depended on their social affinity and status, vary 
considerably. Some of them are interested in sociability, while others just care about 
environmental improvement. Due to the changes in social conditions, citizens have 
been able to voice their concerns by initiating “boundary-spanning contention” 
including collective resistance and elections against local government agencies which 
have gone against their interests, sometimes through civil associations 7 . Local 
                                                 
7 The so-called “boundary-spanning contention” refers to the resistance “not prescribed or forbidden, 






governments are quite worried about the contentions. They believe that civil 
associations like HCs will challenge and threaten their authority. Since local 
governments are not empowered to intervene in the operation of HCs, which are 
legally autonomous organizations, they tend to employ other means to control the 
latter, thereby triggering more conflicts.  
Because of community building, all political forces are increasingly sensitive 
to the distribution of power in neighborhoods, and are gradually more active in 
participating in neighborhood activities. To pursue their interests, these actors 
cooperate, compete and clash with each other, resulting in many unexpected 
contradictions and conflicts. For instance, to pursue common economic interests, local 
government agencies and commercial investors have forged alliances and created 
cooperative partnerships (e.g. Zhu 1999; Zhang 2002), which is similar to the 
operation of growth coalition among local economic and political elites in western 
cities (Molotch 1976; Domhoff 1986; Jonas & Wilson ed 1999). However, their 
interests sometimes clash with those of residents because their business often causes 
inconveniences to the community, such as noise and rubbish. Furthermore, 
community building has also led to the redistribution of power and interests among 
government agencies at different levels, which bring about conflicts within the 
administrative system. In addition, it also cause some groups of citizens to argue 
against one another because of different concerns. In sum, the main political forces in 
neighborhoods are concerned with different interests and objectives, which can cause 
violent conflicts among them in a social setting where utilitarianism prevails.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
that goes on partly within the state and it hinges on the participation of state actors. It exists in a middle 







Neighborhood politics: a window of communist governance in urban China 
Due to community building, more and more grassroots political activities have 
been transferred to neighborhoods from work-units. Neighborhoods have become the 
main channel through which the state carries out its grassroots administration. 
Furthermore, they are also becoming a mian interest intersection of government 
agencies, citizens and other political forces. Looking at neighborhoods, we can 
observe how the state penetrates grassroots communities, how political forces interact 
and intersect with one another and how power relations at the base level are forged. 
As existing research (e.g.Walder 1986; Oi 1989) suggests, grassroots politics can 
function as a window that reflects the foundation of the polity in China. If having 
been aware of how political actors interact with one another in the field of grassroots 
politics, one will understand an important foundation of the Chinese national political 
order in the context of market-oriented economy.   
 By examining some important political events and processes in Shanghai 
neighborhoods, this study sought to explore the transformation of neighborhood 
governance and community power relations under the effects of community building. 
In particular, the study explores the patterns of interaction and power relations among 
government agencies, commercial organizations, neighborhood associations and 
citizens within “local governance web” and their influence on neighborhood 
governance. Furthermore, it also explores the channels and ways by which power is 
exerted in neighborhoods. And it addresses the following questions: What are the 
main characteristics of present neighborhood governance? What are the main factors 
that affect neighborhood governance and community power relations? How do actors 






interests and to forge power relations with others? Specifically, how do government 
agencies implement administration and impose control over neighborhoods? How do 
other social forces, especially citizens, react to govermental authorities--submitting to 
or resisting the control from them--and why? Will community building promote 
democratization in neighborhoods and empower citizens? What may be the 
consequences of the transformation of neighborhood governance to the rule of the 
Party-state in urban China?  
The Existing Explanation of Local Politics in Communist China  
Much research has already been conducted to examine local administration 
practices and power relations at the base level in communist China. Most of them 
focused on the relations among local authorities and citizens, as representatives of 
state-society relations. The researchers adopted either a state-centered perspective or a 
society-centered one, generally assuming a structural dichotomy between the state and 
society. 
Existing research have identified that modern state has great influences on 
local communities (e.g. Gellner 1983; Giddens 1996). In China, the Party-state has 
attempted to remake the society, using all kinds of means, since the CCP had come to 
power. Therefore, when studying grassroots politics in communist China, most 
scholars used to adopt state-centered frameworks and focused on examining the 
influence of the state on the power relations in local communities. Some researchers 
employed the totalitarian paradigm and the clientilism model successively to explain 
how the state conquered the society with coercion and ideology, or permeated into the 
society through patron-client networks (see Nee & Stark 1989:3; Read 2003a:18-22). 






had dominance over grassroots communities (Schurmann 1968; Vogel 1969; Whyte 
& Parish 1984; Walder 1986; Oi 1989; Siu 1989).  
After the end of the 1970s, the state initiated market-oriented reforms, which 
have resulted in great social changes in China. Researchers thus constructed new 
theoretical frameworks to reflect political development; and most relevant to 
neighborhood politics are the following two models.  
 
Local volunteerism and thin reciprocity: the state seeks cooperation from society 
through informal networks 
With the concept of “Administration Grassroots Engagement” (AGE), 
Benjamin L. Read sought to explain how the state administers grassroots communities 
through local quasi-administrative institutions and social networks constructed by 
these institutions. He investigated the case of China’s urban RCs, focusing on the 
relations between urban citizens and these neighborhood organizations. Scrutinizing 
the perceptions and motivation of individuals for cooperation, Read generalized the 
motivations of the residents who provide active, ongoing supports to the RC with the 
concept of “local volunteerism”, while describing the relations among RCs and those 
who only provide weak and occasional support as demonstrating “thin reciprocity”.  
The concept of local volunteerism explains the reasons for persistent and 
substantial cooperation among RCs and some resident activists who positively assist 
the RCs and serve the neighborhood as citizen volunteers. It suggests that the latter 
“take part out of a desire to contribute their time and energy to what they consider an 
honorable and socially valuable undertaking, and in order to enjoy the pleasures of 






2003a:207) Therefore, this kind of cooperation relations differs from patron-client 
ones because residents help RCs mainly due to their psychological and social motives 
instead of interest seeking; such relations would neither be at the cost of other 
residents nor trigger resentment from them.  
The concept of “thin reciprocity” underscores the occasional cooperation 
among RCs and most residents who have a generally positive orientation toward the 
RC but only interact with and support it occasionally. It suggests that such 
cooperation is based on the low-level reciprocal relations that RC staff develop among 
themselves and residents, “including a degree of personal familiarity and occasional 
exchanges of small favors and assistance.”(ibid, p30) Therefore, according to Read 
(2003a), the networks among RCs and their constituents which are based on local 
volunteerism and thin reciprocity are responsible for their obtaining residents’ 
cooperation to administer neighborhoods. Read also pointed out, “because 
constituents may choose whether or not to respond to and participate in these 
institutions, AGE also shapes and sometimes limits what the state can do” (ibid,p7); 
however, this institution does not equal “civil society”, because the state sets up their 
objectives and controls their operation. Therefore, according to him, the RC is 
primarily a tool for the state to administer urban neighborhoods. Although many 
domestic Chinese researchers highlighted the influence of newly-conducted RC 
elections on local democratization (see Xu ed 2000; Liu 2005), Read argued that such 
influence was rather limited (ibid.).   
However, the RC-constituent relations that Read examined is just one 
dimension of local governance. The models of “local volunteerism” and “thin 
reciprocity” fail to identify other types of civil participation and community 






relations in neighborhood politics. Besides, these state-centered models generally 
focused on looking at the cooperation between citizen groups and local authorities 
(e.g.Whyte & Parish 1984; Walder 1986; Oi 1989; Read 2003a). However, since the 
1990s, there have emerged increasing number of civil resistance in grassroots 
communities (see Dai & He 2000; Perry 2001; Cai 2002; Cai 2005). The state-
centered models can not convincingly explain the new elements of local politics. 
 
The civil society paradigm: society resists the state 
In the recent decades, the concept of “civil society” has been revitalized to reflect a 
kind of state-society relation that an relatively autonomous society, characteristic of 
vibrant civil participation and the existence of large number of social associations like 
churches and unions, is able to negotiate with and resist the state. Most researchers 
also believed that a strong civil society can promote democracy (e.g.Gramsci 1957; 
Habermas 1989; Seligman 1992; Cohen & Arato 1992; Walzer 1992; Chambers & 
Kopstein 2001). 
With the decline of communist regimes in East Europe in the 1980s, the 
theories of civil society have been also employed to explain fundamental political 
changes in post-communism states, which were claimed to be a result of the 
emergence of independent and spontaneously organized civil society groups which 
could resist the totalitarian state and compete for political power in these countries 
(Arato 1981; Walder 1999:66).  
With the initiation of China’s economic reforms, many civil associations have 
been established. Most importantly, there emerged several large-scale social 






among the state and society, many scholars believed that, with economic development, 
the China society has been beyond the strict control of the Party-state. They thus 
dismissed the state-centered frameworks and turned to a society-centered perspective 
in explaining China’s social changes. This has led to ardent academic debates on the 
formation of  “civil society ” in China,  resulting in the popularity of this model in 
explaining state-society relations in contemporary China (Deng & Jing 1992; 
Chamberlain 1993; Madsen 1993; Deng 1996; He 1997; Walder 1999; Wang 2001). 
Many researchers believed that the social transformations in China had enabled 
citizens to establish new civil associations and expand social spaces , which could 
help them resist state intervention. Social associations and middle class were seen as 
dynamic elements in the building of a civil society (e.g.Whyte 1992; White 1993a, 
1993b; Davis et al eds. 1995). 
When studying local political development and the changes in power relations, 
the researchers concerned with the theories of civil society focus on examining the 
specific socio-political transformations that facilitate citizens’ actions to fight for their 
rights and to develop their autonomy. They found that many new forms of contentions 
or “rightful resistance” against local authorities had emerged (O’Brien & Li 1995; 
O’Brien 1996), and there were “organized vessels for the expression of group 
interests” in local political fields (Walder 1995: 16), such as trade unions (White 
1993b; Pearson 1994), entrepreneur associations (Zhou 1999) and HCs (Read 2003b). 
These researchers suggested that the emergence of “organized vessels”, and collective 
resistance aginst local authorities imply the rise of civil society and prospect for local 
democratization. As far as community building is concerned, some researchers 
believe that it will lead to the development of civil society in China (Wang 2001; 






However, this model is overly optimistic. It not only overlooks the ability of 
the state to maintain control, but also pays little attention to the splits within citizen 
groups themselves, which prevent them from uniting as a whole to fight for citizens’ 
rights. The researchers also overestimated the desire of China’s citizens, especially 
the middle class, for a democratic polity (see Chen 2002).  
Aimed to explain political development and power relations in China, the 
research guided by various theories from the totalitarian model to the civil society 
model partly reflect the gradual evolution and transformation of Chinese society 
under the communism system. However, there are many limitations to these models. 
As many researchers argued, some concepts based on Western societies such as “civil 
society” do not match with China’s socio-political settings (Perry 1994; Walder 1999; 
Zhang 1999). Furthermore, the evidence presented to support these models are often 
disputed (Walder 1995:16). Consequently, these models created confusion for us to 
understand social changes in China. As Elizabeth Perry (1994:707) pointed out, the 
civil society model suggests that there are fundamental changes of Chinese politics 
towards the direction of democracy while the clientilism model concludes that social 
and political development is still constrained by communist institutions. These 
contradictions imply that both state-centered and the society-centered models make 
overly broad generalizations. One problem with these models lies in their underlying 
assumption of a structural dichotomy between the state and society.  
Existing research suggest that neither the state nor society acts as a coherent 
actor (e.g. Migdal et al 1994; Sun 2000; Migdal 2001). Joel Migdal (1994, 2001) thus 
advocated a “state-in-society” approach. According to him, the state is part of society, 






different components are embedded in diverse social circumstances. These state 
components interact with the scattered elements of society with various forms, 
characteristics, speeds and consequences. In these interactions, state components 
usually encounter different levels of pressures, and they may respond according to 
their own interests. Therefore, the state seldom “convey successfully a coherent 
system” (Migdal 1994:17). Kenneth Lieberthal (1992) describes the administrative 
system in China as demonstrating “fragmented authoritarianism”. Within the system, 
government agencies at different levels compete and conflict with one another for 
their respective interests. As a result, few government agencies actually represent the 
will and interests of the central state in their actions. Therefore, when studying 
government actions in China, we should follow the approach of “anthropology of the 
state” (Migdal 2001) and analyze the behavior pattern of government agencies at 
different levels.  
On the other hand, as Joel Migdal (1994: 3) pointed out, society is composed 
of social forces which have different concerns, and they interact with state 
components in different ways “contingent on specific empirical conditions.” Students 
of China have already found that subordinates are not unified groups whether at work-
units or in neighborhoods (Walder 1986; Read 2003a). Since many studies have found 
that the boundary between the state and society is flexible and fluid, the contradictions 
and confusions require us to move beyond the simple state-centered and society-
centered perspectives to understand power relations within China’s local communities.  
An Alternative Preliminary Model: Quasi-civic Community      
This study examines the dynamics of neighborhood politics by looking at the 






community building is initiated and pushed forward by the regime, much attention 
should be paid to the role of the state in neighborhood governance. One approach 
addressing this question is to examine the formal administrative systems in 
neighborhoods and the actions of local government agencies. The formal systems 
define the structure of neighborhood politics and grant some actors official power; 
they are thus very important in the political order. As agents of the state, local 
government agencies are empowered to govern grassroots communities, their actions 
should be one main dynamic of neighborhood politics. Therefore, this study pays 
attention to the formal administrative systems in neighborhoods and the actions of 
local government agencies, especially Street Offices and quasi-amministrative RCs.  
Aside from using local government agencies, the state also affect local 
governance through other ways, such as law enactment and propaganda. In 
community building, the state not only attempts to penetrate neighborhoods through 
local government agencies, but also grants citizens some rights through passing new 
laws and formulating new policies. For instance, some laws empower citizens to elect, 
or be elected, the members of RCs and HCs in their neighborhoods. Some China 
observers such as Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang highlighted the influence of laws 
and state policies on local governance in rural China by examining “rightful 
resistance” and other “boundary-spanning contention” (O’Brien & Li 1995; O’Brien 
1996, 2003). They found that laws and policies affect local governance not because 
local governments enforce them in grassroots communities, but because villagers 
employ the laws to restrain local governments from abusing their public power. 
Therefore, to fully understand the influence of the state to grassroots governance and 
local power relations, we have also to pay attention to the role of laws and policies in 






In examining formal institutional changes, we assume that institution is an 
independent variable and explore how the changes of institutions affect neighborhood 
governance, community power relations and the behavior pattern of neighborhood 
actors. However, focusing on formal institutions can not fully explain the differences 
among grassroots communities in terms of local governance where the communities 
face the same formal institutional context. Therefore, the examination of formal 
institutions is not enough for us to understand local governance and power relations. 
This requires us to pay attention to the informal aspect of grassroots politics.  
Many previous studies on contemporary China politics have reminded us to 
pay close attention to “the role of informal groups and rules, interpersonal ties and 
relationships, and the decision-making processes that involve negotiating, bargaining, 
conflicts compromises, and stalemates” (Tsou 1976:98; also see Nathan 1973; Pye 
1981;Walder 1986; Oi 1989). Therefore, this study focuses on actual interactions in 
“local governance web” that can reflect the informal side of neighborhood politics and 
the operating state of power in neighborhoods more amply. As Robert D. Putnam 
(1993a) pointed out, the performance of an institution is subject to the influence of   
civil culture under which the institution operates. Therefore, by regarding institutions 
as a dependent variable, this study also explores the main socio-economic factors or 
local culture that affects the performance of community building.  
Pierre Bourdieu (1992) argues that, to understand the dynamics of a certain 
field and the power relations within it, it is most important to explore the role of the 
key capital in this field. A certain kind of capital may be very efficacious in a given 
field, “both as a weapon and a stake of struggle.” The actor who possesses this capital 
can wield power and exert influence on others. In a given field, the force and the 






possesses (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 98-99). During the times of command 
economy, economic capital (economic resources and employment opportunities) was 
the most important factor in neighborhood politics. Due to economic reforms, the 
efficacy of economic capital gradually decreased as it became easier to access this 
kind of resource in the market-oriented economy. Therefore, the key capital in 
contemporary neighborhood politics needs to be explored. As Ray Forrest and Ade 
Kearns (2001:2130)  suggested, when one studies neighborhoods, it is important not 
to “see the neighborhood as just a territorially bounded entity but as a series of 
overlapping social networks….the difference among neighborhoods may perhaps best 
be understood as the differences among the form and content of social networks.” 
Contemporary China studies have also highlighted the important role of social 
networks in the field of politics although their role in neighborhood politics has not 
been systematically examined yet. Therefore, social networks including formal civil 
associations and informal personal connections may be one key capital in 
neighborhood politics. To understand the dynamics of local governance, we have to 
explore the nature of these networks and the ways that they are utilized by actors to 
pursue interests. Therefore, this study investigated the ways that individual or group 
actors employ social networks to influence local decision-making and to forge power 
relations among one another. It also explores how actors build networks with others.  
This study probes power relations among neighborhood actors as reflected by 
their interactions and networks, ranging from the individual level such as the relations 
among neighborhood activists to the group level like the interactions among local 
government agencies and citizen groups. It not only examines the interactions among 
different group actors, but also pays attention to power relations within these groups, 






themselves, making power relations in neighborhoods more complex. Moreover, the 
study investigates how the above power relations influence the exercise of public 
power within “local governance web”, which defines the rights and obligations of 
neighborhood actors and the distribution of public resources in neighborhoods. In 
addition, this study also addresses the channels and ways by which power is produced 
and exercised. Finally, it will further examine the link between the formal institutional 
structure and the power relations among the main actors.  
Community building does not only lead to cooperation among neighborhood 
actors, but also brings about many conflicts among them.  Existing research tends to 
examine how interactions and cooperation among citizens and bureaucratic 
organizations help to develop social capital to facilitate good governance (Putnam 
1993a; Evans 1996; Woolcock 1999, 2001). But these studies have ignored 
community conflicts and their influence on local development. They have also failed 
to identify the potential negative influence of social networks on local governance. In 
reality, community life and interactions are not merely constituted by cooperation and 
cohesion, but also include social conflicts and tension among actors. Furthermore, 
cooperation does not necessarily lead to good governance while community conflicts 
may also result in diverse consequences. Some cooperation among certain actors 
could be at the cost of others’ interests and thus result in conflicts among them and the 
latter. On the other hand, Some conflicts could lead to social splits that adversely 
affect local development while others may result in the enhancement of social 
integration within certain citizen groups themselves and thus the improvement of 
local governance (Coser 1956). Therefore, community conflicts should be examined 






inclusive approach in which we not only pay attention to community cooperation, but 
also explore the influence of social conflicts on local development.8 
To systematically study community power relations, we need to examine the 
interactions among actors both in everyday life and in non-routine “events”. As Fan 
Ping pointed out, actors build social networks in everyday life, and they utilize these 
networks in events. By examining everyday interactions among actors, we can 
explore how social networks are built; by examining their interactions in events, we 
can further explore the quality, quantity and the utility of these networks (Fan 2000).  
Therefore, except for paying attention to everyday life, this study examine some 
events of cooperation and conflicts in neighborhoods to disclose the state of local 
governance and community power relations.   
Following the above theoretical perspectives and approaches, I hypothesize 
that the formal institutions that the state has set up regarding community building is 
one determinant factor in neighborhood politics; but local governance is also greatly 
influenced by the state of civicness and informal social networks to a great extent. 
Neighborhood governance in present-day China is in a dilemma. In particular, on the 
one hand, some local government agencies and commercial organizations have 
formed alliances among them through informal links in order to exercise control over 
neighborhoods (Zhu 1999; Zhang 2002). On the other hand, in some sub-
neighborhoods, social networks including civil associations and informal connections 
among citizens have also developed well and facilitated the cooperation among them; 
and there is prospect for them to promote autonomy to some extent with these 
networks (Gui 2001; Read 2003b). However, due to the prevalence of utilitarianism, 
the networks may fail to involve high-level trust. Therefore, within “local governance 
                                                 






web”, people contest power and interests by utilizing informal networks, which not 
only shape the interactions among different group actors but also affect power 
relations within these groups. In other words, informal networks influence community 
power relations and neighborhood governance to a great extent. I would refer to this 
kind of neighborhood as “quasi-civic community” in terms of the state of governance. 
The formation of this concept is inspired by Robert D. Putnam’s classic study on local 
governance of Italy. He labeled those communities where citizens trust and cooperate 
with one another which result in good governance as “civic communities”; he also 
describes those communities where citizens do not trust and cooperate with one 
another and Mafia bully around as “uncivic communities”. Specifically, in an ideal 
“civic community”, citizens are actively engaged in public affairs; they share equal 
political rights and obligations; people trust and cooperate with one another through 
horizontal networks; they abide by laws; and there are a large number of vibrant civil 
associations. As a result, the administration of local government is effective, and 
citizens are satisfied with their life. In sum, civic community is based on a large 
quantity of “social capital” which promotes governance and democracy.  
However, the model of “civic community” fails to identify the influence of the 
state on local governance; as well, it fails to recognize the passive influence of social 
capital on governance and democracy. The model of “quasi-civic community” pays 
much attention to the role of the state in terms of its influence on grassroots politics. It 
aims to describe the state of local governance, community power structure and the 
prospect for local democratization under an authoritarian regime. It differs from the 
model of “civic community” in that it suggests that group interactions within 






connotations of these two concepts will be discussed later). In particular, the model of 
“quasi-civic community” constitutes the following suppositions.  
 
Community power structure is changing from the integral one to an intercursive 
one 
As China researchers observed, before the Opening and Reform, the state and 
its local agencies almost monopolized all public resources. In the local communities 
like work-units and neighborhoods, “there was a nearly complete fusion of political 
and economic powers,” and local officials had both “a formidable political apparatus 
at their disposal” and wide discretion in distributing all kinds of resources (Walder 
1989:411). This integral hierarchy of community power structure was characteristic of 
strong state domination and weak citizen influence, and it was based on strict coercion, 
communist ideology, the state’s monopoly on political, economic and information 
resources as well as social splits in citizen groups. 
With the initiation of economic and other urban reforms, the state “renounced 
much of its power to dictate social and personal activities” (Davis 1995:17). There 
have emerged many social associations which have gained opportunities to access 
resources and to mobilize support to challenge existing authorities, and they can 
independently wield their influence in neighborhood politics (Cao & Li 2000; Xu ed 
2000; Read 2003b). Ordinary citizens have also built “a new network pattern with 
increasing numbers of social ties that are independent of the workplace, which 
suggests increasing individual freedom and a potential early step towards a 
democratic society. ”(Ruan et al 1997: 87) Furthermore, as Kevin O’Brien (2003: 58) 






state commitments can be a source of inclusion, and they are busy exploiting the gap 
between rights promised and rights delivered.” Some urban citizens have thus been 
increasingly active in articulating their concerns in neighborhoods. They may launch 
collective actions such as complaining to higher-level government agencies and 
blocking roads to resist local authorities that violate their interests (Dai & He 2000; 
Cai 2002). Presently, similar to rural China, a significant issue in neighborhood 
politics is the rise of collective resistance against local authorities (e.g. Liu 2004). 
Therefore, local authorities and social forces have to negotiate with one another in 
local decision-making sometimes.  Hence, community power structure seems to be 
changing from the integral one to an intercursive one, and some local decisions could 
be made in democratic ways. 
The degree of neighborhood democratization is still limited  
In “civic communities”, citizens can articulate their interests in democratic 
ways (Putnam 1993a). In contrast, in “quasi-civic communities”, there is some but 
limited improvement in local democratization because there are many factors 
hampering full democracy. Although the state has claimed to develop grassroots 
democracy, and has enacted some laws to empower citizens to elect civil associations 
such as RCs and HCs, these laws are not strictly implemented.  
Given the limited formal participation channels, social forces in grassroots 
communities have to turn to informal channels to pursue their interests, which could 
lead to uncertainty of grassroots politics. This can impede neighborhood 
democratization and good governance. For example, to facilitate their extracting 
resources from the neighborhoods, local authorities could exploit gaps in laws and 






grassroots democracy and the achievements of neighborhood governance (Shi 2005). 
Faced with control from local authorities, whether neighborhoods can achieve 
autonomy depends on the solidarity and cooperation among residents, and the amount 
and quality of the social capital that sustain the cooperation. However, in most 
China’s neighborhoods, there is presently lack of sufficient community participation 
and positive social capital (Shen 2000; Xu ed 2000; Shi 2005). 
Most importantly, even in relatively politically developed neighborhoods with 
high quantity of social capital, there may be serious problems with civil participation 
and community solidarity. Many social capital theorists believe that dense community 
interactions definitely promote local cooperation and governance (Putnam 1993, 
2000). However, this is not always the case.  
Previous studies remind us of the problem of prevalent factionalism in the 
politics at different levels in many developed and developing states including China 
(e.g. Nicholas 1965; Tsou 1978; Pillsbury 1978; Sun & Lu 2000). Faction politics 
means that a certain political field is dominated by several factions who compete 
against one another for power; and a faction, according to Ralph W. Nicholas (1965), 
is a political group recruited by a leader on the basis of diverse principles or ties. 
Faction is built on personal clientilist ties among relatively powerful leaders and weak 
followers, and their relationships are based upon the exchange and assessment of 
mutual self-interests. The relationships reflect the rights and obligations among these 
two parties (Nicholas 1965; Nathan 1973). However, as Pillsbury (1978: 270) has 
pointed out, “as they jockey to maintain or gain control of leadership of the total 
community, each faction attributes to itself only the purest of motives-- the well-being 
of the community and its members”.  In other words, factions do not care much about 






politics is characteristic of ceaseless conflicts.  Its existence enables a few leaders and 
enthusiasts to monopolize power and thus impedes local democratization.   
 
Guanxi serves as the base of community interactions instead of positive social 
capital 
As mentioned before, contemporary mainstream development studies 
suggested that good governance should be based on large quantity of social capital in 
communities. The most important founders of social capital theories are Pierre 
Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam, but they looked at social capital from 
fundamentally different perspectives. From the neo-Marxist perspective, Bourdieu 
(1986:248-49) claimed that  
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. The 
volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on 
the size of the networks of connections he can effectively mobilize and on 
the volume of the capital… possessed by a given agent, or even by the 
whole set of agents to whom he is connected.”  
Therefore, he regarded social capital as a personal asset serving those 
individuals who have connections with others. Based on a liberal-pluralist 
approach, Coleman (1988S) and (Putnam 1993a, 2000) identified the main 
elements of social capital as social networks, norms of reciprocity and trust in 
groups or communities, which can promote solidarity and cooperation among 
members. Some theorists also divide the concept into “bonding,” “bridging” and 
“linking” social capital. “Bonding social capital” consists of strong ties 






capital” refers to weak ties among people or groups who are of similar economic 
and political status but in different locations, occupations or ethnic groups (Gittell 
& Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000). Both of them are based on horizontal ties among 
people with similar socio-political statuses. In contrast, “linking social capital” 
refers to the vertical networks “among people who are interacting across explicit, 
formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society” (Szreter1 & 
Woolcock 2003:6). For a community to achieve good governance, there has to be 
a large number of horizontal and vertical ties based on the norms of reciprocity 
and generalized trust within and beyond the community.  
For Pierre Bourdieu, social capital is just one of many types of capital. Like 
financial and human one, social capital can also be utilized to target at either good or 
bad aims. For him, “the social construction of the content of social capital …is 
irreducibly attached to class stratification which, in turn, is associated with the 
exercise of economic and other forms of exploitation, and the relationship between 
them.” (Fine 2001: 191). In contrast, James Coleman (1988s) and Robert Putnam 
(1993a, 1993b) linked social capital with morality, and they claimed that social capital 
is good for the public benefits of groups of people like families and communities; 
most later researchers tend to follow this perspective (e.g. Evans 1996; Hofferth & 
Iceland 1998; Fedderke et al. 1999). However, some researchers have pointed out that 
there are downsides of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, restrictions on individual 
freedom and business initiative, and downward leveling norms (Portes & Landolt 
1996; Portes 1998). Sheri Berman (1997a, 1997b) also criticized the optimistic 
attitude of neo-Tocquevilleans, such as Robert Putnam, towards political consequence 
of social capital. Based on her examination of the experience of the Weimar Republic 






are most important for social capital to promote governance. She further suggests that 
“under certain circumstances associationism and the prospects for democratic stability 
can actually be inversely related.” (1997a:401) Robert Putnam (2000) himself, in his 
later studies, also paid attention to the possible negative consequences of social 
capital. Therefore, the social capital that serves “civic community” and lead to good  
governance should be positive in nature. However, in this study, I employ the concept 
of social capital to refer to the networks and norms, which could be both positive and 
negative. 
The concept of social capital has been introduced to Chinese studies. In 
contrast, the most relevant Chinese concept of guanxi refers to private and informal 
ties that are based on the norms of reciprocity and trust, and can be utilized to obtain 
desired goods from others (Huang 2003:12). Generally, guanxi is instrument-oriented, 
by which two persons exchange favors, but it also involves personal affection 
(ganqing). According to Andrew Walder (1986), guanxi relationships range on the 
continuum from the pure expression of friendship to ceremonialized bribery in terms 
of the extent that personal affection is involved (also see Yan 1996:17). In the 
traditional Chinese society, as many research have implied, “particularlism”-based 
guanxi was the hidden dynamics that facilitate cooperation among social members 
(Fei 1947; Parsons 1949; Liang 1963; Hwang 1987). In contemporary Chinese studies, 
some scholars considered guanxi as social capital (e.g. Luo 2000). However, Huang 
Qihai (2003) pointed out that there are many differences between these two concepts. 
Regarding guanxi as individual ties that are based on the norms of reciprocity and 
trust between two persons, he finds that the elements of social capital and guanxi 






reciprocity and trust. Furthermore, both are invoked to facilitate cooperation among 
actors. However, there are also essential differences, the most significant of which is 
that guanxi is based on interperaonal or special trust while social capital at community 
level is based on generalized or institutional trust (Huang 2003). 9  Moreover, guanxi 
is only personal connections in character and is associated with the realm of private 
benefits (e.g.Yang 1994; Yan 1996; Bian 1994, 1997). In contrast, social capital can 
be both private goods (Bourdieu 1986; Burt 1992, 1997, 1999; Astone et al 1999), and 
“public goods” (Putnam 1993a; Fukuyama 1995a, 1995b; Evans 1996; Huang 2003). 
In addition, in contemporary China, some public communication and participation 
channels such as the mass media can be utilized to connect ordinary citizens to the 
state and to facilitate collective action (later discussion, see Chapter Five). This type 
of “public vertical network” is beyond the connotation of guanxi, but is included 
under the rubric of “linking social capital.” Therefore, the concept of guanxi does not 
cover all the horizontal and vertical networks and generalized trust that facilitate 
collective cooperation. Actually, existing research has identified that the connotation 
of guanxi is most close to Bourdieu’s notion of social capital although it also overlaps 
with those of Coleman and Putnam (Huang 2003:21). This implies that the 
deployment of guanxi by different actors for the same target may result in the exercise 
of certain kinds of exploitation, and thus conflicts among them. 
As mentioned above, in present urban neighborhoods, actors usually tend to 
utilize informal social networks to participate in local politics and neighborhood 
governance. But most of such networks may be guanxi instead of positive social 
capital in nature. In particular, the networks between local officials and businessmen 
                                                 
9 institutional trust refers to citizens’ trust to stable and satisfactorily performing institutions (Luhmann 






more often reflect the exchange of power and financial resources instead of 
generalized trust among them (Wank 1995, 1999; Brunn 1995). RCs actively build 
networks with resident activists just to get assistance from the latter to facilitate their 
management in sub-neighborhoods (Read 2003a). Many residents participate in 
neighborhood governance because of “thin reciprocity” with RC staff. Due to the 
prevalence of utilitarianism, these networks are more interest-oriented rather than 
affection-oriented. Consequently, it is hard to develop these social connections into 
positive social capital. Therefore, the model of quasi-civic community hypothesizes 
that neighborhood politics in authoritarian China is guanxi-based. 
In sum, this model aims to describe and explain the state of neighborhood 
governance and power relations at the base level as a whole. It hypothesizes that, 
generally, there are much more interactions among neighborhood actors than before; 
in some sub-neighborhoods with high civicness or large quantity of social networks, 
citizens develop autonomy and are empowered to some extent. However, such social 
networks that promote the development are guanxi ties instead of positive social 
capital in nature, and they may unfortunately impede neighborhood democracy and 
good governance. Therefore, this kind of relatively developed neighborhoods are 
“quasi-civic community” instead of “civic community” in character. Most China’s 
neighborhoods still range on the continuum from the complete domination of local 
authorities and integral power structure to “quasi-civic community”.           
Since very few studies systematically examined power relations in 
neighborhoods and the dynamics of neighborhood governance, this study is meant to 
fill this gap. The present study could lead to a better understanding of  citizens’ 
political life at the neighborhood level in contemporary urban China and local 






Overview of the Thesis  
The next chapters are as follows: Chapter Two introduces the fieldwork sites 
and discusses the methodology. Chapter Three focuses on examining the process of 
community building and the formation of local pro-image coalition in neighborhoods. 
It describes the formal institutional changes initiated by the state. It further explores 
the ways that local authorities manage neighborhoods and establish their domination 
together with business groups. Based on a survey conducted in two neighborhoods, 
Chapter Four gives a quantitative description of the differences of the neighborhoods 
in terms of governance performance. It then provides a preliminary explanation for 
such difference with the state of civicness, which is shaped by the quantity and quality 
of social capital in the community. Chapter Five examines a case of community 
movement, which represents civil participation in informal ways. Examining the ways 
that residents employed social capital to mobilize support to affect local decision-
making, it displays the complex interaction relations between the state, local 
authorities, business groups and citizens. Chapter Six identifies the performance and 
problems of local democratic reforms of civil associations. It discusses both the 
positive and negative influences of these associations towards local governance. 
Chapter Seven summarizes the findings in this research and highlights the relations 







Chapter Two: Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed drastic transformation of contemporary China’s 
neighborhood politics. To understand the dynamics of local governance, we need to 
conduct in-depth investigation on the complicated power relations among government 
agencies, commercial organizations, citizen associations and ordinary citizens in 
urban neighborhoods. 
The primary aim of this research is to identify the main factors affecting 
neighborhood governance and their operating mechanisms by investigating the 
consequences of community building projects. Hypothesizing that state authority and 
social capital are two main factors affecting local governance, this study probes the 
impact of the formal institutions set up by the state regarding community building, 
and the state of civicness, which is shaped by the quantity and quality of social capital 
in the community, on neighborhood politics. In particular, it examines the specific 
interactions among local political actors and explores the main factors that influence 
such interactions in four sub-neighborhoods over an extended period of time from 
2000 to 2005.  
In the following sections, I first discuss my research methods. Next, I explain 
the case selection and operationalize the study; and, finally, I discuss my data sources 
and fieldwork experiences. 
Research Methods: Survey and Comparative Case Study  
As Andrew Bennett (1999) pointed out, a convincing explanation of causal 






mechanisms.10 Among many research methods, survey and comparative study excel 
in identifying causal effects and enhance the reliability of research. In contrast, case 
study is suitable to be used to explore those factors that are not obviously identified 
and may be ignored otherwise. It can also be used to shed light on the complicated 
causal mechanisms among various factors. Another advantage of using the method of 
case study is that researchers can employ many kinds of data such as interview, 
secondary literature and field observation. A case study usually has high validity. In 
other words, the methods of comparative study and case study can enhance the causal 
explanation of a phenomenon from different aspects (see Lijphart 1971; Bennett 1999; 
Bennett & George 1997, 2000). Therefore, the method of comparative case study can 
be employed to integrate the advantages of comparative study and case study, and to 
resolve their respective limitations. In particular, the method of comparative study can 
be utilized to identify the main social factors affecting research objectives while the 
method of case study can be employed to display the specific causal mechanisms and 
interaction traces among social factors or variables (Bennett & George 1997; Bennett 
1999). 
Existing studies suggest that, except for macro socio-political conditions, the 
policy of local authorities, the formation of residential buildings, the socio-economic 
characteristics of local population and social networks usually influence local politics 
(Read 2000; Oliver 2001; Leyden 2002). Thus, to explore the role of social capital, 
there is a need to conduct a comparative study in neighborhoods which have similar 
environments, residential patterns, the same local governmental policies, and 
demographic characteristics, so that these factors can be controlled.  
                                                 
10 “Causal mechanism” refers to “the causal processes and intervening variables through which causal 







Further, in order to explore the causal effect and causal mechanisms among 
neighborhood governance, civicness, and state authority and social capital in this 
research, I combine the methods of survey investigation and comparative case study. 
In particular, on the one hand, I conducted a survey to evaluate the performance of 
neighborhood governance and the state of civicness in urban neighborhoods, and to 
obtain some clues about the relations between them. On the other hand, this study 
relies more on qualitative investigation to explore the dynamics of neighborhood 
politics; and, I adopt the method of comparative case study to examine the causal 
mechanisms among these main social factors. By comparing the governance 
performance of two sub-neighborhoods with each other, we can control the effects of 
minor factors and concentrate on main factors that affect neighborhood politics.  
Case Selection and Background of the Neighborhood  
In China’s urban territorial management system, sub-neighborhood (xiaoqu) is 
the basic unit for the state to implement local administration. Through the RC in every 
sub-neighborhood, the state and its agencies regularly interact with the citizens. As 
residents in the same sub-neighborhood are generally bonded with one another, there 
are many opportunities for them to participate in collective action together. For 
example, they collectively vote in the RC election and participate in entertainment 
activities organized by their RC. Therefore, I look at a sub-neighborhood as the unit 
of analysis for this study of urban grassroots politics. 
I chose a Shanghai neighborhood constituted by four sub-neighborhoods for 
my fieldwork because of the following reasons. On the one hand, as the biggest city 
and the economic center of China, Shanghai has been leading the country in urban 
renewal and community building practice since the mid-1990s; its experiences have 






Shanghai can help us better understand drastic social changes and the impact of 
community building on urban grassroots governance in China. On the other hand, 
Shanghai is the place of origin of the Chinese Communist Party. The study of the 
transformation of the grassroots governance in Shanghai can help us better understand 
the changes in communist practice in urban China.  
Since the mid-1980s, Shanghai has initiated large-scale urban renewal projects. 
The city has built many new houses to resettle the citizens who were shifted from the 
downtown area; these homes for resettled residents are called “resettlement homes” 
(dongqianfang). Estate developers also constructed many new housing complexes for 
sale. Some of them were bought by individuals on the emerging housing market, 
which are called “commodity homes” (shangpinfang); many others were collectively 
purchased by state-owned work units for their employers, which are called “work-unit 
homes” (danweifang) (also see Cao & Li 2000; Read 2003b:39). Therefore, these new 
residential neighborhoods include residents from different employers and socio-
economic backgrounds. Unlike the old-style Shanghai lanes, most of the residential 
neighborhoods developed in the 1980s and the early 1990s feature relatively 
integrated design and are composed of a group of apartment-blocks. These 
neighborhoods are called “new villages” (xincun). Since the mid-1990s, the city has 
initiated the privatization of public-owned houses, and it has encouraged the 
occupants of “resettlement homes” and “work-unit homes” to buy their homes, 
usually at very low price (also see Wang and Murie 1996). All these privatized homes 
are called “sold public homes”. Besides, since the mid-1990s, estate developers have 
begun to develop many well-designed condominium complexes for sale on the market 






        Therefore, residential neighborhoods in Shanghai can be generally classified into 
“three worlds” (Gu 2000). “The first world” refers to the new neighborhoods with 
condominiums that were developed after the mid-1990s; they are generally of high 
quality. In these neighborhoods, there are professional property management 
companies that provide services such as sanitation, security, maintenance and ground-
keeping for the residents. “The second world” refers to those neighborhoods 
constituted by “sold public homes” and early “commodity homes” that were 
developed in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Compared to those new condominium 
neighborhoods, they are relatively out of date in terms of designs. In the 
neighborhoods of “the second world”, services are provided by some property 
management companies which were transformed from the former state-owned 
housing maintenance bureaus. But the services are generally not so good. Before 
urban renewal, most residential neighborhoods in Shanghai, which are called 
Shanghai-style lanes, were outmoded and shabby.  Residents lived in crowded space 
with many families sharing toilets and kitchens, and the RCs there were responsible 
for providing the services to residents. The existing shabby old-style neighborhoods 
belong to “the third world”. As one RC director told me, in different neighborhoods, 
residents respond to their RCs differently: “In the first world, they (residents) just 
ignore you (the RC); in the second world, some would interact and cooperate with 
you, others not; in the third world, many of them closely interact with you”. The 
reason is that most residents in “the third world” belong to the low-income group and 
they have to rely on the RCs for services and social welfare. Those living in “the first 
world” belong to the high-income groups; they can get services from the property 
management company, and they do not need a RC at all. Presently, most Shanghai 






Neighborhood, where I conducted my fieldwork study, is a typical neighborhood of 
“the second world”. 
          Before the end of the 1980s, most Shanghai citizens lived in the Shanghai-style 
lanes, where there were generally few green spaces or plants in neighborhoods. With 
urban renewal, many downtown residents were resettled to suburbs. They felt both 
happy and anxious. While they would have had the opportunity to live in more 
spacious houses and better environments provided by the government and estate 
developers, most of the new residential neighborhoods were distant from the city 
center,  making it  inconvenient for them to go to work. To compensate them, the 
government provided many newly-built residential neighborhoods for resettled 
citizens to choose from. Green Neighborhood, developed from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, was one of them. It is located in the W Street, PN district, Shanghai. 
As a newly-built residential neighborhood, Green Neighborhood has many 
green spaces. It is divided into four sub-neighborhoods, two in the north (GI and GII) 
and two in the south (GIII and GIV). In GIII and GIV are 150 six-storied apartment 
buildings surrounded by bamboos. In GI and GII, in addition to 64 six-storied 
buildings, there are twelve twenty-six-storied buildings surrounding approximately 
8,000 square meters of open ground, planned for a central community park. Most of 
the planned park is located in GII.  









The four sub-neighborhoods are quite similar to one another in terms of living 
environment. There were 3560 registered residents in GI, 3458 in GII, 4240 in GIII 
and 3807 in GIV in 2002. The low-building area of Green Neighborhood was mainly  
composed of “resettlement homes” and “work-unit homes”. As far as the GI high-
building area was concerned, 68.0% of the residents living in No.1 High-building and 
87.5% of the residents living in No.2 High-building occupied “resettlement homes”. 
Most homes of No.3 High-building were sold to foreigners, and they were beyond the 
local administration. In No.4 High-building, there is a mix of “resettled homes” 
(32.0%) and many “work-unit homes” (44.0%), some of which are occupied by 
middle-ranking officials. This building is thus called “cadre building”. In No.5 High-
building, except many “work-unit homes” (53.8%) and “resettlement homes” (30.8%), 
there are also some early “commodity homes” (15.4%). In GII high buildings, the 
composition of homes is broadly similar to those of GI.  
Generally, the residents living in GI and GII high buildings are heterogeneous 
in terms of their career, socio-economic makeup and level of education as well. 
However, they are distinguished from other local residents living in low buildings, 
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who are generally at lower socio-economic status and education level. This will be 
illustrated later. In each sub-neighborhood, there is a RC administering the residents. 
Since the mid-1990s, some property management companies have emerged to 
provided housing management and maintenance services for residents.  
The main difference between these four sub-neighborhoods could be the state 
of civicness and social capital, for my investigation suggests that there are different 
quantity and quality of social networks as well as different levels of trust within them. 
Furthermore, the political “production” of these four sub-neighborhoods is diverse. 
For example, there was a ten-year community movement that resisted the attempts by 
an estate development company and the local government to occupy the community 
park between GI and GII successively. Residents in these two neighborhoods reacted 
quite differently to the movement. The larger part of the park is located in GII, and it 
is therefore expected to be of more concern to their residents. However, most protest 
activists were residents in GI, and their role was much more important than those in 
GII.  
Another example concerns HCs in these sub-neighborhoods. During the period 
of the community movement, several HCs were established and well-organized in GI. 
They always held dialogues with the local government, the housing management 
company, the Party branch and the RC. They were so influential in the movement that 
the local government claimed that they would be more threatening to the government 
authority than the Falungong organizations.11 In the other three sub-neighborhoods 
where HCs were not well-organized, the service of property management companies 
                                                 
11 It is a religious association that emerged in the 1990s and recruited hundreds and thousands of 
people. It established many grassroots branches in both urban and rural areas. It has proclaimed by the 
state to be an evil religious organization in 1999; many of its members have been arrested since then 






were not satisfactory to residents. However, the prosperity of HC activities in GI also 
led to endless factional conflicts in the sub-neighborhood finally.  
As civil associations in GI and its residents’ reactions to local political affairs 
are quite different from those of the other three sub-neighborhoods, this study focuses 
on the transformation of neighborhood politics in GI in the context of community 
building. Furthermore, as GII is especially similar to GI in terms of their main internal 
characteristics such as building types and the socio-economic characteristics of 
residents, a comparative study of GI and GII will be conducted. 
Operationalization of the Research 
As mentioned above, I conducted a survey to explore the relations between the 
performance of local governance and civicness. In the survey, I evaluated the 
performance of local governance using seven indicators: the penetration of RC in sub-
neighborhoods, community participation, the residents’ perceptions of community 
services, property management and safety, neighbor relationships, empowerment and 
community. I evaluated civicness using five indicators: the vibrancy of associational 
life, residents’ consciousness of laws, social networks among residents, their 
understanding of local public affairs and their reaction to government policies (the 
reason for adopting these indicators to evaluate governance performance and 
civicness will be discussed in Chapter Four).  One or two questions were designed to 
reflect each indicator. An index score for each answer was created, ranging from one 
point (for instance, “no’’ influence from the RC) to three points (“large” influence) or 
from one point (for instance, “very dissatisfied” with something) to five points (“very 
satisfied”). Regression analysis was conducted to discover the link among these social 






 I adopted qualitative methods to examine the role of formal institutions and 
informal social capital in neighborhood politics and community power structure.  
Given the several dimensions of power (Lukes 1974), I evaluated the state of 
community power by probing the following questions: first, who can shape people’s 
cognition, perceptions and preferences in the field of neighborhood politics? Second, 
who can manipulate the local political agenda? Third, who can participate in the 
decision-making processes of important local affairs?  
To evaluate the first dimension of community power, I interviewed 
government officials, leaders of community organizations and ordinary citizens. 
Specifically, I asked about their viewpoints on certain issues relating to neighborhood 
politics. To evaluate the second dimension of community power, I extensively 
observed and interviewed all social groups within the neighborhoods. I explored why 
some projects and events were featured in the local political agenda while others got 
ignored. To evaluate the third dimension of community power, I examined both the 
formal institutions in neighborhoods and the actual decision-making processes of 
important local affairs that affected the interests of those main actors. By examining 
the actual decision-making processes, we can identify the “real” power holders and 
related interaction networks which were responsible for the decision-making. 
Integrating these three aspects, we can decide who were really influential in 
neighborhood politics. I also asked some respondents to recall their past viewpoints of 
certain neighborhood issues and compared them with their present viewpoints to see 
the changes of local politics. 
I paid much attention to how the state attempted to perform its grassroots 
administration through initiating community building projects; how it establish formal 






also attended meetings of local government officials and other neighborhood activities 
to see how government formally or informally wielded power in the neighborhoods. 
Eighteen local officials were interviewed about neighborhood issues and their 
relationships with other actors. Local businessmen, members of civil associations and 
citizens were also interviewed about their interactions with local government 
agencies, and their attitudes towards local officials. Local government documents 
were examined to understand their power practice.  
The role of social capital in neighborhood politics was investigated via the 
decision-making processes of certain important public affairs and how residents 
utilized both their horizontal networks and vertical ties with others to participate in 
such processes. Through the open-ended interviews, I learned from local people’s 
recollection of influential community events to gain understanding of their viewpoints 
on local issues.  
Focusing on a few influential political events in the sub-neighborhoods, I 
examined the informal ways by which actors participated in neighborhood politics. 
Specifically, I explored how actors interacted with each other regarding the earlier-
mentioned movement. Residents succeeded in their resistance against the attempts of 
the local government to occupy the community park in the end.  This movement 
provides a good empirical case to reflect on the change of community power structure. 
Historically, it was almost impossible for citizens to win in their collective resistance 
against government agencies in communist China. I explored the role of the vertical 
link between some municipal government agencies and the resident protestors by 
interviewing the main participants of the movement, and I also checked many relevant 






I examined formal channels for citizens to participate in neighborhood politics 
by investigating their participation in the elections of local civil associations such as 
RCs and HCs. Other than voting rate, the most important indicators of participation 
are the extent to which citizens can affect the operation of these civil associations and 
the extent to which these associations themselves can represent the interests of 
residents and participate in the crucial local decision-making. Residents were asked: 
“Are you familiar with members of the RC (or the HC)?” “Did you actually 
participate in the decision-making of the RC (or the HC)?”  I also interviewed 
members of the RCs and the HCs: “Do you call for opinions of residents before you 
make a decision on important issues?” To evaluate the extent of which these 
associations participate in local decision-making processes, I examine the decision-
making processes of a few important local events and investigated the role of RCs and 
HCs in such events, i.e. whether they positively participated in decision-making and 
articulated the interests of residents. 
I also explored the role of social capital in the election of these associations by 
asking residents the following questions: “If you attended the election before, why did 
you vote for certain person? Was it because of your personal relations (guanxi) with 
him or her, or something else? Would you expect him or her to return your favor 
(renqing) when he or she holds power?” Members of the RCs and the HCs were asked 
the following questions: “Did you make use of your guanxi to mobilize familiar 
residents to support you in the election? And how did you do it?” I also observed how 
members of these associations utilized their networks with residents and colleagues to 







The examination of these community events reflects the actor-actor relations, 
actor-event relations and event-event relations within these neighborhoods, which 
could be very helpful for us to understand the community power structure and the 
dynamics of neighborhood politics.  
Data Sources 
Many researchers adopt traditional data collection methods like survey and 
interviews to directly obtain information from research subjects. However, there are 
some methodological weaknesses with these kinds of methods because they can lead 
to errors from both respondents and investigators. Specifically, these methods “create 
attitudes in part because respondents commonly try to manage impressions of 
themselves in order to maintain their standing in the eyes of an interviewer.” (Lee 
2000:2; also see Webb et al. 1966; Campbell & Russo 2001: 146-156) Therefore, 
Webb et al (1966) recommended “unobtrusive measures” such as physical traces, 
archival material and participant observation. They suggested that, except for 
interviews and questionnaires, researchers can also study the experiences, attitude and 
belief of people by watching what they do and examining various kinds of physical 
evidence, written and spoken documents (see Lee 2000:1-2). They also argued that 
“data collection methods used singly are inferior to the use of multiple methods” (Lee 
2000:6). Therefore, these researchers suggested that researchers should combine 
unobtrusive measures with the traditional methods (Webb et a, 1966; Lee 2000; 
Campbell & Russo 2001).  
In studying China, most researchers collected data mainly from the following 
sources: 1) survey; 2) files and statistics from government agencies; 3) media report; 
and 4) non-participant observation and interviews. However, many of them use these 






supported by the authorities. To conduct research in China, many urban researchers 
then seek the support of local government agencies, usually with the help of RCs, to 
conduct questionnaire interviews. Although some surveys may be well designed and 
respondents are randomly sampled, the RCs, as many RC staff told me, seldom 
bothered to follow the random principle. Instead, they usually asked any residents 
available to answer questionnaires. Therefore, it will be misleading to generalize the 
finding of such surveys. Government statistics, as Yongshun Cai (2000) convincingly 
demonstrated, are usually seriously manipulated. Since the government still imposes 
restrictions on the mass media, the latter usually have to follow official instructions; 
and many media reports are thus distorted. As one of my interviewees, who is a 
journalist in Jiefang Daily in Shanghai, told me, “The media always follow the 
government; you can not always believe their reports.” However, since the 1990s, 
strict government control over the mass media has been relatively relaxed. With 
government’s permission, some media began to report social events as they really are. 
But the reliability of such reports still needs to be carefully ascertained.  
As to interviews, especially those that involve sensitive topics, their reliability 
is dependent on many conditions. There was a typical debate on this issue. Mayfair 
Yang (1994), based on her long participant observation, claimed that Chinese people 
employ “guanxi ” in almost every aspect of life. However, Douglas Guthrie (1999), 
based on his interviews with many businessmen on public occasions, argued that, with 
the policy of Opening and Reform, Chinese businessmen relied primarily on official 
means instead of informal “guanxi” in their business practice. Therefore, he 
concluded that “guanxi” practice was declining in the economic life of Chinese people. 
Obviously, as Mayfair Yang pointed out, there is a serious reliability problem with 






employed guanxi because such practice has always been discouraged by the 
government and are thus a sensitive topic (Yang 2002). Therefore, a researcher who 
utilizes these data sources, should be very cautious of the potential reliability problem 
with them. 
Keeping these facts in mind, I collected data for this study mainly from the 
following four sources. The first one was my direct observations and experiences in 
Green Neighborhood. To deeply understand the social life in a community, it is 
necessary to do long non-participant observation. Non-participant observation not 
only makes us familiar with community members and obtain their cooperation, but 
also helps us see the actual interactions among actors in the community. Through non-
participant observation, we may find out how social networks, trust and norms are 
constructed and utilized in the field of neighborhood politics. I lived in Green 
Neighborhood for more than one and a half years. During this period, I attended all 
kinds of neighborhood meetings, festivals and other activities; I observed networks 
and human relationships amongst residents on these occasions. I also participated in 
the activities of local organizations such as the Street Office, RCs, HCs and property 
management companies in Green Neighborhood in order to observe how they 
interacted with one another. Through non-participant observation, I learned a lot 
about the power relations among these community actors, which also helped me 
evaluate the reliability of my interviews. 
The second source is in-depth interviews. To understand the past events in the 
community as well as people’s attitudes and motivations of participating in local 
affairs, we have to extensively listen to their representations of these events and 
interactions. With non-participant observation, I identified important informants for 






reporters, leaders of neighborhood associations such as RCs and HCs, and ordinary 
residents. Based on my familiarity with them (more on this later), I interviewed them 
about their experiences with and attitudes towards with past community events. Due 
to the sensitivity of some topics such as personal relationships or power contest 
among community actors, most of the interviews were conducted in private places 
such as my home or the interviewees’ homes. In these interviews, they talked to me 
about many influential local events. These open-ended interviews allowed me to gain 
a perspective on all parties’ behavior and helped me understand them from an 
insider’s stance. I compared the interviews about the same events against one another 
to judge the reliability. In addition, having worked for two RCs and a Street Office in 
the past five years, my wife knew very well about the reality of neighborhood 
governance in Shanghai; her experience helped me greatly in my fieldwork study. 
The third source is relevant official documents and media reports. From 
personal entails, I managed to network with some local officials in order to access 
many government documents about community building and influential events within 
Green Neighborhood. The materials reflect official expectations on these issues. I also 
collected many relevant media reports, which could partly reflect civil opinions over 
these issues. I further evaluated the reliability of these materials with my own 
observations and interviews. 
The fourth source is the community survey. In this survey, residents were 
asked about the period of residence in their neighborhood, educational level, income, 
human relationships, networks, evaluation of the community, community 
participation and attitudes to community resistance. With the assistance and 
introduction from the RCs, the questionnaire interviews were conducted by my 






Table 2.1 Socio-economic characteristic of the respondents in GI and GII 




Female 48.6% 46.7% Sex 
Male 51.4% 53.3% 
No 73.1% 76.2% Membership 
of The CCP Yes 26.9% 23.8% 
16-29  11.9% 15.9% 
30-44 25.9% 16.8% 
45-59 39.5% 21.8% 
 
Age  
60 and beyond 22.7% 45.5% 
less than  middle school 3.8% 4.4% 
middle and high school 56.2% 84.5% 
 
Education 
college and beyond 40.0% 11.1% 
relatively high 29.6% 17.5% 
middle  34.1% 25.0% 
Family 
income 
relatively low 36.3% 57.5% 
ordinary working staff 61.2% 73.3% Job position 
senior staff 38.8% 26.7% 
 
The survey result shows that there was large variation in terms of socio-
economic characteristic of the respondents. In addition, the employed residents in 
Green Neighborhood included factory workers, private businessmen, teachers, 
government officials, and entrepreneurs.  
Fieldwork 
The Chinese society and political system are quite sensitive to “outsiders”. 
Any “outsiders” who attempt to learn about the detailed socio-political life of a 
community are closely watched by the local people, including government officials 
and residents. Local administrators usually only welcome those “outsiders” who 






they dislike those who may pay attention to local “downsides”. Therefore, they 
usually discourage outside researchers from conducting in-depth research in the 
communities under their jurisdiction in case the latter find “downsides”, especially 
problems of local administration. Those researchers who fail to get approval to study 
the communities are often turned away. To avoid potential troubles for themselves, 
local residents would not talk about relatively sensitive topics such as local politics to 
outsiders. They usually selectively provide information to researchers dependent on 
the degree of their familiarity with the latter.  
As a result, an “outsider” researcher has to “go into” the community through 
approved channels and provide good justification for the research activities there. 
Therefore, it is necessary to build and employ guanxi networks with local people, 
which I managed to do. Since this is a longitudinal study on a neighborhood, I 
conducted many fieldwork trips in order to follow its changes in the past five years. 
 
The 2000 investigation 
In 1999, the PN district government chose four RCs to conduct the 
experimental reform of “three-self” RC election (see Shi 2005). The GIV RC was 
selected for its “successful experience” in community building. Because the reform 
was regarded as the first experiment of grassroots democratic reform in Shanghai 
neighborhoods, it received extensive attention.  
Interested in community development, I hoped to find out whether this reform 
would promote grassroots democratization or the emergence of “civil society” in 
urban China. With the introduction of my former supervisor, who is an influential 






Community Development Research Association and the PN district government to 
investigate the consequences of the reform. We went to Green Neighborhood in 
January, 2000; I lived there for seven months.  
During this period, I gradually got familiar with many local government 
officials, RC staff and residents. I also helped local community organizations and 
some residents to do many things, such as dealing with computer documents, taking 
photos and writing letters for illiterate aged residents. In many ways, I made friends 
with them and gained their trust. Naturally, they talked to me about the movement 
which was very influential to the local community but unexplored by “outsiders”. 
Through the introduction of Head of GIV HC, I got acquainted with the primary 
leader of the movement, Mr Shen, who was also head of No.1 Building HC. At that 
time, Shen had been experiencing a series of setbacks in the movement (see details in 
Chapter Five). He and other movement activists were eager to look for potential 
audience to publicize their “just” resistance. They were glad to know that I was 
interested in studying the movement.  
Initially, Shen was a little suspicious of my motives in entering the 
communities due to my “official” background. However, like other local people, after 
many times of interaction, he understood that I am a neutral researcher who strived 
for thoroughness in my study of grassroots communities. I also introduced a family 
teacher to his daughter and many of my friends to him. We became friends and had 
good “guanxi” with each other. We exchanged small presents, visited homes and 
provided meals for each other. He not only told me the entire story of the movement 
in detail, but also provided me with all his files. Mr. Shen was proud of what he had 
done in the community. He asked me to be his “secretary” to record the public events 






community. Due to his introduction, many other activists also accepted my interviews 
and talked frankly to me about their viewpoints. The local government also permitted 
me to study the movement because they hoped that I could figure out solutions to this 
kind of community conflicts. I also attempted to interview many local people 
including officials, RC staff and residents who had diverse standpoints on this 
movement.  
After the first phase of fieldwork, I returned to my university to finish my 
master’s degree study. After graduation, I got a job as a municipal government 
official and worked on community building. Therefore, I had the opportunity to read 
many government files on community building. I also obtain a deeper understanding 
of local administration including that of Green Neighborhood. 
 
The 2002 survey and fieldwork 
While working for the municipal government, I kept on contacting people in 
Green Neighborhood. I often attended important local meetings and talked to local 
people during my spare time. With the help of the GI RC and the GII RC, I also 
conducted a survey in GI and GII in January, 2002. Due to limited fund and time, it 
was impossible to conduct a large-scale community survey. Therefore, I limited the 
sample of this survey to 200 persons. The main objective of this survey was to collect 
some basic information of local residents and their community life, and to get some 
clues on possible links among social factors, which could be a guild for my non-
participant observation and in-depth interviews.  When I initiated my research in 
Green Neighborhood, the community movement was still going on in GI and GII and 
primarily involved those residents living in the high buildings near the park. I was 






groups, and thus chose the residents above 16-year old living in the high buildings as 
my sample. Specifically, there were 1422 GI residents and 1635 GII residents above 
16 years old living in the high buildings. I randomly sampled 100 residents in each 
group. Before conducting the interviews, the interviewers were introduced to the 
respondents by RC staff or heads of resident groups. We also sent the interviewees 
small presents to express our gratitude for their cooperation. In the end, I received 185 
questionnaires (91 from GI and 94 from GII) that were well answered. To obtain basic 
information about the residents living in low buildings, I also elicited the support of 
GI RC and the GII RC to non-randomly interview 30 residents above 16 years old 
living there with the same questionnaire in each sub-neighborhood.12 I received a total 
of 45 questionnaires that were well answered. The surveys enabled me to obtain much 
background information about the local people before conducting in-depth interviews; 
they also allowed me to deduce some links among much less relevant social factors. 
And all tentative conclusions were further examined by my intensive observations and 
interviews.  
I also requested those respondents who would like to talk to me more about 
their community to write down their contact numbers on the questionnaires. 83 
respondents, 45 in GI and 38 in GII, did so as requested. In March 2002, I quit the 
government job and moved to GI until June 2002. I contacted the 83 residents and 
finally conducted in-depth interviews with 76 of them one-on-one. Some of them had 
become my friends, with whom I have kept contacts. I also employed other personal 
relationships in my field research. For example, when the vice head of 1308 HC 
happened to know that I was a student of his close friend, a professor in my university, 
he provided me with much frank information about the community. The main topic of 
                                                 






interviews during my fieldwork at that time was primarily about the community 
movement. My interviews included three main questions: 1) What did you know 
about the movement? 2) What did you do, or what are you going to do in the 
movement? and why? 3) What is your opinion on the movement and those parties 
involved in the movement? After this phase of the fieldwork, I started my doctoral 
studies at NUS. 
 
The 2003 and 2004 fieldwork 
In recent years, China’s urban neighborhoods have been experiencing rapid 
changes. Especially, as the main civil associations in the neighborhoods, HCs have 
become increasingly influential in urban grassroots communities. There also have 
emerged many controversies and conflicts relating to the associations , reflecting the 
transformation of local politics. In November 2003, I returned to the neighborhood to 
investigated community development in recent years. I visited local officials, RC staff 
and residents, sent them small presents, and invited them to tea, lunch or dinner. Most 
of my respondents answered sensitive questions about local politics frankly in private 
sessions. For example, some of them always told me:  “Because you are our own 
person (insider, or zijiren), I will tell you the truth…”  
In 2004, the law on property management and HCs was revised and enforced 
by the state. Shanghai thus conducted a new round of HC elections. Local 
governments, Party branches and housing management companies tried to manipulate 
the elections. Some residents strongly resisted such manipulation. In June 2004, the 
HC elections was organized in Green Neighborhood; the elections became the focus 






procedure; I observed the propaganda of the government about the election, the 
establishment and operation of election committees in these neighborhoods and the 
actual election activities.  
I also conducted comprehensive interviews to learn the plans of the 
neighborhood actors for participating in the election of HCs, and the main factors 
affecting their participation. These intensive observation and interviews enabled me to 
understand a lot about how the actors competed in the elections and forged power 
relations with one another. 
 
2005 and 2006 interviews 
During my 2004 fieldwork, some HCs in Green Neighborhood were elected 
under the manipulation of the RCs and the Street Office. However, some former 
movement activists in GI strongly resisted such manipulation; and the elections of 
their HCs were delayed again and again. I went back to the fieldwork site in June and 
July 2005, and February 2006; and I visited some of my main informants and 
conducted 12 interviews, which helped me learn a lot about the latest political 
development in Green Neighborhood. 
In sum, this is a study based on a few Shanghai sub-neighborhoods. I will not 
claim that my findings on neighborhood politics are applicable to the whole urban 
China, even the whole Shanghai. Actually, as other researchers have suggested, due to 
the varied situations “from city to city and neighborhood to neighborhood” (Read 
2000: 807), it is very difficult to make generalizations about neighborhood politics in 
urban China. The primary aim of this study is, through detailed description of local 






furthermore, to develop a theoretical framework of urban grassroots politics. This 







Chapter Three: Community Building and the Formation of Local Pro-image 
Coalition in Urban Neighborhoods 
 
Introduction 
As Andrew Walder (1995b) suggested that in post-socialist states, including China, 
changes within political systems themselves should be primarily responsible for social 
transformations and the expansion of public space. Therefore, to understand the 
dynamics of neighborhood politics, we have to first look at the local regime and the 
changes within political systems. However, the way that local regime implements its 
management policy and achieves domination over neighborhoods under the context of 
urban reforms is presently unclear.  
Generally, formal systems define the boundary of a certain political field. 
However, existing research has reminded us of the influence of informal politics and 
the role of personal networks in Chinese political field (e.g. Nathan 1973; Walder 
1986; Dittmer 1995; Wank 1995; Brunn 1995). Therefore, this chapter examines the 
formal institutional changes of urban local administration on the one hand and the 
informal channels that the local regime utilizes to construct its domination on the 
other.  In particular, it addresses the following questions: How have urban reforms, 
especially the community building, affected the functions of the local regime and its 
administration? How does the local regime establish its domination? In the following 
sections, first, I examine the existing research on local regimes. Next, I describe the 
transformation of grassroots governance from the era of command economy to market 
economy in order to provide the setting for further analysis of local regimes in urban 






of local authorities and economic elites, leading to the discussion of their behavior 
pattern regarding neighborhood management. 
Social Transition and China’s Local Regime 
Since the 1980s, socialist China has been experiencing the transition from a 
command economy towards a more market-oriented economy, thus greatly affecting 
local governance. Many studies have examined the transformation of the functions of 
local governments and their behavior pattern in the context of this transition. Before 
the mid-1980s, many local governments were primarily concerned with enforcing 
state policies and promoting balanced community development (Blecher 1991). 
However, later formal institutional changes like decentralization and fiscal reform 
allowed local governments to share “profits” of local economic development, like tax 
revenue, with the central state. They thus became more concerned with economic 
growth rather than social development and attempted to attain economic resources 
with their administrative power (Yang & Su 2002). Researchers have also developed 
a number of models to explain the mechanisms that local states are involved in 
economic activities. Jean Oi (1992, 1995, 1999) explored the relations between local 
governments and the enterprises auxiliary to them. She found that local governments 
have characteristics of modern corporations. Local officials behave like trustees, and 
they intervene in the operation of enterprises, utilizing the political and financial 
resources under their control to support the latter. Therefore, these enterprises grow 
rapidly. She termed this type of symbiotic unity between local governments and 
enterprises as “local corporatism”. Lin Nan (1995) paid much attention to the role of 
informal networks in local political economy. Using the concept of “local market 
socialism”, he highlighted the role of family networks in facilitating the operation of 






of regime theory, some other researchers investigated the redevelopment of China’s 
cities. As Tingwei Zhang (2002) pointed out, in western liberal polities like America, 
business groups dominate in local politics while, in China, there is a strong 
government involvement in development programs at various levels, which often 
assumes the leadership of bureaucracy. His study further “reveals features of the 
socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai in the transitional era: a regime 
characterized by a strong local government followed by cooperative nonpublic sectors 
with excluded community organizations.” (ibid, p475) 
Unfortunately, while most of these existing research focused on the 
involvement of local pro-growth coalition in promoting economic development, very 
little attention has been paid to the way in which local regimes facilitate their 
domination in routine management. This chapter therefore examines how and under 
what conditions local governments and other social forces cope with routine 
management in neighborhoods within the context of Chinese urban reform.  
 
Community Building and the Transformation of Local Governance in Urban 
China 
The local management systems and community power structure in neighborhoods 
in the era of command economy 
Grassroots community is one location where the state directly interacts with 
social forces, especially citizens. To consolidate the regime and to accomplish its 
development strategy, the Party-state endeavored to stabilize and control grassroots 
communities. After the 1949 Revolution, the Party-state attempted to permeate 
grassroots communities and organizations, and gradually established a set of systems 






System and Neighborhood System. Wu Fulong has pointed out that before economic 
reforms, the former three systems were pillars of socialist urban governance:  
“The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is guaranteed 
by the hierarchical party system which is parallel to the administration 
system. Party branches exist at all levels of government, institutions and 
workplaces, and play a leadership role in these organizations. Household 
registration (hukou) effectively requires the registration of the place of 
residence with the public security agency. Tied with food rationing, 
employment permission and other welfare benefits that were not 
purchasable, the system effectively prevented rural peasants from 
moving into the cities” (Wu 2002:1073) 
Among them, the most important was the hierarchical Work-unit System, by 
which the state mobilized citizens to strive for socialist industrialization. Before the 
1990s, most urban citizens were integrated into state-owned or collectivity-owned 
work-units such as factories, shops, schools, hospitals and government agencies at 
different levels. Each work-unit was called a danwei. As many previous studies found, 
these work-units were not only work places, but also main channels by which the state 
served, and imposed control over, urban citizens. In particular, the members of work-
units were granted a lot of privileges and welfare denied to peasants such as secure 
jobs, nearly free housing, free medical care, subsidies for many items and good 
retirement pensions. But the work-units also imposed strong political control over 
their employees because the party branch and the security department at every work-
unit closely monitored their activities, granting rewards to encourage political loyalty 
and sanctioning punishments for politically unacceptable behavior (Lu & Perry 
1997:3, also see Whyte & Parish 1984; Walder 1986; Lu 1989; Shaw 1996). Thus, 
work-units played both political and economic roles in cities and became the center of 






their work-units which could thus effectively manage and control citizens (Walder 
1986). Therefore, the ‘hierarchical’ Work-unit System was the main pillar of the 
routine management of the Party-state in cities (e.g. Hua 2000; Wu 2002). 
The Party-state also utilized neighborhood organizations as the secondary 
governing system to manage the citizens who either did not belong to any work-units 
or had retired from work-units. The administrative system of China’s big cities 
usually includes two levels of government including the municipal government and 
district (qu) governments. Every district government usually set up a few Street 
Offices as its local branches to administer sub-districts (jiedao), each of which usually 
includes several neighborhoods. In contrast to the sociological concept of 
“community” which highlights the common sense of identity, China’s 
“neighborhood” is a more geography-oriented concept. It refers to a geographical area 
which includes hundreds of buildings and is surrounded by some natural boundaries 
such as rivers or broad roads. However, its scale varies from one city to another. In 
Shanghai, a neighborhood may include several lanes (linong) or a new-style urban 
village (jumin xincun), and some public facilities such as schools, shops as well. 
Usually, for a neighborhood of jumin xincun, the population is around several hundred 
thousand.  
To facilitate their administration, Street Offices usually divide a neighborhood 
into several sub-neighborhoods (xiaoqu) and establish a RC in every sub-
neighborhood to help it oversee residents. Each sub-neighborhood is often roughly 
separated from others by walls or fences, and its population ranges from several 
hundreds to several thousands. By the end of 2002, excluding its rural suburbs, urban 
Shanghai comprised 18 district governing 99 Street Offices, which in turn oversaw 






residents”, whose obligations are mainly to serve residents and to help Street Offices 
advertise state policies. Its members should be elected by, and from within, its 
constituents. As one branch of the district government, Street Offices should provide 
operation fund and other forms of support, but has no power to give any order, to RCs 
under its jurisdiction. 13 However, Street Offices and police stations in neighborhoods 
actually supervised the operation of RCs and utilized the latter help them to 
implement state policies, to monitor citizens’ activities in neighborhoods, to organize 
a few residents who did not belong to any work-units for regular political study, and 
to provide a few services to residents as well (Whyte, Vogel & Parish 1977: l86; 
Whyte & Parish 1984; Read 2003a). Therefore, Street Offices have actually integrated 
RCs into part of the grassroots administrative system, which was called the 
Neighborhood System (Xiang & Song 1997).  
The four systems constituted a tight government control network to supervise 
all citizens. As China researchers observed, “In both work-units and in neighborhoods, 
efforts are made by authorities to ensure conformity with official standards of 
behavior.” (Whyte and Parish 1984: 240) Such “administered mass organizations” 
like trade unions and women unions in work-units and RCs in neighborhoods help a 
lot to organize citizens, making China working like a “conscription society” (Kasza 
1995). During the era of command economy, these administrative systems were 
highly effective in terms of social control.  Compared to other world cities, “Chinese 
cities after1949 became remarkably orderly.”(Whyte & Parish 1984: 247) The strict 
state control also resulted in a clear integral hierarchy of community power structure 
in every urban neighborhood, with Street Offices and other government branch 
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agencies, such as police station, housing maintenance bureau, food bureau handling 
all important matters, often with assistance from the RCs (Read 2003b:54; also see 
Whyte & Parish  1984).  





















Community building and the reconstruction of grassroots governance under 
market-oriented reforms  
The implementation of market-oriented urban reforms in the 1990s, including 
those of state-owned enterprises, fiscal system, housing and land, and labor market 
has had imposed great impact on the former urban governing systems, especially the 
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Work-unit System. First, after the initiation of market-oriented reforms, many state-
owned enterprises were unable to compete with private sectors due to their low 
efficiency. 14 Many went bankrupt; others not only dismissed many workers they did 
not need any more, but also reduced the services offered to existing employees to cut 
down management cost. Many workers thus lost their jobs. In Shanghai, the number 
of workers who were laid off from 1991 to 1996 was 1.091 million (Sun et al 
1999:16). Therefore, the Work-unit System characteristic of full employment and full 
social services has been gradually crippled.  
Second, since the 1990s, a new tide of urbanization has arisen in China; many 
cities have initiated urban renewal projects. In 1992, the state decided to push forward 
the opening of Shanghai and to develop it into an international metropolis. With the 
support of the central government, the Shanghai government started to reconstruct the 
city on a large scale. They proclaimed that Shanghai would be improved significantly 
every year and substantially every three years in terms of its image (yinian yige yang, 
sannian da bianyang). Governments at different levels have not only invested heavily 
to reconstruct the infrastructure, but also invited domestic and international investors 
to develop real estates in Shanghai. With the large-scale city renewal, many citizens 
had to be moved from their former residences affiliated to their work-units to newly-
constructed neighborhoods; the total number of resettled families was more than one 
million in the 1990s. 15 
Third, with the labor market reform and economic development, more and 
more citizens worked for private and foreign enterprises instead of state-owned work-
                                                 
14 According to Janos Kornai (1992), due to the system of “soft budget”, socialist state-owned 
enterprises under command economy are deemed to be in low efficiency in terms of their economic 









units. Economic development also attracted a large number of citizens moving from 
rural areas and small cities to developed cities to look for jobs or to conduct business; 
they are called “floating population” (Solinger 1999). In Shanghai, there have been 
millions of “floating population” since the mid-1990s. Therefore, due to urban 
reforms, many former work-unit employees (danwei ren), particularly workers, lost 
their links with the state-owned workplaces. Together with citizens who work in 
private sectors and the “floating” population, they have become simple members of 
the society (shehui ren) that are beyond the control of the Work-unit System (Hua 
2000; Xu ed 2000; Wu 2002). Furthermore, as Wu Fulong pointed out, the 
foundations of the Party-state System in work-units and the Household Registration 
System have also been shaken by reforms. Specifically, to increase efficiency of state-
owned enterprises, the state implemented the system of “manager responsibility” to 
shift more executive discretion from Party branches to professional managers in 
work-units. The Household Registration System aiming to confining rural-urban 
migration and intercity migration was previously related to the provision of welfare 
and jobs through work-units. With the disintegration of the Work-unit System, the 
Household Registration System was also gradually relaxed. Migrants can purchase a 
hukou or acquire it through buying “commodity housing” (see Wu 2002: 1074). 
With the governing capacity based on these systems greatly weakened, the 
Party-state then shifted its main pillar of grassroots management from work-units to 
residential neighborhoods because neighborhoods have “the jurisdictional capacity to 
regulate all activities within the area regardless of their affiliation” (Wu 2002:1080). 
The state required these local territorial agencies to take more management functions 
to regulate new activities taking place outside work-units and to administer citizens 






2000; Yang 2002; Wu 2002). However, before the mid-1990s, local governments and 
RCs had inadequate economic and political resources to fulfill such difficult tasks, 
since the former Neighborhood System was the secondary administrative system. 
Therefore, there were great potentials for social unrest to occur, which would have 
threatened the rule of the Party-state. In many big cities such as Shanghai, there was 
increasing number of citizens complaining (shangfang) to all levels of governmental 
agencies of losing their jobs or being forcibly resettled, which was regarded by the 
Party-state as an indication of social unrest. 
To cope with these challenges, the Party-state launched extensive community 
building projects in big cities to strengthen the Neighborhood System as the main 
control channel. The central government encouraged local governments to explore 
new models of Neighborhood System that suited their local social conditions. 
Therefore, the Shanghai Municipal Government started community building in the 
early 1990s. In particular, the main projects are as follows: 
 
(1) Providing social services, promoting reemployment and poverty reduction  
Before economic reforms, work-units were responsible for providing 
comprehensive social services to most citizens, taking care of them almost “from the 
cradle to the tomb”. Street Offices and RCs only provided services to a few citizens 
who did not belong to any work-unit, and the tasks including baby-sitting, barbering, 
or helping the aged to shop, were much less than those provided by work-units. 
Therefore, the services provided in neighborhoods were few and small of coverage; 
only a few staff of Street Offices and RCs were involved. With the disintegration of 
the Work-unit System and the rise of non-state sectors, more and more citizens could 






neighborhoods for services. To maintain social stability and regime legitimacy, the 
state required Street Offices and RCs to be responsible for providing comprehensive 
social services to the citizens under their jurisdiction. Since the 1992, the Shanghai 
municipal government has regarded “developing community services” as a focal point 
of local administration. Except for state investment, the municipal government also 
required local governments and social organizations to provide fund for developing 
social services. Since then, there has been great enhancement of social services 
provided in neighborhoods, such as everyday health check, barbering, parking, small 
maintenance, consultancy, arts training, professional training and provision of 
information. Many service facilities have also been established. For instance, in each 
neighborhood, the government has established at least one big center providing social 
services to all local residents and several life-care institutions for the aged. 
Furthermore, many Street Offices staff and RC staff have been engaged in this project.  
As mentioned above, since the beginning of the 1990s, a large number of 
workers have been laid off every year. By 2002, the cumulative number of laid-off 
workers was 1.6 million, which was nearly one third of the number of employers in 
state-owned work-units (Yin ed 2004:86). Furthermore, most of these laid-off workers 
have little education, and their skills are outdated for the new economy. It was hard 
for them to find jobs in the labor market by themselves (see Sun et al 1999). Being 
laid-off has thrown many urban families into extreme poverty, which has also 
threatened state legitimacy and social stability. Therefore, the state has initiated many 
reemployment projects in cities. Local governments are required to organize skill 
training programs for laid-off workers, and they enlist RCs in organizing these 
programs, introducing laid-off workers to new jobs and providing job information to 






The state also implements policies of poverty reduction in neighborhoods. 
Specifically, it provides relief subsidies to very poor families; schools also reduce the 
tuition fees of students from poor families. These families can apply for all kinds of 
relief subsidies from local government agencies, while the latter usually expect the 
RCs to investigate whether the applicants are actually poor and to distribute the relief 
subsidies to those approved. According to state policies, local governments should 
distribute relief subsidies to all poor families. However, in reality, due to limited fund, 
many local governments do not approve all applications even if they are well justified.  
 
(2) Conducting “spiritual-civilization building” project 
In the large-scale urban renewal of the 1990s, many neighborhoods were 
reconstructed, residents were resettled, and social networks in old neighborhoods 
were destroyed. As a result, residents did not know one another in new neighborhoods. 
While some fought over small issues, few residents cared about public affairs. 
Citizens were psychologically isolated from their neighborhoods. There also emerged 
a large number of neighborhood criminals. Urban life was thus in relative disorder. 
Consequently, citizens were dissatisfied with local authorities (see Xu ed 2000). 
Therefore, the municipal government was eager to promote community integration to 
keep neighborhoods stable and to enhance their own legitimacy. Besides, the 
orientation towards an international metropolis also caused the government to care 
much about the image-building of neighborhoods. After expansion of social services 
in neighborhoods, the municipal government decided to further launch “spiritual-
civilization building” projects to reconstruct environments in neighborhoods. The 
aims are to restore social order, to improve physical environments, and to build social 






Specifically, the government set up five main criteria to evaluate the 
performance of community building, or “spiritual-civilization building” projects, in 
particular: good public orders, neat and tidy environments, comprehensive social 
services, harmonious neighbor relationships and abundant entertainment activities. 16 
In 2005, the government set up another new criterion--high satisfaction of residents 
with their neighborhoods. 17 These criteria have also been quantitatively 
operationalized into small items that can be measured. Sub-neighborhoods which 
meet these criteria at different level are be granted municipal-rank or district-rank 
honor titles of “Model Quarter” (wenming xiaoqu).  
To promote the enthusiasm of local governments in developing develop 
“Model Quarters”, the municipal government established “committees of ‘spiritual-
civilization building’” at various government levels, constituted by heads of all 
government departments to supervise the implementations of the project. Furthermore, 
it regarded the number and the rank of “Model Quarter” as one main criterion for 
evaluating the management performance of local governments. Therefore, many 
Street Offices invested significantly to build “Model Quarters”. They not only 
endeavor to improve neighborhood environments such as planting greeneries, 
building service facilities, establishing enclosing walls and fences around sub-
neighborhoods to enhance security, but also enthusiastically organize exercise teams 
and host entertainment activities to show how peaceful and harmonious neighborhood 
life is under their jurisdiction. Especially, since the breaking out of the Falungong 
movement in the end of 1999, the state has attached more importance to “spiritual-
civilization building”. It claimed that local governments should “guide the citizens to 
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live a healthy life” and make sure they do not join “evil religious organizations” like 
the Falungong association.  
 
(3) Strengthening Street Offices and RCs  
In the age of command economy, the municipal government, representative of 
the state, had control over almost all power and resources; government agencies at the 
district level and Street Offices could only passively perform directives from the 
municipal government, which seriously impaired their capability and enthusiasm to 
positively promote local development. Due to rapid social changes, there have been 
increasing administrative affairs to be dealt with, which were beyond the management 
capability of the municipal government. The latter thus had to entrust the district 
governments to take over many management functions. Especially, after having 
initiated the community building plan, the municipal government had insufficient 
financial resources to implement these projects, which needed a large amount of 
investment, by itself. 18  The government then had to rely on local governments, 
particularly Street Offices that directly take care of public management at the 
neighborhood level with the assistance of the RCs. Therefore, the municipal 
government set up a city administration mode of ‘two levels of government, three 
tiers of management and four levels of networks (the municipal government, district 
governments, Street Offices, RCs) and granted Street Offices much power to 
stimulate their enthusiasm. 
After 1996, the municipal government not only raised the ranks of main 
leaders of the Street Offices, but also empowered the latter to be in charge of the 
socio-political and economic development of the neighborhoods under their 
                                                 






jurisdiction. Most importantly, the government has enforced the policy of “refunding 
business tax”. That is, the government refunded large percentage of the tax levied on 
those enterprises registered in a certain neighborhood to the local Street Office so that 
it would have enough resources to promote local development. The more enterprises 
register in a neighborhood, the more economic resources the Street Office will have. 
Since then, the performance of Street Office officials and their personal income have 
been highly tied to local economic development. As a result, “the combination of new 
market elements and decentralized state apparatus has given rise to the entrepreneurial 
endeavor of China’s governance” (Wu 2002:1071). Street Offices not only set up their 
own businesses, but also make every effort to attract external enterprises to register in 
the neighborhoods under their jurisdiction through all kinds of channels and means 
including providing investors with various schemes of incentive (e.g. Zhu 1999; Wu 
2000). Furthermore, they also welcome estate developers to reconstruct 
neighborhoods under their jurisdiction. Obviously, once a neighborhood is 
reconstructed and “updated”, its image is improved and its economic production 
increases. The local government therefore receives more financial resources and can 
cut down the budget for poverty reduction since the poor families are resettled away. 
Thus, local governments spare no effort to encourage and help estate developers. 
Consequently, with the initiation of community building projects,  local growth 
coalitions have been gradually formed among local governments and businessmen 
(Wu 1999; Zhu 1999; Wu 2002).  
Since the mid-1990s, Street Offices have had more economic resources at their 
disposal. Some of these resources are spent on community buildings; others are 
distributed among local officials. Correspondingly, the income and professional 






neighborhoods, the income of the middle-rank management staff can be several times 
that of the average income of Shanghai citizens; thus many people are attracted to 
such positions in Street Offices. 
To cope with the increasing management affairs shifted to them, Street Offices 
have set up many branch institutions. Furthermore, they follow the instructions of the 
municipal government and strengthen RCs to assist them to manage the sub-
neighborhoods. Before the initiation of community buildings, RCs played a marginal 
role in urban management. Most of their staff were retired or jobless residents with 
little education. To improve the efficiency of RCs, Street Offices recruited middle-
aged former management staff of state-owned enterprises who had been laid off to 
constitute new RCs. In recent years, they have even begun to recruit undergraduates 
to work as RC staff. Furthermore, Street Offices have also renovated RC office 
facilities. Since they can decide on the amount of the operating fund distributed to 
RCs, Street Offices often ignore the law and require the RCs to work mainly for them 
instead of for residents; and they appoint RC staff to ensure that the latter do their best 
to serve the Street Offices. As a result, RCs have been transformed into quasi-
administrative institutions (Shi 2005).  
 
(4) Introducing grassroots democratic reforms 
With the influence of globalization, Chinese government faces the pressure of 
democratization. The government has chosen to develop grassroots democracy to 
show its efforts in democratization. It has also decided to develop grassroots 
democracy in cities to promote local governance. Since the late 1990s, some big cities 
have initiated democratic reforms in neighborhoods, and to conduct elections of some 







A, the election of RCs 
Under the control of Street Offices, RCs had to work mainly for them. When 
there were contradictions among government agencies and residents, the RCs had to 
be on the side of the former. Citizens were very dissatisfied because the RCs failed to 
stand for their interest, as required by law. They would often put the blame on the 
state, which is believed to be responsible for the action of the Street Offices and the 
RCs, since the latter were agents of the state in neighborhoods. In other words, this 
former Neighborhood System had resulted in some adverse influence on the 
legitimacy of the Party-state. Therefore, since the late 1990s, some big cities, such as 
Shanghai and Shenyang have required local governments to conduct democratic 
election of RCs to restore the autonomy of the latter. In this reform, high-level 
governments encouraged residents to fulfill their rights and to elect the members of 
RCs by themselves and from within residents instead of those appointed by Street 
Offices so that the new elected RCs would mainly work for residents themselves 
instead of for local government agencies. This reform was claimed to be the climax of 
community building by all levels of governments (Xu ed 2000; Read 2000; Shi 2005). 
Shanghai conducted election in several selective RCs in 1999 for trail and in all RCs 
in 2000. In 2003, the city conducted RC election again.  
 
B, the election of HCs 
The state also initiated the establishment and election of HCs in 
neighborhoods. In the time of command economy, the state distributed homes to 
citizens through their work-units, and only charged a small rent from them. It also 






maintain homes for citizens. With the increase in urban population, the state could not 
afford to provide enough homes to all citizens. Therefore, it decided to initiate the 
reform of house property and to introduce market forces to construct “commodity 
homes” after the mid-1990s. The state required citizens to buy homes from it or in the 
market instead of asking for homes from work-units as before. To promote this reform, 
the governments at different levels not only established many state-owned estate 
development companies, but also encouraged private developers to be engaged in 
estate development (Zhou & Logan 1996; Wang & Murie 2000). Furthermore, the 
state also transformed Housing Maintenance Bureaus into property management 
companies. Many estate development companies also established property 
management companies under their control to be responsible for maintaining the 
housing they had sold or rented to citizens.  
Furthermore, many city governments encouraged citizens who had bought 
homes to elect their representatives to constitute HCs, whose obligations were to cope 
with public affairs that were related to residents’ homes, such as managing housing 
maintenance fund (usually several million yuan), and monitoring property 
management companies. In Shanghai, the Peoples’ Congress enacted a policy in 1997, 
which required that HCs be established in all new-built residences.19 Since then, more 
and more HCs have played an active role in their neighborhoods (Cao & Li 2000; Li 
& Shi 2002; Read 2003b). In 2004, the central government enacted a law regulating 
the election and operation of HCs; it also required local governments to initiate HC 
election in accordance with the new law. By initiating the elections of RCs and HCs, 
the state claimed to democratize grassroots communities and to regulate them by law. 
                                                 
19 See Management Regulations of Residential Housing Property in Shanghai (shanghaishi juzhu wuye 






Therefore, “democracy” and “rule by law” have become popular discourses in 
China’s urban society and have begun to influence neighborhood politics.    
 
(5) Strengthening local Party organizations  
Like in workplaces, the CCP also set up the Party-state System in 
neighborhoods—Street Working Committees (jiedao danggongwei) parallel to the 
Street Offices and Party Branches (dangzhibu) parallel to the RCs. The disintegration 
of the Work-unit System and social changes in the 1990s led the Party to believe that 
it could only consolidate its rule over citizens through neighborhoods. Therefore, the 
Party initiated “Party-building in community” project and started to strengthen its 
neighborhood branches to ensure its control. The Party assigned every Street Working 
Committee, constituted by all heads of government agencies at neighborhood level, to 
be in charge of governance of the neighborhoods under its jurisdiction; and the Party 
required that all government agencies at neighborhood level including Street Offices 
be under the leadership of their Street Working Committees respectively. Since every 
committee share offices with the Street Office, and the head of the Office is also 
appointed the primary vice-secretary of the Committee, the Party organization is 
actually integrated with and has actual control over the  Street Office. In turn, the 
Party also assigned every Party Branch in sub-neighborhoods to be in charge of 
governance at the base level and to control the RC.  
Furthermore, to reinforce its leadership in neighborhoods, the Party required 
its ordinary retired members to transfer their membership to, and its employed 
members to associated themselves with the activities of, the Party branches at their 
sub-neighborhoods (also see Sun 1997; Wu 2000：1081). The Party also urged its 






and exercise groups to take over their leadership so that the control of the Party over 
these civil associations could be smoothly achieved. In other words, due to the 
declining influence of the Party-state System in workplaces, the Party expects to 
exercise its authority over the society by revitalizing the Party-state System in 
neighborhoods. Recently, it even formulated a policy to require Street Working 
Committees to establish branches in all social organizations, including private and 
foreign enterprises in the neighborhoods under their jurisdiction, so that the Party 
could politically influence these organizations.  
Therefore, with the disintegration of the Work-unit System and the initiation 
of community building, more management functions have been shifted from 
workplaces to neighborhoods. In addition, due to urban development, there have been 
emerging new public affairs that need to be managed. Hence, the scope and amount of 
neighborhood management, together with the economic and human capital invested in 
this field, have been substantially expanded. As a result, the Neighborhood System 
has been revitalized as one main pillar of urban grassroots governance. In sum, 
community building “reflected the state’s attempt to reconsolidate its power to create 
a governable society as well as to cope with practical pressures such as the provision 
of social assistance to poor and aged residents, re-employment of laid-off workers, 
and the management of ‘floating’ immigrants.”(Wu 2002: 1071; also see Dai & He 
2000; Hua 2000) Due to the limited economic resources and poor management 
capability of government agencies, the state also encouraged commercial 
organizations and citizens to participate in local governance. The ideal objectives that 
the state wanted to achieve in community building are reflected by the slogan of the 
Shanghai Municipal Government: “the Party must be able to impose strong leadership 






of social forces should actively participate in community building; citizens should live 
in peace and enjoy their lives in communities” (Dang de lingdao youli; xingzheng 
guanli youxu; gefang guangfan canyu; qunzhong anjuleye).Therefore, with shifting 
focus from work-units to neighborhoods, China’s urban grassroots governance is 
changing towards being more market-oriented (Tang & Parish 2000; Xu  ed 2000; 
Hua 2000; Wu 2002; Yang 2002), which can be reflected by chart 3.2: 
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Guanxi Networks and the Formation of Local Pro-image Coalition in 
Neighborhoods 
In community building, the Party state has attempted to maintain a governable 
society and to improve the image of cities by empowering local regimes. As a result, 
local governments have been able to play an important role in urban administration. 
Being concerned with promotion and other interests, local officials endeavor to 
mobilize political and financial resources to improve the image of the neighborhoods 
under their jurisdiction to impress high-ranking governments. Given the importance 
of guanxi networks in Chinese society, they often utilize the informal ties in their 
mobilization efforts.  
The primary target for local officials in mobilizing resources is officials in 
high-ranking government agencies. Since the career prospect of China’s officials 
depends on the impression of their superiors involving both the image of the area 
under their jurisdiction and the related personal image instead of election by citizens, 
local officials spare no efforts to impress their superiors. Usually, they seek to 
establish guanxi with high-ranking officials to get their patronage by giving presents 
like local products, transportation cards, food tickets and even cash gift in envelops 
(hongbao) with tactful excuses, often at the expense of the public. For instance, when 
officials in high-ranking government agencies visit lower-level government agencies 
under their supervision, local officials present transportation cards with much money 
in the account with words like: “many thanks for coming, we welcome you to visit us 
in the future to give instructions and help; and the cards are just to cover your 
transportation fees.” Local officials also invite officials in high-ranking government 
agencies to visit popular scenic sites under their jurisdiction with the excuse of 






Street Office told me, “it is normal for us to treat visitors from high-ranking 
government agencies to something.” Naturally, the officials who accept the offers 
would help the Office on other occasions in return for their favors. 
The mass media is another important channel for local officials to show off 
their “management performance” and to improve their image. Once a local 
government agency get praise by the mass media for their performance and image, 
they can attract the attention of high-ranking officials and investment from 
businessmen. Many local officials concede, “If you want to impress them (superiors), 
you have to spend 30% energy on working, and 70% energy on propaganda (sanfen 
gan, qifen chui).” Therefore, they would always like to make friends with media 
reporters. In Shanghai, some big media, like the municipal-government affiliated WH 
Newspaper, are politically influential; their journalists are very popular among local 
officials.  
The relationship between the W Street Office and media is a typical case. In 
1989, Mr. Wang, the then Party Secretary of the Office invited Ms. Ge, a journalist 
working for the WH Newspaper to visit Green Neighborhood and to broadcast their 
performance on image-building of the neighborhood. Ms. Ge then got her report 
published on the front page of the newspaper, attracting extensive attention.20 Since 
then, the Street Office has become very famous in Shanghai for its performance, 
which has in turn enhanced the personal political image of Mr. Wang. In fact, he got 
promoted later. Wang and other main officials in the Street Office built good guanxi 
with Ms. Ge and invited her to visit them and sent her presents. In the following 
decade, both parties cooperated well with each other. As Ge herself told me, “They 
(the leaders of the Street Office) attached much importance to broadcasting their 
                                                 






image in the media. Any time when they initiate new projects, they inform journalists 
about this. ” My personal experience also confirm the attitude of the W Street Office 
towards the media. I worked for a newspaper as a journalist for a short period in 2001. 
When I visited the Street Office, they treated me to a big meal and gave me a cash gift. 
Only then, did I understand why there had been always some good news about the 
Office on many Shanghai media. To show my friendship to them, I declined the cash 
gift. However, being experienced, my friend laughed at me saying that I did not really 
understand the local officials. As he told me, “If you accept their offer, they would 
believe that you would be on their side in future; otherwise, they would not trust you 
and tell you the truth.” 
Actually, many power holders like officials and media reporters have received 
too many gifts such as food tickets so that they can not use up these things at all. As a 
result, outside many supermarkets in Shanghai, there are always a few people asking 
customers whether they have spare food tickets to sell out in discount. The formation 
of this kind of black market partly reflects the prevalence of informal favor exchanges 
in the Chinese administrative structure. 
Research indicates that, in the economic field, local officials also attempt to 
build informal alliance with investors, especially estate developers, to make profits 
(Zhu 1999; Zhang 2002).  The initial success of resource mobilization through 
informal networks in turn provides local officials more resources to build both 
neighborhood image and their personal guanxi. Therefore, they have gradually forged 
local pro-image coalitions with high-ranking officials, media reporters, businessmen, 
controlling many resources. In Shanghai, many heads of Street Offices and their Party 
Secretaries have the power to allocate millions of yuan; and, as mentioned above, 






Focusing on image building, Street Offices tend to promote social 
development in a perfunctory manner; and they attempt to dominate the 
neighborhoods under their jurisdiction so that they can manipulate everything to show 
off their “prosperous, peaceful and stable image.” On the one hand, the Offices utilize 
formal institutes like police stations and RCs to manage neighborhoods. They also 
establish public facilities and organize all kinds of propaganda and entertainment 
activities to attract residents against the influence of dissident organizations. On the 
other hand, Street Offices also employ informal networks to facilitate their 
domination. For example, having control over RCs, they can utilize the personal 
networks between RC staff and resident activists to influence other ordinary residents 
(Read 2000, 2003a). Furthermore, they also utilize informal networks to disunite HCs 
(for a discussion on this, see later chapters). Most importantly, they forge alliances 
with business groups to facilitate image building and domination over the 
neighborhoods under their jurisdiction. This can be illustrated by the situation of 
property management, which is almost relevant to the interests of every resident 
household.  
Case study: Property Management and the Domination of Local Pro-image 
Coalition  
With the further housing reform, the former state-owned Housing 
Maintenance Bureaus (fangguansuo) in every neighborhood have been transformed 
into independent commercial property management companies. Besides getting less 
and less financial subsidy from the state, they have to support a large number of staff, 
most of whom are not well qualified , and were previously distributed to them by the 
government. Therefore, it is very difficult for them to compete with those newly-






companies choose to focus on taking over management of new neighborhoods of “the 
first world,” composed of expensive condominiums where the rich residents can 
afford very high management fees and the companies can make big profits. They 
usually send skilled staff and invest a lot to manage these new neighborhoods.  
In contrast, according to state policies, the companies can only charge low 
management fees in the old neighborhoods of “sold public homes” like Green 
Neighborhood. As a result, they do not care much about their reputation among 
residents there and just send their unskilled staff to manage the old neighborhoods, 
showing little motivation to improve the environments and services there. 
Furthermore, since few residents know much about property management, these 
companies often try to defraud them of several yuan. For example, when maintaining 
the homes of residents, especially public facilities in the neighborhood, they charge 
much more than the approved fee. Having had many such experiences, residents and 
HCs in these old neighborhoods are able to see through such tricks and urge the 
companies to improve their services. But the latter would not invest much to do so, 
thus dealing with the requirements of residents passively. Some companies even 
employ rough former prisoners with low salary as guards (baoan) to deal with 
disgruntled residents. As one staff in a property management company privately 
admitted: “Our general manager told us, it is not worthwhile to provide the old 
neighborhood with good services. We can employ some rough guys instead of skilled 
staff. Only they (the former) can handle those disgruntled residents (diaomin). ” 
However, concerned with legitimacy and social stability, the state requires property 
management companies to improve their management. To deal with pressure from 
both higher-ranking governments and residents, many property management 






institutes before, their management staff had connections with local authorities. 
Therefore, they tend to utilize the existing guanxi and to actively build new informal 
networks with the officials.  
Since Street Office is the grassroots administrative authority that is directly 
responsible for the routine management of neighborhoods, it is required to promote 
balanced community development including monitoring the management of property 
in their neighborhoods. Once some companies fail to provide fundamental services 
and a protest from residents is triggered, the Street Office monitoring them is also 
blamed by high-ranking government bodies. As a result, its image and reputation are 
hurt and thus loses competition against its counterparts. Therefore, the Street Office 
has strong motivation to provide shelter for the property management companies 
under its jurisdiction. In fact, a Street Office can assist property management 
companies in the following ways:                                                                                                                  
 It can help the companies to monopolize the management of their 
neighborhoods without competition from other companies. By law, a HC has the 
power to dismiss the property management company which has failed to satisfy 
residents in their neighborhood, and to employ another company. However, in reality, 
it is very difficult for HCs to exert such power because the Street Office benefited 
from the present company will not allow them to do so. With administrative power, 
the local authorities always attempt to intervene in the decision-making of HCs. For 
example, in 2000, the HC in JQ Sub-neighborhood in the PN district tried to dismiss 
their non-performing property management company. Another company was found to 
take over management of their sub-neighborhood. However, the Street Office and the 
RC in the sub-neighborhood did not allow the HC to do this, as they were afraid that it 






image. Furthermore, they had good relationship with the present company. Therefore, 
they insisted that the RC was the representative of all residents and it had the power to 
make the decision. In the end, without the approval of the administrative authorities, 
the new company had to withdraw. Although this case has triggered much debate in 
China (see Yang 2000), it is not rare. In Green Neighborhood, some HCs were 
dissatisfied with the property management company; but they were not allowed to 
dismiss it. With the support of the Street Office, the company ignored the 
requirements of residents without fear of being dismissed. Therefore, wielding 
administrative power, the authorities have imposed arrangements regarding property 
management upon the HCs and residents, and have deprived them of the power of 
decision-making.  
The Street Office can help the companies evade state evaluation. To promote 
the development of social services, the Shanghai Municipal Government requires to 
evaluate those professional associations which provide social services to citizens 
(hangfeng pingyi). Relevant government agencies are responsible for inviting ordinary 
citizens or some of their representatives to evaluate an association in terms of its 
services on a designed form. The associations that get high scores attain good image 
and thus have more commercial opportunities while those with low scores get their 
image hurt or even their business license suspended. Since property management is 
important to all citizens, considerable attention is paid to its evaluation.  The 
municipal government requires Street Offices to hold evaluation on management 
companies under their jurisdiction twice in a year. Most companies in old 
neighborhoods are afraid of this because of their poor management practices, turning 
to the Offices for help. As mentioned above, once some companies get unfavorable 






often attempt to cheat together with the companies in the evaluation. Usually, the 
Office will distribute the evaluation forms to the secretaries of Party branches in sub-
neighborhoods and ask them to find some residents with whom they have good 
personal relationships to write a favorable report of the property management 
companies on the forms. As a local official said at a big meeting attended by officials 
of the Street Office, managers of property management companies, secretaries of 
Party branch and RC heads,  
“Now in this room, we are all people on the same side (zijiren), and we can 
tell the truth just between us. To be frank, in the evaluation, our secretaries (of 
Party branches) and RC heads helped a lot. Your company should appreciate 
this and express many thanks to them!”21 
Therefore, by the patronage ties with the local authorities, the property 
management companies evade evaluation by the state and do not bother to improve 
their management practice. Ordinary residents are deprived of the power to know the 
enforcement of evaluation and to resort to high-ranking authorities through this 
formal channel of public evaluation.  
The Street Office can help the companies in routine management. Usually, the 
Street Office requires RCs under its jurisdiction to help property management 
companies in mediating small disputes between them and residents on issues such as 
the collection of the fees of property management. The companies usually collect 
management fees from resident’s households every month. Because they fail to 
manage the neighborhoods well, some residents do not pay the fees. In such a 
situation, the Street Office requires RC staff to help the companies collect the fees. 
Since RC staff are in better relationships with residents, they either ask heads of 
resident groups to collect the fees or do it by themselves.  
                                                 






The Street Office can shelter the companies when the latter have violent 
conflicts with residents. Due to the irresponsibility of property management 
companies in old neighborhoods, many residents are dissatisfied and often have 
conflicts with them. However, local authorities usually shelter the companies from 
complaint of residents, as illustrated by the following case. On June 7, 2002, Aunt Ho, 
the then vice head of the No.4 HC in GI planned an outing with her husband, but she 
could not open the door of her home. She tried to call for help but found that she 
could not reach anyone. The old couple felt very scared and helpless. On that day, the 
RC needed to contact her. Although they tried to call her again and again, they failed 
to reach her. Then they realized that there might be something wrong. The head of the 
RC went to Ho’s home and found that the lock to her door had been stuck by glue and 
the telephone cable had been cut off. Then he attempted to get the door opened and 
the old couple released. The next evening, Aunt Ho received a call from a hospital, 
saying that an ambulance was going to her home to pick up a patient. Ho told them 
that nobody at her home was sick. But the hospital staff said that her son had just 
called to ask them to make an emergency rescue of his seriously sick mother. Aunt Ho 
realized that there must be someone trying to harass her, and she reported to the police. 
Finally, the police discovered that it was a staff in the property management company 
who had caused these troubles. This person was unskilled in housing maintenance and 
often impolite to customers. As the vice head of the HC, Aunt Ho often criticized him, 
and he thus attempted to take a revenge on her. After the incident, the property 
management company pleaded to the local police station for the person. Due to the 
good relationships between them and the local authorities, the man was not severely 
punished.22 
                                                 






Therefore, Street Offices can support property management companies in 
many aspects and help them a lot in their business. The Offices do so not only 
because of their own concern of “management performance”, but also due to the 
favors they expect in return. Regularly, the companies send presents to officials in the 
Offices, secretaries of Party branches and RC heads, and offer them meals as well, 
usually on festivals or meetings, to build networks with these power brokers.  As the 
former secretary of Party branch in GIII told me, “on many big occasions like Spring 
Festival, the property management company always had something for us, like bed 
sheets, purses, and a little cash.” Actually, the RCs are aware that residents are 
dissatisfied with the companies; they are also often upset by the irresponsibility of the 
latter and sometimes complain of the problems of the companies. But due to the 
pressure of the Street Office and the presents sent to them by the companies, the 
secretaries of Party branch and RC heads generally support the companies on official 
occasions in return for their favors. When asked why they help to cheat, a former 
secretary of the party branch in GI told me, 
 “The Street Office expect us to do so. Furthermore, we need their (the 
company) support sometimes. They also often send us small presents. Since 
we are so close to one another, there is no reason for us to tell the truth to 
offend them; otherwise, we will make them lose face and can not get support 
from them any more.” 
Sometimes, the companies also provide payment in response to requests by the 
local authorities for “donation” to maintain their ties with the latter. For example, the 
officials in the W Street Office monitoring property management companies 
established a club to organize some entertainment activities regularly. In this way, 
they tried to establish guanxi networks with other officials and economic elites. To 






to pay high membership fees. Similarly, RCs also regularly organize entertainment 
activities such as short tours for their staff and resident activists who often help them. 
Since RCs have limited financial resources, they often request support from the 
property management company in their sub-neighborhood. Although sometimes quite 
reluctant, the companies pay the fees and provide petty financial support as required 
in case the local authorities withdraw their support or even cause troubles. The 
general manager of a property management company in Green Neighborhood 
complained in a private occasion,  
“They (officials of the Street Office) are always asking for something. We 
have to send them presents like transportation cards and expensive food on big 
occasions like Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival to solicit their 
support. These regular items cost us tens of thousand yuan every year. In 
addition, they may help to mediate disputes between us and residents 
sometimes. As a government agency, this is their duty. But they always regard 
their mediation as a kind of favor to us, and they expect favors in return. Then 
we have to send them presents and offer them meals again. Although we 
believe that it is unfair for them to do so, we can not charge them of 
committing blackmail or corruption; otherwise, we will be excluded from the 
business. ”  
In sum, to deal with counterpart competition and to circumvent pressure of 
higher-ranking governments and ordinary citizens, the Street Office and property 
management companies under its jurisdiction have forged an informal coalition 
between them through informal networks. Property management in the neighborhoods 
of “sold public homes” is thus embedded in bureaucratic support which is provided by 
the local administrative authorities. This coalition composed of resource occupants 
“on the same side” are primarily concerned with economic growth and image-
building. Ordinary residents are deprived of their power of decision-making; and the 






activities are manipulated and blocked. If residents has violent conflicts with property 
management companies, it is hard for them to get fair mediation. Furthermore, to 
avoid the monitoring of HCs, property management companies utilize the local 
authorities to impose constraints on these civil associations. They are also trying to 
buy off HC members, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. Even when residents 
try to wield “weapon of the weak” like refusing to pay management fees, their 
resistance is often weakened by the RCs. As a result, they are in a disadvantageous 
position to articulate their concerns regarding property management, and are generally 
dominated by the local pro-image coalition.  
With their domination over neighborhoods, the local pro-image coalition tends 
to ignore the requirements of the state and residents, thus hindering neighborhood 
governance and resulting in dissatisfaction from citizens. There was lack of 
systematically precise data to reflect the governance performance at the whole Green 
Neighborhood. But my investigation suggests that, except GI, governance 
performance in other sub-neighborhoods was not satisfying.  In my 2002 survey in 
GII, a typical old sub-neighborhood, few respondents were satisfied with property 
management while most of them experienced dissatisfaction, similar with the 
respondents’ sense of their neighborhood and their feeling of empowerment (see 
Chapter Four). One confusing thing about this sub-neighborhood was that it had been 
granted the title of “Model Quarter” although it failed to meet the expected criteria. It 
turned out that the head of the GII RC had a brother working for the municipal 
“committee of ‘spiritual-civilization building’”. Just because of this, the Street Office 
had employed her as Head of GII, who then asked her brother to help them get the 
title. This case shows again how the local pro-image coalition mobilizes political 






property management in GII was not rare. In 2003, the municipal government sent 
teams to investigate social services in every district under its jurisdiction and to rank 
all the relevant businesses. In the PN district, property management was evaluated to 
be the worst among all businesses of public services. My investigation also suggests 
that, in the past few years, the governance situation in Green Neighborhood has been 
getting worse in some aspects. These findings suggest that the local pro-image 
coalition should be partly responsible for this.  
Interest-based Society and the Formation of Local Pro-image Coalition  
 This research examines the dynamics of the formation of local pro-image 
coalitions in urban neighborhoods. It has been found that their domination impedes 
neighborhood governance, thus adversely affecting both the quality of life of citizens 
and the performance of state buildings. However, the present social context and 
institutional arrangements are partly responsible for the situation.   
 
Efficiency-oriented Administrative System and Local Pro-image Governments 
In community building, although Street Offices are officially required to 
promote balanced community development, their actual management orientation has 
been distorted by the present administrative evaluation system and social values. With 
the state seeking to rebuild its legitimacy in management performance and 
utilitarianism a pervasive factor in the society, “efficiency” has been highlighted in 
every aspect of social life, including administration. Almost all state institutions are 
efficiency-oriented in their management activities, but most of them just pay attention 
to immediate and visible performance. For example, in administrative management, 






management performance of governments at various levels; this was also the case in 
community building. When the municipal government and district governments 
evaluate the management performance of Street Offices, they generally adopt “hard” 
indicators such as the rate of local economic growth and image building of 
neighborhoods under their jurisdiction while ignoring “soft” indicators like the 
satisfaction of local residents. Furthermore, since high-ranking governments 
frequently distribute a lot of administrative tasks to every Street Office, the latter have 
to establish more institutions and recruit new staff to cope with these radically 
increasing new tasks. For example, it has to establish “committee of ‘spiritual-
civilization building’” and to invest a lot in the construction of “Model Quarters”. 
However, the fund that the state could provide is limited, and even can not cover the 
salary of the increasing number of staff of the Street Office. In the era of command 
economy, there were only less than ten staff in a normal Office. However, in 2004, 
there were nearly seven hundred people in many Shanghai Street Offices including 
tenured officials and contracted staff. According to the Party secretary in one Office, 
the allotted fund from the state every year can only cover one sixth of its actual 
expenditure. In addition, since the whole society is increasingly material-oriented, 
leaders in Street Offices also face pressure from their subordinates who want their 
income to be enhanced. As the Party secretary in the W Street Office claimed, “If 
there is no enhancement of income, they (the officials in the Office) will lose the 
motivation to work hard.” Therefore, Street Offices have to make every endeavor to 
promote local economic growth rather than balanced development. 
When investing resources in community building, Street Offices focus more 
on those apparently visible projects like image building and organizing large-scale 






less about social welfare, which is relatively invisible to high-ranking governments. In 
recent years, due to the opening of Shanghai to domestic and foreign investors, there 
has been great economic growth in the PN district. In 2004, the W Street Office 
collected more than two hundred million yuan, which was four times of the amount in 
2001. Unfortunately, they spent most of the income on those apparently visible 
“image projects” (xingxiang gongcheng) under the label of “serving-the-people 
projects” (weimin xiangmu or shishi gongcheng) like building many splendid gates in 
the neighborhoods under their jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the officials in charge of 
these construction projects usually received big presents and rebates from the 
construction companies that they hired.   
 
Table 3.1 2004 Budget for Part of Neighborhood Management Items of the W Street 
Office  
Items Amount (yuan) 
Propaganda 494,430 
Social welfare and poverty reduction  343,766 
Neighborhood security 325,000 
Neighborhood infrastructure   628,872 
 
Source: from the files of the Street Office 
 
Table 3.1 shows that the Street Office invested less resources in social welfare 
of residents than other items. For example, the regular budget for propaganda was 
much higher than it. The Office also spends a lot of money to organize other casual 
propaganda activities. In the 2004 summer, it hosted a large music party and invited 
many high-ranking officials and media reporters as part of its image building in the 
neighborhood. This cost about two hundred thousand yuan, more than a half of the 






resident families in the neighborhoods under the jurisdiction of the W Street Office. 
But the official charge of social welfare at the Office told me that he had insufficient 
resources to support them because “the leaders (of the Office) do not attach 
importance to these affairs.” Yongshun Cai (2004a) has pointed out that many such 
image-building projects were not much about the interests of citizens but involved 
misuse of public resources, thus hampering community development. Indeed, the 
efficiency-oriented administrative system and distorted management orientation of 
local authorities are partly to blame for this. 
 
Urban Reforms and the “Rational Choice” of Property Management Companies 
 
Due to urban reforms, property management companies in old neighborhoods 
face many constraints. As mentioned before, in the neighborhoods of “the second 
world” like Green Neighborhoods, many residents belong to the working class, and 
quite a large number of them have been laid-off due to the reform of the state-own 
enterprises. They can not afford high management fees. Afraid of social unrest, the 
state does not allow property management companies to raise management fees since 
many residents are already dissatisfied with the present reform. Due to low profits, the 
companies naturally have no motivation to provide good services. Furthermore, they 
can not just dismiss their many unskilled staff. Their poor management has triggered 
the dissatisfaction of residents, many of whom thus refuse to pay the management 
fees. With the decline of income, property management companies have reduced their 
services. As a result, property management of “sold public homes” in many 
neighborhoods has fallen into a vicious circle. For the companies, it is more 






good services to residents. When faced with the pressure from the state and residents, 
the companies thus seek to establish alliance with local governments which are 
concerned with boasting their management performance. When I asked some 
managers whether they could break away from the dependence on the local authorities 
if they improve property management and thus satisfy residents, they said they would 
not do so due to much bigger cost. Therefore, they prefer to keep the patronage 
networks with the local authorities in order to maintain the image and maximize the 
profits of both parties.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter examines the changes of formal local political institutions in 
urban neighborhoods on the one hand, and discloses the formation of informal local 
pro-image coalition between Street Offices and other social forces, especially, 
business groups on the other. It was found that guanxi networks are very important for 
local power holders to forge coalition and to construct their domination, resulting in 
passive social-political consequences. 
 In particular, it illustrates that, with the disintegration of the work-unit system 
and the initiation of community building, the state has reconstructed the local 
administrative structure. Street Offices have been thus increasingly important in urban 
management system. However, they have also become very self-interested and have 
led to the forging local pro-image coalitions in neighborhoods. Therefore, urban 
reforms and community building are the structure of incentives for the local pro-
image coalitions to emerge. Furthermore, this research also examines the special ways 
in which local authorities construct coalition and domination in neighborhoods. They 






with local economic elites, but also to impose domination over and exercise 
exploitation on residents. Therefore, neighborhood politics is dominated by the local 
pro-image coalition based on guanxi.  
The formation of local pro-image coalition and its domination in 
neighborhoods has led to the impasse similar to the devastating impact of what 
Pransenjit Duara (1988) refers to “state involution” on rural village. He adopted this 
concept to refer to the under-development of state administration at the local level 
although the state expanded its local institutions in size; and he regarded the outcome 
of tax levying on rural households, which was the main concern of the then state, as 
the primary indicator to reflect the management efficiency of the state. However, the 
contemporary China state is primarily concerned with maintaining stability in 
neighborhoods instead of directly levying tax on urban households. Therefore, this 
study looks at property management and the satisfaction of residents as the main 
indicators to reflect the management efficiency of the state.  
As shown above, the guanxi-based local pro-image group of Street Offices and 
commercial organizations not only attempt to evade state monitoring, but also tend to 
ignore the interests of citizens, which in turn trigger much dissatisfaction from 
citizens and impair state legitimacy. Their misusing of public resources on image-
building and the “rational choice” of property management companies unwilling to 
improve their management imply one serious consequence of “state involution”: the 
ceasing or even decline of neighborhood governance. Therefore, this chapter suggests 
that the situation of neighborhood governance is not as good as expected by the state. 
In the later chapters, we will specifically examine the performance of neighborhood 











Since the initiation of community building, the Shanghai municipal government has 
set up six criteria to evaluate governance performance of sub-neighborhoods: good 
public order, neat and tidy environments, comprehensive social services, harmonious 
neighbor relationships, abundant entertainment activities and high satisfaction of 
residents with their sub-neighborhoods. Those which meet these criteria at different 
degree are granted municipal-rank or district-rank honorary titles of “Model Quarter” 
(wenming xiaoqu). The municipal government has adopted the number and rank of 
“Model Quarter” as one main criterion for evaluating performance of local 
governments. It also regards the annual increase in the number of “Model Quarter” as 
an achievement of urban administration. Consequently, local governments, 
particularly Street Offices, have put in great efforts “to create ‘Model Quarters’”. 
They have not only invested heavily to improve neighborhood environments by 
planting greeneries and renovating public facilities, but also organized entertainment 
activities at the local level. Until 2004, out of 3293 Shanghai sub-neighborhood, 2494 
of them had attained the status of “Model Quarters”.23 
Ideally, a sub-neighborhood that has been officially granted the title “Model 
Quarter” should have achieved good governance and its residents should be satisfied 
with the community. However, this is not always the case. For example, in Green 
Neighborhood, the four sub-neighborhoods had all been granted the municipal-rank 
“Model Quarter”. Yet, the residents differed in their evaluation of governance in their 
sub-neighborhoods. As well as mentioned in Chapter Two, GI and GII were similar in 







terms of the style of residential buildings and socio-economic characteristics of the 
local population. However, as many GII residents told me: “Yeah, our sub-
neighborhood is so-called ‘Model Quarter’, but so what? The administration and 
services are still bad! I just want to move out!” In contrast, many GI residents were 
quite satisfied with their sub-neighborhood. Therefore, the honorary title “Model 
Quarter” or the official criteria are not enough for us to evaluate the performance of 
neighborhood governance.  
This chapter examines the difference between them in terms of performance of 
neighborhood governance, and explores the factors responsible for the difference 
using a quantitative measurement. The first section focuses on the quantitative 
measurement of the development of neighborhood governance. The second section 
attempts to explain findings from the quantitative measurement. The final section 
discusses the relation between civicness and neighborhood governance. 
 
A Quantitative Measurement of performance of Neighborhood Governance  
In his influential work on Italy’s local governance, Robert D. Putnam 
(1993a:64) pointed out that any measurement of institutional performance “must meet 
four severe tests: 1. It must be comprehensive,” e.g. the assessment must encompass 
the many dimensions of local governance, 2. “It must be internally consistent,” e.g. 
the assessment must be focused on the entire efficiency of local governance. 
Therefore, the researcher “must thus look closely at the concordance among [his or 
her] various operational measures of institutional performance and be alert for signs 
of ‘multidimensionality’ ”, 3. “It must be reliable,” e.g. “the institutional performance 
must be reasonably durable, not volatile,” and 4. “It must correspond to the objectives 






As mentioned in the first chapter, the main objectives that the Party-state’s 
initiation of community building were to improve neighborhood governance, 
particularly, to provide social services for the citizens and to penetrate grassroots 
communities through RCs, and to introduce democratic reforms to urban 
neighborhoods as well.  The official criteria which are integrated into the indicators 
for evaluating the performance of neighborhood governance are: a) objective 
indicators such as greenery coverage, the number of mediation and patrol groups, 
community service facilities, the number of physical exercise groups and 
entertainment activities, and b) subjective indicators such as residents’ sense of their 
relationships with neighbors and of their community in general. 
Since objective indicators can be easily measured, these items are the focal 
points of investment of the Street Offices as they seek “to create ‘Model Quarters’ ”. 
These stringent requirements are usually satisfied. Therefore, to compare the actual 
situations of governance of two “Model Quarters” at the same rank, the objective 
indicators are not very useful. For this reason, I adopt some official subjective 
indicators and other indicators that are in common use to comprehensively evaluate 
local governance performance of GI and GII. These indicators are divided into seven 
categories. 
 
1, The residents’ perception about community services 
          One primary objective for the government to initiate community building was 
to transfer social service functions from work-units to residential neighborhoods (Xu 
ed 2000; Wu 2002). Therefore, the residents’ perception about local social services is 
an important indicator for local governance. With the fast development of 






is relatively difficult for aged people to do the same because many of them cannot 
afford the relatively expensive commercial services; furthermore, some are physically 
weak and are not able to shop. The RCs are required by the government to take care 
of aged residents. Many respondents commented that the services of RCs for the aged 
are very important to local residents’ families. Only if the RCs take good care of their 
aged parents, can the young professionals feel comfortable to work, thus contributing 
to local economic development. In the questionnaire was the question: Please evaluate 
the social services for the aged in your sub-neighborhood (Q46a). 
Table 4.1 Residents’ perceptions to social services for the aged 
Q46a, please evaluate 
the social services for 



























1.1% 7.4% 62.8% 28.7% .0% 
 
This table shows that the GI respondents differed from the GII respondents in 
terms of their satisfaction with the social services provided in their respective sub-
neighborhoods. In GI, 42.2% of the respondents were “very satisfied” and “somewhat 
satisfied” while 12.1% of them were dissatisfied. In contrast, in GII, the percentage of 
respondents who were “somewhat satisfied” was 28.7%. This suggests that GI 
respondents were generally more satisfied with the social services in their sub-
neighborhood. However, the percentage of GII respondents who were dissatisfied was 
8.5%, lower than that of GI respondents (12.2%). 
 






Another item that highly affects the everyday life of residents is property 
management.24 As mentioned in the first chapter, before the 1990s, the management 
and maintenance services of citizens’ homes were provided by their work units or the 
local housing bureau. With the housing reform, this task was transferred to 
commercial property management companies; their management and maintenance 
services for homes are thus highly relevant to the quality of local residents’ life. In the 
survey was the question: Please evaluate the property management and services in 
your sub-neighborhood (Q46d). 
Table 4.2a Residents’ perceptions to property management 
Q46d, please evaluate 
the property 
management and 



























20.7% 31.5% 39.1% 8.7% .0% 
 
This table shows that, in GI, 42.9% of the respondents were “very satisfied” 
and “somewhat satisfied” with property management in their sub-neighborhood while 
17.6% of them were dissatisfied with it. In contrast, only 8.7% of the GII respondents 
were “somewhat satisfied” while more than a half of them (52.2%) were dissatisfied 
with it. 
The perception of residents regarding the safety of their sub-neighborhoods 
affects their community identity and social cohesion to a great extent (Suttles 1972:34; 
                                                 
24 In fact, many other local amenities and items of social services such as schools, day care, health care 
institutions, and exercise and sports facilities also affect the everyday life of many residents and thus 
community development (e.g.Putnam 1993a). However, all sub-neighborhoods in Green Neighborhood 
share these kinds of goods. Therefore, these items cannot reflect the difference between the sub-






Forrest & Kearns 2001:2134-2135). Whether people feel safe in their sub-
neighborhood is thus one sub-indicator for evaluating neighborhood governance.  
With the initiation of community building, local governments were urged to 
set up grassroots institutions and to establish facilities to enhance the security of 
neighborhoods. The municipal government also required that the security for a 
“Model Quarter” to be enhanced greatly so that at least 80% of local residents are 
satisfied with it. Therefore, local governments not only urged RCs to organize retired 
residents to patrol in sub-neighborhoods, but also required property management 
companies to be responsible for guarding the sub-neighborhoods and buildings under 
the latter’s jurisdiction. Therefore, guarding sub-neighborhoods is included in 
property management. In the survey was the question regarding residents’ perceptions 
to safety situation: Please evaluate the situation of safety in your sub-neighborhood 
(Q46e). 
Table 4.2b Residents’ perceptions to safety situation in their sub-neighborhoods 
Q46e, please evaluate the 


























 1.1% 22.6% 30.1% 44.1% 2.2% 
 
This table indicates that most GI respondents (67.0%) were satisfied with the 
situation of safety and security in their sub-neighborhood while few of them (2.2%) 
were dissatisfied. In contrast, 46.3% GII respondents were satisfied while 23.7% of 
them were dissatisfied. In other words, compared to GII respondents, more GI 







3, The penetration of RCs in sub-neighborhoods 
The primary aim for the state-initiated promote on neighborhood governance 
is to enhance state legitimacy and control. The primary mean to achieve this is to 
revitalize the RCs (see Read 2000, 2003a). Therefore, the influence of the RC in a 
sub-neighborhood and the relations between it and the residents is an important 
indicator for neighborhood governance. In this study were two questions: How do you 
feel with your RC? (Q64c)  How is the relationship between you and the RC 
staff ?(Q56) 
 
Table 4.3a Residents’ Satisfaction with the RCs. 
Q64c, how do you feel 






























Based on the data from a 1993 China Housing Survey, John R. Logan and 
Yanjie Bian found that only 34.6% of Shanghai citizens thought that RCs were “quite 
good” while 5.3% of them thought that RCs were “not very good” (quoted in Read 
2003a: 46). But my survey in GI and GII in 2002 illustrates that nearly a half (48.6%) 
of the respondents were satisfied with their RCs while only 4.3% of them were 
dissatisfied. This implies that there is improvement in terms of citizens’ satisfaction 
with the RCs. The table also shows that more GI respondents (56%) were satisfied 








Table 4.3b The relationships between residents and the RC staff 
Q56, how is the 
relationship between 
you and the RC staff? 
 


























45.7% 30.4% 13.0% 8.7% 2.2% 
 
 
According to Read (2000, 2003a), the administration performance of a RC in 
the sub-neighborhood greatly depends on the number of resident activists who are in 
good relationships with the RC staff and the familiarity of RC staff with other 
ordinary residents. This table shows that most of our respondents (63.0%) knew their 
RC staff. However, nearly a half of GII respondents (45.7%) did not know RC staff at 
all; in GI, this percentage was only a little more than a quarter (28.1%). Furthermore, 
there were also more “neighborhood activists” in GI (4.5%) than in GII (2.2%). In 
other words, GI residents were generally in better relationships with the RC than their 
GII counterparts . 
Therefore, the findings demonstrated on Tables 4.3a and 4.3b suggest that the 
GI RC was much more influential and in better relationships with residents than the 
GII RC. In terms of the penetration of RC in grassroots communities, the former was 
more successful than the latter. 
 
4, Residents’ perceptions to neighbor relationships 
Existing research has found that the relationships among neighbors are highly 
related to social cohesion (Forrest & Kearns 2001). The government also hopes to 






pertinent question was: How do you think of the relationships among residents in your 
sub-neighborhood? (Q36) 
 
Table 4.4 Residents’ evaluation of neighbor relationships 
Q36, how do you think 
the relationships among 































This table shows that more GI respondents (25.3%) than their GII counterparts 
(18.1%) believed that their relationship with neighbors  were “somewhat” or “very” 
intimate. Fewer GI respondents (24.2%) had the opposing feeling than GII 
respondents (34.1%). In addition, the number of GII respondents who thought that 
their relationships with neighbors were “somewhat” or “very” distant was nearly 
double that of who believe that relationships with neighbors were “somewhat” or 
“very” intimate. These results imply that there should be higher social solidarity in GI 
than in GII. 
 
5, Community participation 
Community development relies on the active participation of local residents, 
which should be one indicator for evaluating local governance. Therefore, in the 
survey the following question was asked: In the community activities listed below, 
which items did you participate in? (Q79) Each respondent was permitted to tick a 







Table 4.5a   The rate of residents’ community participation 
The rate of residents’ community 










Percentage of Respondents 41.3% 58.7% 
 
This table presents the actual rate of community participation. It shows that a 
majority of respondents in both sub-neighborhoods participated in community 
activities. However, there was a higher rate of community participation in GI (69.7%) 
than in GII (58.7%). 
Table 4.5b The contents of community participation 
Community 





GI (n=89) 24.7% 9.0% 16.9% 11.2% 11.2% 
GII(n=92) 
19.6% 6.5% 15.2% 0 15.2% 
 
(continued) 
Disseminating science Neighborhood charity Helping neighbors with each other Others 
4.5% 15.7% 31.5% 10.1% 
6.5% 10.9% 23.9% 16.3% 
 
This table further illustrates the contents of local community participation. 
Many respondents in both GI and GII indicated that they had participated in “helping 
neighbors with each other”, “sanitation” and “collective entertainment activities”, and 
some respondents actually participated in several items. 
 
6, The sense of empowerment of residents 
It is worth pointing out that the state claims to promote neighborhood self-
governance and to empower local residents in its community building. To investigate 
residents’ subjective sense of empowerment and of their influence in local decision-






the host of you sub-neighborhood or not? (Q65) b) Who do you think is in charge of 
making decisions regarding important matters in your sub-neighborhood? (Q67) 
 
Table 4.6a Residents’ subjective sense of empowerment 
Q65, do you have the feeling that you residents 








Percentage of Respondents 53.8% 44.1% 2.2% 
 
This table shows that higher percentage of the GI respondents (76.1%) felt 
empowered more or less than the GII respondents (46.3%). Therefore, in terms of 
subjective self-sense, residents in GI were much more empowered than their p 
counterparts in GII. 
Table 4.6b Residents’ sense of local decision-making 
Q67, do you think who is in 
charge of the decision-
making of important 


























62.4% 18.3% 6.5% .0% 12.9% 
 
This table illustrates the difference of the residents’ subjective sense of local 
decision-maker and community power structure in GI and GII. Most respondents in 
both GI and GII confirmed the leading role of the government in local decision-
making. However, in GI, there were also many respondents (35.5%) who believed 
that the local residents and HCs were in charge of decision-making; in other words, 
they believed that ordinary citizens and civil associations were also influential in their 






and the property management company as the local decision-makers while only a few 
respondents (6.5%) believed that residents and HCs could wield influence.  
Therefore, in terms of residents’ subjective sense, community power structure 
in GII was still similar to that in old neighborhoods, with the government and its 
agencies monopolizing power. In contrast, residents and civil associations in GI could 
share community power and participate in local decision-making. 
 
7, The general perceptions of residents about their sub-neighborhoods 
The state claimed that it had initiated community building so that citizens 
could live in peace and enjoy life in their neighborhoods (see Xu ed 2000). The 
degree of community development should be reflected in local residents’ satisfaction 
with, and their confidence in, their community. There were three questions in the 
survey: What is your general feeling of your sub-neighborhood ? (Q29) Would you 
like to live in your sub-neighborhood for a longer time ? (Q49) Are you confident of 
the future development of your sub-neighborhood ? (Q91) 
Table 4.7a Residents’ satisfaction with their sub-neighborhoods 
Q29, what is your 



























4.3% 22.3% 59.6% 13.8% .0% 
 
This table illustrates that there was an obvious difference between GI and GII 
residents in terms of their general feeling of their sub-neighborhoods. In GI, a half of 
the respondents (50.6%) were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their 
community and 42.9% of them provided neutral answer; only 6.6% of them were 






respondents provided neutral answer; but only 13.8% of the respondents were 
“somewhat satisfied” while 26.6% of them were “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very 
dissatisfied ”. Therefore, GI respondents were more satisfied with their community 
than their GII counterparts. 
Table 4.7b Residents’ willing to live in their sub-neighborhoods for longer time 
Q49, would you like to live in your 



















13.0% 46.7% 40.2% 
 
In accordance with the above finding, this table shows that more than a half of 
GI respondents (53.5%) would absolutely like to live in their community for a longer 
time. In contrast, much less GII respondents (40.2%) would like to do so while quite a 
few of them (13.0%) would not at all. 
Table 4.7c Residents’ confidence of their sub-neighborhoods 
Q 91, are you confident of 




















3.3% 50.5% 46.2% 
 
This table illustrates that most GI respondents (73.8%) were confident of the 
future development of their sub-neighborhood while only less than a half of GII 
respondents (46.2%) had this kind of confidence. 
According to these indicators respectively, the situations in GI was better than 






consistent with one another so that the assessment based on them can reflect the entire 
efficiency of local governance in the two sub-neighborhoods. 
Table 4.8 The consistency of the indicators 
 
Kendall's 
tau_b RPSSA PA IOPR NR CP SOE IGPRC 
Residents’ 
perceptions to 
social services for 
the aged 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000       
 Sig. (2-tailed) .       




Coefficient .246(**) 1.000      
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .      
 N 182 183      
Index of the 
penetration of RC 
Correlation 
Coefficient .378(**) .187(**) 1.000     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .     




Coefficient .070 .049 .265(**) 1.000    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .284 .447 .000 .    




Coefficient .122 -.020 .215(**) .162(*) 1.000   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .086 .775 .001 .021 .   
 N 180 179 177 181 181   
The sense of 
empowerment 
Correlation 
Coefficient .146(*) .167(*) .289(**) .190(**) .165(*) 1.000  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .033 .012 .000 .005 .024 .  
 N 180 179 178 181 177 181  
Index of the 
general 
perceptions of 




.244(**) .334(**) .352(**) .151(*) .172(*) .438(**) 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .018 .013 .000 . 
 N 169 168 167 170 166 169 170 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
RPSSA= Residents’ perceptions to social services for the aged; PA= Property management; IOPR=Index of the 
penetration of RC; NR= Neighbor relationships; CP= Community participation; SOE= The sense of empowerment; 
IGPRC= Index of the general perceptions of residents to their communities 
 
In response to these questions, this table presents the results of an analysis of 
bivariate correlations among seven indicators. 25  The average r of the fifteen 
                                                 
25 The responses to Q 64c and Q56 are correlated to each other (r=0.36). So I created an index of the 
penetration of RC to integrate them together; the coefficients between them and the index are 0.66 and 
0.86 respectively. The responses to Q24, Q49 and Q91 are also correlated to each other (r=0.27, 0.44 






correlations is 0.207. All but one of them are in the correct direction,while all but four 
of them are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Generally, these indicators are 
internally consistent. It implies that the better were social services for the aged, 
property management, neighbor relationships, the better was  the penetration of RC, 
and the higher were residents satisfied with their community and feel empowered. 
Therefore, neighborhood governance in GI was much better than that in GII in terms 
of these seven indicators together. 
Table 4.9 Independent Samples Test of Performances of Community Building 
    
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Social services for 
the aged 
Equal variances 
assumed 13.567 .000 1.257 182 .210
  Equal variances 




assumed 1.854 .175 6.795 181 .000
  Equal variances 
not assumed   6.798 180.383 .000
The penetration of 
the RC 
Equal variances 
assumed .865 .354 2.752 179 .007
  Equal variances 




assumed 2.191 .141 1.434 183 .153
  Equal variances 




assumed 8.743 .004 1.539 179 .126
  Equal variances 
not assumed   1.541 178.780 .125
The sense of 
empowerment 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.721 .101 5.002 179 .000
  Equal variances 
not assumed   4.982 172.152 .000
The perceptions to 
the community 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.966 .087 6.410 183 .000
  Equal variances 
not assumed   6.409 182.656 .000
 
The independent samples test shows that the difference between these two 
groups of respondents in terms of more than a half of these indicators (except 
                                                                                                                                            







residents’ perceptions to social services for the aged, neighbor relationships and 
community participation) is significant. Therefore, the conclusions based on them can 
be generalized to all residents living in the GI and GII high-buildings. 
These dimensions of neighborhood governance were measured by the survey 
conducted among the residents living in the GI and GII high-buildings, which were 
nearly a half of the total population of the sub-neighborhoods. Therefore, I also tested 
the conclusions drawn from the survey by other sources of data and my intensive 
interviews with residents living in both the high-building and low-building areas, thus 
confirming the general conclusion that local governance in GI was much better than 
in GII. Another source of evidence was the rate at which resident families participated 
in community charity. In Shanghai, the RC in every sub-neighborhood asked resident 
families to donate cash to help extremely poor families before every Spring Festival. 
My interviews revealed that people who donated, regardless of being rich or poor 
themselves, were generally satisfied with the local administration, neighbor 
relationships and community development. Therefore, the rate at which residents 
participated in community donation could be an important indicator that reflects 
community participation, local solidarity and positive social capital in the sub-
neighborhoods. 
Table 4.10 Rate of the resident families participating in community donation 
 2002 2003 2004 Average 
GI (n) 241 257 223 240 
Rate 16.33% 17.41% 15.11% 16.33% 
GII (n)  179  179 
Rate  13.29%  13.29% 
Source: from GI RC and GII RC files 
 
This table shows that compared to GII residents, a higher percentage of GI 






was higher solidarity and community participation in GI than GII. My intensive 
interviews in Green Neighborhood in the following years re-confirmed the view that 
the state of governance in GI was still better than in GII. Therefore, the conclusions 
based on the survey were generally reliable and valid. 
A Quantitative Explanation of Neighborhood Difference of Governance 
 
Neighborhood difference in terms of civicness 
Many researchers have argued that civil culture affects the performance of 
local governance to a great extent (Putnam 1993a, 2000; Evans 1997; Woolcock 1999, 
2001). Putnam (1993a) claimed that governance performance in a community 
depends on the state of citizenship or civicness; and a community with high civicness 
including civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance and active 
civil associations, which can be termed as “civic community”, will achieve good 
governance. He also measured civicness with indicators such as the vibrancy of 
associational life, the rate of reading newspaper, political participation and citizens’ 
attitudes towards honesty, trust and abiding by laws. I test this theory, which is based 
on empirical facts in a liberal polity, in a communist setting and explain the difference 
between neighborhoods in terms of civicness. However, I measure civicness in terms 
of five indicators, a little different from those of Putnam (1993a), because the rate of 
reading newspaper, which is not the primary channel for citizens to know public 
affairs any more, is not useful. In particular, the indicators and measurements are 
outlined as follows: 
 






Existing research regards “the vibrancy of associational life” as the primary 
indicator for civic engagement and the civicness of community life (Putnam 1993a). 
In the past decade, many grassroots associations such as HCs, choral societies and 
physical exercise groups, have been established in Shanghai neighborhoods (see Xu 
ed 2000). Research also indicates that HCs are closely relevant to the substantial 
interests of local residents and actively engaged in neighborhood politics (Cao & Li 
2000; Read 2003b). Findings from my fieldwork also suggested that HCs are 
important to local governance while most other community associations supervised by 
RCs were only participated by a few residents who had good relationships with the 
RCs (also see Xu ed 2000).  
Therefore, I focused on the vibrancy and influence of HCs in sub-
neighborhoods. In Green Neighborhood, generally, the more one HC was vibrant in 
neighborhood affairs, the more satisfied residents were with it. Thus, I measured the 
vibrancy of associational life in a sub-neighborhood primarily using the evaluation of 
local residents with respect to the HC: How do you feel with your HC? (Q64d) 
Table 4.11 Residents’ satisfaction with the HCs 
Q64d, how do you feel 


























6.4% 40.4% 40.4% 12.8% .0% 
 
 
This table illustrates the huge difference between GI respondents and GII 
respondents in terms of their satisfaction with the HCs. More than a half (57.2%) of 
GI respondents were “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their HC while 
only a few of them (9.9%) were not satisfied. In contrast, only a few GII respondents 






were “very dissatisfied” or “somewhat dissatisfied”. This implies that the HCs in GI 
are much more active and satisfying than those in GII; besides, there was more 
vibrant associational life in the former. 
 
2, Citizens’ consciousness of laws 
Charles Tilly (1978) pointed out that modern state-making in Western Europe 
promoted the process within which many laws were enacted and enforced by the state. 
With this process, citizens have gradually learned to cope with public affairs in 
accordance with laws. Many students of China have adopted Tilly’s theoretical 
framework of state-making to explain the transformation of state-society relations in 
modern and contemporary China (e.g. Duara 1988; Esherick & Rankin eds 1990). 
However, Zhang Jing (2000, 2001) argued that laws had been ignored in China’s 
administration before, and that these researchers, ignoring the link between state-
making and laws enforement, just paid attention to how the state strengthened its 
power and control over grassroots communities. Therefore, she questioned the 
applicability of the framework of state-making in studying China’s local politics. 
Since the mid-1990s, the China state has enacted many laws and regulations 
regarding community building which are much relevant to the interests of citizens. 
Laws have begun to play an increasingly important role in urban local governance. As 
Mr. Tan, the primary leader of the community movement explained, “Only if we 
(citizens) know much about laws can we protect our interests by law!”  Therefore, this 
study assumes that the framework of state-making can be applied to neighborhood 
politics. However, empirical evidence has to be examined to test the assumption. 
Therefore, I regard citizens’ knowledge of the laws as an important indicator of 






There are many laws relevant to community building; it is impossible to 
examine citizens’ knowledge of all these laws in a small-scale survey. The laws on 
greenery are much about the living conditions of citizens because they touch on how 
neighborhood environments such as green spaces and parks should be protected. 
Therefore, a pertinent question in the survey was: Do you know something about the 
laws on greenery and park? (Q25) 
Table 4.12a Residents’ knowledge of laws 
Q25, do you know something about 



















12.9% 79.6% 7.5% 
 
This table indicates that both GI and GII respondents knew something about 
the laws more or less. However, they differed from each other in terms of their 
knowledge. More GI respondents (16.9%) knew “much” about the laws than GII 
respondents (7.5%); less GI respondents (9.0%) knew “nothing” about the laws as 
compared to their GII counterparts (12.9%). This implies that GI residents were more 
knowledgeable about the laws.  
In the survey concerned the role of laws in community building: What do you 
think that community building should be performed in reference to? Each respondent 
was permitted to tick a maximum of three items. 
Table 4.12b Residents’ view of the governing rule for community building 
Residents’ view of 




















58.3% 1.2% 6.0% 16.7% 2.3% 50.0% 1.2% 
GII(n=92) 






This table shows that most respondents in both GI and GII believed that 
community building should be performed in reference to laws and the attitudes of 
residents instead of the administrative orders of local government agencies and the 
attitudes of the other local groups. This implies that many citizens recognized the 
importance of laws in local governance. On the other hand, few respondents in GI or 
GII approved of the attitudes of the property company because most of them believed 
that the commercial organizations are primarily concerned with profit-making instead 
of the common interests of the community.  
The table also illustrates the specific difference between these two groups of 
respondents. Most GI respondents (58.3%) considered laws to be the reference point 
for community building while most GII respondents (57.6%) chose the attitudes of 
residents. In GI, there were also many respondents (16.7%) who preferred the 
attitudes of HCs; in GII, quite a few respondents (10.8%) considered the 
administrative orders of local government and the attitudes of the RC. Therefore, for 
GI respondents, the main reference points for community building were laws, the 
attitudes of residents and the attitudes of HCs in the order of importance; for GII 
respondents, the main reference points for community building were the attitudes of 
residents, laws, the administrative orders of local government and the attitudes of the 
RC in the order of importance. Finally, the fact that there was a higher percentage of 
GI residents than their GII counterparts who believed in laws was generally in 
accordance with the fact that the former knew more about the laws. 
 
3, Informal networks among residents 
Many social capital theorists argue that informal networks produced by the 






governance to a great extent. A pertinent question in this study concerned the 
networks among residents: How often do you interact with your neighbors? (Q32) 
Table 4.13 The frequency of neighborhood interactions 
Q32, how often do you 
interact with your 
neighbors? Seldom Sometimes Frequently 
GI(n=89) Percentage of 
Respondents 24.7% 66.3% 9.0% 
GII(n=94) Percentage of 
Respondents 40.4% 50.0% 9.6% 
 
This table indicates that, compared to rural communities (Fei 1947; Yan 1996), 
interaction networks among residents in the sub-neighborhoods were generally quite 
thin. It also illustrates that more GI residents (75.3%) “sometimes” or “frequently” 
interacted with their neighbors in everyday life than their GII counterparts (59.6%), 
implying that there were denser informal networks among residents in GI than in GII. 
 
4, Citizens’ understanding of local public affairs 
Before citizens effectively participate in local public affairs, they should know 
something about these matters. Therefore, understanding public issues in a certain 
community is an indicator of local civicness. In this survey the relevant question was: 
Do you know important public affairs (such as the RC election) in your sub-
neighborhood? (Q39) 
Table 4.14 Residents’ understanding of local public affairs 
Q39, do you know important public 



























This table shows that 57.1% of the GI respondents knew “much” and “a little” 
of public affairs in their community while only 46.8% of the GII respondents knew “a 
little”. There was higher percentage of GI respondents who knew more about their 
local public affairs than their GII counterparts. 
 
5, Residents’ reaction to government policies 
In their study of Chinese cities in the early 1970s, Martin K. Whyte and 
William L. Parish (1984:290) found that, due to strict coercion, residents seldom 
dared to speak out against governmental agencies and local cadre, and they had little 
influence on their neighborhood environments. Therefore, I also investigated 
residents’ present reactions towards government authority. In this survey, the follow 
question was asked: If any government agencies implement policies that violate your 
interests illegally (for example, to levy too much tax), will you consider doing 
something to urge the government to change them? (Q73) 
Table 4.15 Residents’ reaction to government policies 
Q73, if any government agencies implement 
policies that violate your interests illegally (for 
example, to levy too much tax), will you 
consider doing something to urge the 
government to change them? No Not very sure Certainly 
GI(n=90) Percentage of 
Respondents 4.4% 48.9% 46.7% 
GII(n=92) Percentage of 
Respondents 13.0% 63.0% 23.9% 
 
This table indicates that ordinary citizens in contemporary urban China react to 
the government authority in a different way from the past; many would voice their 
concerns publicly. GI respondents also differed from their GII counterparts in this 
aspect; nearly a half of GI respondents (46.7%) indicated that, once any government 






few of them (4.4%) indicated that they would not. In contrast, only 23.9% of GII 
respondents indicated that they would do so while quite a few of them (13.0%) said 
that they would not. Traditionally, like most GII respondents, Chinese citizens always 
follow government authorities subconsciously and seldom dare to resist the latter 
(Pye1992; Zhang 1994). But many GI residents have departed from this tradition in 
terms of their reactions to the authorities. 
To accurately illustrate the difference between the neighborhoods in terms of 
civicness, I also examined the correlations among these five indicators and integrated 
them into an index. 
Table 4.16 Correlations among indicators and civicness 
 
Kendall's 






Coefficient 1.000      
 Sig. (2-tailed) .      




Coefficient .156(*) 1.000     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .     




Coefficient .064 .178(*) 1.000    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .332 .011 .    





Coefficient .139(*) .231(**) .376(**) 1.000   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .001 .000 .   





Coefficient .171(**) .168(*) .036 .106 1.000  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .017 .605 .138 .  




Coefficient .584(**) .434(**) .436(**) .512(**) .431(**) 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
 N 178 178 178 178 178 178 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
HC= Home-owners’ committee: LOG= Laws on greenery: IN= Informal networks: UOCA= 








This table presents the results of an analysis of bivariate correlations among 
these five indicators and the index of civicness. The average r of the ten correlations 
among the five indicators was 0.16. All of them were in the correct direction, and all 
but one of them are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, these 
indicators are internally consistent. In other words, civicness among GI respondents 
was higher than GII respondents. This implies that the more networks there are among 
them, the more vibrant associational life is in the community, and the more residents 
react actively to the policies of government agencies.  
Table 4.17 Independent Samples Test of Civicness 
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Civicness Equal variances 
assumed 2.112 .148 6.715 176 .000 
 Equal variances 
not assumed   6.695 170.720 .000 
 
An independent samples test shows that the difference between these two 
groups of respondents in terms of the state of civicness is significant. Therefore, the 
conclusion of the neighborhood difference in terms of civicness or civil culture can be 
generalized to all residents living in the GI and GII high-buildings. 
 
Civicness and neighborhood governance 
The above survey results illustrate that there was a big difference between GI 
and GII in terms of both governance performance and civicness. Was the difference in   
respect of the two issues relevant to each other? In the following section, I report the 
findings from a regression analysis conducted to explore the link between civicness 






indexes of the indicators of governance performance as the dependent variables, I use 
the OLS regression analysis to explain the performance of neighborhood governance 
together with civicness and other socio-economic factors. The regression analysis 
indicates whether performance of neighborhood governance is influenced by 
civicness or other factors. 
 






Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 2.326 .612  3.799 .000 
Female  -.064 .115 -.041 -.555 .579 
Age -.104 .070 -.129 -1.485 .139 
Education level .012 .025 .045 .475 .635 
Party member  -.261 .135 -.152 -1.936 .055 
Income  -.115 .060 -.158 -1.910 .058 
Civicness .145 .031 .336 4.645 .000 
a.  Dependent Variable: residents’ perceptions to social services for the aged 
b.  Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 171. r2 = 0.174. 
 
This table illustrates that civicness is positively correlated to residents’ 
perceptions about the social services. In a sub-neighborhood with relatively high 
civicness like GI, respondents knew much about laws, government policies and local 
public affairs. They also actively and effectively reacted to the action and policies of 
government agencies through informal networks among them or vibrant civil 
associations like HCs in their community. Therefore, they could urge the local agents 
of the state like the RC to improve social services, which would thus satisfy them 
more than those in a sub-neighborhood with low civicness like GII.  
 






Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   






Female  .044 .149 .022 .296 .768 
Age -.102 .089 -.100 -1.143 .255 
Education level -.040 .032 -.117 -1.225 .222 
Party member  -.415 .174 -.188 -2.382 .018 
Income  -.018 .078 -.020 -.237 .813 
Civicness .166 .040 .302 4.135 .000 
a.  Dependent Variable: residents’ perceptions to property management 
b.  Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 170. r2 = 0.164 
 
This table also shows that civicness is positively correlated about residents’ 
perceptions to property management. In a sub-neighborhood like GI, residents knew 
much about their community and relevant policies, and they could thus establish well 
organized HCs to supervise the property management company. The latter thus had to 
improve its management practices and services. The result was that residents were 
generally satisfied with property management. On the contrary, in a sub-neighborhood 
with low civicness like GII, few residents bothered to meet together to put pressure on 
the property management company, or to establish HCs to supervise the latter. This 
partly accounted for the bad property management in it. 
On the other hand, the Table 4.18 also shows that Party membership is 
negatively correlated about residents’ perceptions to property management—this 
finding was least expected. A preliminary explanation is that the citizens with CCP 
membership used to receive much privilege from the state, and they thus had higher 
expectation to receive good property maintenance services than others. Therefore, as a 
result, many of them were dissatisfied with the property management in a 
neighborhood of a “second world” like Green Neighborhood, which was not good 
enough for them. 
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 1.515 1.038  1.459 .146 






Age .228 .127 .143 1.800 .074 
Education level -.014 .142 -.009 -.099 .921 
Party member  .411 .244 .123 1.684 .094 
Income  -.153 .110 -.107 -1.392 .166 
Civicness .373 .057 .443 6.559 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: Index of the Penetration of RC 
B.  Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 169. r2 = 0.293  
 
This regression analysis presents some unexpected results. If clientilism model 
is still applicable in explaining the relationships between state agents and citizens, one 
would expect family income to be negatively correlated to the penetration of the RC 
because poor families would seek to establish patron-client networks with the RC and 
rich families would not. In community building, the state urged CCP members to 
cooperate with the RC in administering their sub-neighborhood. One would expect 
that the RCs would be generally in better relationships with the residents with Party 
membership than others. In everyday life, many people believe that the RCs mainly 
deal with females, old residents or those residents at low level of education, and have 
a better relationship with them than others. However, Table 4.19 shows that the 
expected effects of these socio-economic factors, except for age, on the penetration of 
RC were not confirmed by this survey.  
Table 4.19 also shows that civicness positively correlates with penetration of 
RCs. In a sub-neighborhood with relatively high civicness like GI, due to the pressure 
from citizens and civil associations, the RC had to improve its management and 
services. It thus in turn received more support from residents and was thus able to 
forge better relationships with the latter than its counterparts in GII. Therefore, in 
grassroots communities with higher civicness, the RCs could be more influential than 
their counterparts in other sub-neighborhoods. 
 











  B Std. Error Beta     
(Constant) 2.951 .679  4.349 .000 
Female  -.082 .128 -.050 -.639 .524 
Age -.089 .078 -.105 -1.144 .254 
Education level -.023 .028 -.084 -.839 .403 
Party member  .014 .150 .008 .094 .925 
Income  -.082 .067 -.108 -1.226 .222 
Civicness .080 .035 .177 2.307 .022 
a  Dependent Variable: Neighbor relationships 
B.  Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 172. r2 = 0.061 
 
This table also shows that civicness positively correlates with residents’ 
evaluations of neighbor relationships. In a sub-neighborhood like GI, residents 
interacted with one another relatively frequently. They did not only communicate with 
one another about laws and local public affairs, but they also reacted to government 
authorities together. As a result, there was cooperation and trust among the 
respondents; they naturally believed that the relationships among them were 
harmonious.  
Table 4.22 Reasons for Residents’ Participation in Community Activities 
 
Mobilized 
by the RC 
Mobilized 

















(n=54) 20.4% 22.2% 3.7% 9.3% 3.7% 33.3% 11.1% 
GII 
(n=50) 26.0% .0% 6.0% 10.0% 6.0% 28.0% 26.0% 
 
This table illustrates the reasons for residents’ participation in community 
activities in north Green Neighborhood. The biggest group that participated in 
community activities in both GI and GII explained that they were motivated to do so 
because of the concern of common interests of their communities. This partly 
confirms our early presumption that there may be many residents participating in 






  Many respondents reported that they participated in community activities due 
to the mobilization of the RC. There were also quite a few residents who were 
mobilized by neighbors, implying that they could participate in community activities 
due to their concern with “face” or of relationships with their neighbors. Furthermore, 
a few residents participated in community activities due to their concern with 
individual interests, suggesting that they might care much about power and interests. 
Therefore, we can conclude that residents could be generally classified into several 
groups in accordance to their motivation of participating in community activities 
(more discussion later). 
Table 4.21 also shows that HCs have developed as an important channel for 
community mobilization while some other community associations such as chorus 
clubs and physical exercise groups were not so influential in neighborhood politics in 
terms of their influence of community mobilization. 
Most importantly, this table also illustrates the huge difference between GI 
and GII in terms of the motivation of residents’ participation. A higher percentage of 
GI residents (33.3%) participated in community activities due to their  concern with 
common interests than GII residents (28.0%). Furthermore, the secondary group in GI 
(22.2%) participated in community activities because of the mobilization of HCs 
while fewer residents (20.4%) did so because of the mobilization of the RC. In 
contrast, the secondary group in GII (26.0%) participated because of the mobilization 
of the RC; and nobody did so due to the mobilization of HCs. Therefore, the state-
sponsored RC still wielded great influence in GII while autonomous civil associations 
of HCs were more influential than the RC in GI. This table also shows that there was 






due to their individual interests than GI residents (3.7%). All these findings suggest 
that there was higher civicness in GI than in GII. 
Therefore, in contemporary urban China, the state-sponsored RC cannot 
monopolize community mobilization any more. Our findings also suggest that 
China’s citizens do not participate in community activities always because of their 
desire to cooperate with the RC or to contribute to the interests of their community. 
This implies that the model of local volunteerism and thin reciprocity (Read 2003a) is 
limited in explaining community participation in present urban China. Instead, these 
findings confirm that citizens may participate in community activities due to their 
diverse concerns. 





Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) .374 .464  .807 .421 
Female  -.064 .088 -.051 -.726 .469 
Age .089 .053 .136 1.663 .098 
Education level -.045 .019 -.208 -2.339 .021 
Party member  .031 .103 .022 .302 .763 
Income  .064 .046 .109 1.404 .162 
Civicness .144 .024 .410 6.009 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: the sense of empowerment of residents 
b. Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 170. r2 = 0.268 
 
As Robert D. Putnam (1993a) argued, citizens in a community with low 
civicness will feel exploited by others and excluded from local politics. This table 
confirms the link between civicness and the sense of empowerment of local residents, 
which are positively correlated to each other. The more local residents know about 
laws and public affairs, the more they dare to actively react to governance policies, 
the more local civil associations are vibrant, the more can residents influence public 






Surprisingly, the level of education is negatively correlates with the sense of 
empowerment of local residents. Usually, people may believe that the more a person 
is well-educated, the more he or she gets to know about laws and positively reacts to 
government policies. However, my survey suggested that this is not always the case. 
Table 4.24 The correlations between education level and civicness 
 Kendall's tau_b EL LOG IN UCA RGA HC 
Education level Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000      
 Sig. (2-tailed) .      




Coefficient -.142(*) 1.000     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .034 .     




Coefficient -.058 .178(*) 1.000    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .381 .011 .    





Coefficient -.052 .231(**) .376(**) 1.000   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .001 .000 .   





Coefficient -.090 .168(*) .036 .106 1.000  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .176 .017 .605 .138 .  




Coefficient -.141(*) .156(*) .064 .139(*) .171(**) 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .019 .332 .040 .010 . 
 N 185 182 183 185 182 185 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
EL= Education level; LOG = Laws on greenery; IN = Informal networks; UCA = Understanding of 
community affairs; RGA = Responding to government actively; HC = Home-owners’ committee.  
 
The table shows that the level of education is negatively correlated to 
civicness. My interviews suggested that due to utilitarian concerns, many local 
residents with good education were just busy with their careers and businesses, and 
did not bother to spend time learning specific laws; they neither interacted with 
neighbors nor engaged themselves in local public affairs. Therefore, few of them felt 






between level of  education and the sense of empowerment of local residents suggests 
that this explanation receives only weak support. 
 






Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 1.274 .603  2.114 .036 
Female  -.087 .113 -.054 -.768 .444 
Age .040 .069 .049 .586 .559 
Education level -.018 .025 -.066 -.731 .466 
Party member  -.061 .133 -.034 -.455 .650 
Income  -.013 .060 -.017 -.213 .832 
Civicness .204 .031 .455 6.579 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: the general perceptions of residents to their communities 
b.  Shaded variables are significant at the .05 level. Number of observations: 161. r2 = 0.314 
 
This table shows that civicness positively correlates with the general 
perceptions of residents about their communities. In a sub-neighborhood with 
relatively high civicness like GI, where residents knew much about laws and local 
public affairs, they established HCs to represent their interests; they could positively 
affect local decision-making. They could also get better services from local 
management agencies. Thus they felt empowered. Of course, the result was that most 
of them became more satisfied with their community and confident with its future; 
and they would live there for a longer time than others. In contrast, in a sub-
neighborhood like GII, low civicness could hinder governance, resulting in the 
residents bad perceptions about their sub-neighborhood in general. 
Generally, the above findings provide some evidence for our preliminary 
model of grassroots politics in relatively politically developed sub-neighborhoods. 
Firstly, Tables 4.6a and 4.6b suggest that community power structure in sub-
neighborhoods like GI was changing from an integral one to an intercursive one. 






did not believe that they could affect local decision-making. This implies that the 
degree of neighborhood democratization was still limited. Thirdly, there were 
problems with the quantity and quality of social capital. Table 4.9 shows that the 
average rate for GI resident families to donate in the past three years was 17.79%, 
indicating that  most residents failed to show kindness to neighbors. This implies 
relatively low solidarity in the community. Furthermore, Table 4.12 shows that there 
were still nearly a quarter (24.7%) of GI residents who “seldom” interacted with their 
neighbors. Presumably, there was lack of neighbor networks among these people. 
Fourthly, this study also investigated the contents of neighbor interaction. 
Table 4.26 The Contents of Neighbor Interactions 
Q33, what kind of contacts 



















54.8% 8.3% 14.3% 15.5% 3.6% 3.6% 
GII(n=88) 
65.9% 5.7% 11.4% 11.4% 5.7% .0% 
 
The table shows that only a few respondents in GI interacted with their 
neighbors closely. This implies the social networks among the residents were not so 
good in terms of “quality”. In accordance with this, Table 4.4 shows that there were 
also nearly a quarter (24.2%) of GI residents who felt that their neighbor relationships 
were “somewhat” or “very” distant. In addition, I also investigated the social support 
networks of residents in the survey. 
Table 4.27 Social Support Networks of Residents 
Q35, among the following 
groups and institutions, who is 
the first you would like to 













GI (n=89) Percentage of 
Respondents 
 






GII(n=92) Percentage of 
Respondents 
 
47.8% 10.9% 3.3% 14.1% 2.2% 16.3% 5.4% 
 
The table shows that the networks among neighbors were much more 
important to GI residents than their GII neighbors (11.2% vs 2.2%). However, even to 
GI residents, neighbors were not as important as relatives and friends outside of the 
community in terms of position in social support networks; and quite a few of 
residents (20.2%) would not request for help from anybody when facing problems. 
This implies that there was lack of high trust among neighbors even in GI. Therefore, 
the above findings suggest that, in relatively developed sub-neighborhoods like GI, 
the quantity and quality of social capital were also quite limited, let alone in other 
sub-neighborhoods like GII. Therefore, neighborhoods like GI should belong to 
“quasi-civic community” instead of “civic community”. 
Conclusion 
Community building has promoted local governance in some aspects. 
Generally, neighborhood environments have been improved; social services and 
welfare have been provided; the state-sponsored RCs have been strengthened; and 
most residents have been generally satisfied with, and had confidence in, the 
development of their sub-neighborhoods. In politically developed sub-neighborhoods 
like GI, there was some improvement in local democratization. However, the big 
difference between GI and GII implies that even for those sub-neighborhoods labeled 
as “Model Quarter”, there is substantial variation among them in terms of actual 
community development. 
In the past decade, there have also been some structural changes in urban 
neighborhoods in terms of civicness, or citizens’ political attitudes and actions. In 






have established vibrant community associations; and they have begun to respond to 
governmental policies actively. This implies that civicness and social capital in these 
neighborhoods has been enhanced. 
With the comparative method and elementary quantitative analysis, I further 
explored the link between governance performance and civicness in sub-
neighborhoods. My findings have generally confirmed Robert D. Putnam’s (1993a) 
claim that civicness is crucial to the performance of new institutions. We can 
conclude that, due to the growth up of civicness in politically developed sub-
neighborhoods like GI, local governance performance has been promoted and social 
space has been expanded. However, the difference between GI and GII in terms of the 
state of civicness and the way by which civicness was developed in GI requires 
further studies.  
Moreover, Tables 4.6b and 4.11a have indicate that the state still wields great 
influence in neighborhoods through both local agents and law enacting. Given the 
rising influence of civil associations and citizens, one may tend to conclude that the 
model of civil society can be utilized to describe the power relations in neighborhoods. 
However, as mentioned in the second chapter, the methods of comparative study and 
quantitative research are appropriate in exploring the causal effects among variables, 
though not adequate in explaining the causal mechanisms among them. Therefore, 
there is need to explore how state authority and civicness in neighborhoods affect 
local governance performance. Will a relatively developed sub-neighborhood like GI 
definitely move towards grassroots democratization and good governance so that most 
residents can benefit from it? Or will it grow up as an ideal “civic community”. These 






Chapter Five: Social Capital, Community Movement and the Enhancement of 
Civicness 26 
   
Introduction 
As shown in previous chapters, since the 1990s, neighborhoods, instead of work units, 
have gradually become a main site where the interests of government agencies, 
commercial organizations and citizens are negotiated. Facing the domination of the 
local pro-growth coalition between the former two groups, citizens have begun to 
launch collective resistance at the neighborhood level to defend their interests and 
rights. Unlike large-scale political movements such as the 1989 Tiananmen 
Movement (e.g. Calhoun 1994; Pei 2003), grassroots resistances are mainly directed 
at local authorities or commercial organizations, focusing on specific economic or 
social problems; for example, protecting their neighborhood environments instead of 
abstract socio-political notions. Despite being small in scale, grassroots resistance 
exerts considerable impacts on local governance. Furthermore, they also reflect the 
state of community cohesion and civicness. As Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns suggested, 
the simplest observable measure for recognizing a socially cohesive neighborhood 
“would be of groups of people who live in a local area getting together to promote or 
defend some common local interest” (2001: 2134). To understand neighborhood 
politics and the socio-political order of contemporary China at the base level, we have 
to explore the mechanisms of these grassroots movements. 
In the following sections, I first review existing research on collective 
resistance. The next section discusses the main concept of social capital employed in 
                                                 
26 The earliest draft of this chapter was presented at Asia Research Institute conference: “Social and 
Cultural Change in Asia: Past and Present,” 16-17 October 2003, National University of Singapore; see 
Shi (2003). Part of it also appears differently in my one co-authored article; see Shi and Cai (2006). I 







this project. Then I describe the movement’s history. Finally, I examine the link 
between social capital and ordinary social movements.  
The Study of Collective Resistance in Contemporary China  
When studying China’s collective resistance, there is a need to classify 
different types of social movements in terms of characteristics and dynamics, as each 
type faces different conditions and constraints (Perry 2001; Pei 2003; Liu 2004). 
According to Liu Neng, since the 1990s, collective protests by cross-class citizens, 
referred to as “ordinary social movements”, and the rights defense movements by 
“weak” citizen groups are the two types of collective resistance that break out most 
frequently (see Liu 2004:67). 27  These two types of movements constitute “ordinary 
resistance”. As Pei Minxin (2003:28) writes, these resistances “seek redress of routine 
instances of injustice for which victims hold the government and its agents 
responsible.” However, according to Liu Neng, ordinary social movements differ 
from rights defense movements in participants and orientations. In particular, their 
participants include citizens from different class backgrounds. Except for specific 
economic problems, ordinary social movements also deal with certain social issues 
including environmental protection, property rights, etc; and they aim to promote the 
interests of all citizens in given communities instead of those of particular groups (Liu 
2004:65). Furthermore, ordinary social movements sometimes claim rights which are 
granted to citizens by law in principle but never actually delivered to them, for 
example, the rights to organize a free demonstration. Therefore, compared to reactive 
                                                 
27What is called a “right-defense” movement (weiquan yundong) refers to the collective efforts of 
certain citizen groups to defend their own rights or interests. This type of movement generally focuses 
on specific economic issues faced by weak groups, such as asking for compensation for resettlement, 
protesting against over-levied taxation, etc; and they are usually reactive and defensive. Most of their 
participants are of similar socio-economic status (Yu 2004). In contemporary China, some citizen 
groups such as rural peasants, rural-urban immigrants and urban workers are “weak” in terms of their 






rights defense movements, ordinary social movements utilize a greater degree of 
proactive resistance28.  
Until now, the dynamics of ordinary social movements in the new context of 
urban governance have not been well understood. Mainstream theories on social 
movements focus on resource mobilization and political process models, examining 
the mechanisms of collective resistance (McCarthy& Zald 1973, 1977; Tilly 1978; 
McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001) while 
new social movement theories highlight the social meaning and significance that 
contemporary collective resistance represents (Touraine 1981，1988; Castells 1983；
Offe 1985; Habermas 1987； Melucci 1989；Johnston & Klandermans eds 1995). 
These theories appear inadequate to explain the dynamics of ordinary social 
movements within an authoritarian context.  
Most existing studies on China’s ordinary resistance focus on examining rights 
defense movements; and suggest that improved legislation and the relative tolerance 
of high-level government to civil resistance against local authorities could serve as the 
“political opportunity” for citizen action (O’Brien 1996; Li & O’Brien 1996; Cai 2002; 
Yu 2004). This framework cannot adequately explain the different consequences of 
collective resistance in different neighborhoods under the same “political opportunity 
structure”. Previous studies on both social movements in other countries and China’s 
rights defense movements suggest that social networks should be responsible for the 
mobilization of collective action (e.g. Snow, Louis & Sheldon 1980; Klandermans & 
Oegema 1987; Dieter & Gern 1993; Lee 2000b; Ying 2001; Cai 2002); however, most 
                                                 
28 According to Charles Tilly (1978), reactive movements generally aim to resist against agents of the 
state to defend group rights and privileges which have already been possessed by citizens while 







of them focus on examining the role of horizontal networks among citizen protesters 
themselves without looking at the support they may receive from high-level 
government agencies. As Mayer Zald (1992:339) pointed out, most social movement 
researchers ignore the influence of the inner workings of government on collective 
action. Therefore, it remains a question why some citizen protesters succeed in getting 
support from higher-ranking authorities in China while others fail. More recent 
studies suggest that personal vertical networks are important channels for China’s 
citizens to informally participate in politics in order to pursue their individual interests 
(Walder 1986; Oi 1985, 1989; Lieberthal 1992). This infers that some citizen 
protesters may also utilize personal vertical networks between themselves and the 
high-ranking officials who are close to them to facilitate civil resistance. Clearly, we 
need to explore the role of vertical networks in collective resistance. Fourthly, as 
many researchers pointed out, there was few existing research identifying how 
collective action reshapes a polity’s institutional structure (O’Brien 2003:59 ; also see 
McAdam 1996:36); and “comparatively little is also known about the biographical 
consequences of contention; in particular, how it affects the values of activists” (O’ 
Brien 2003:59). Therefore, we need to explore biographical consequences of 
collective resistance to further understand contentious politics.  
This chapter examines the dynamics of such collective resistance in Green 
Neighborhood. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: 1) why are citizens 
in certain neighborhoods more active and successful in launching collective resistance 
than citizens in other neighborhoods who face similar problems and situations? 2) 
How do they undertake collective action using horizontal and vertical networks with 






in the movement in order to outwit their opponents? 4) What is the impact of such 
kind of community movements on local political order? 
A Story of the North Green Neighborhood: A Ten-year Community Movement 
Since the 1990s, many of China’s cities have launched large-scale urban 
renewal and estate development projects to promote local economic growth and to 
improve urban images. However, local governments and estate developers are usually 
very rushed in making progress and profits; and they often push forward projects that 
may adversely affect citizens’ living environments in neighborhoods. This has 
resulted in accumulating mass dissatisfaction among citizens and significant civil 
resistance. This study examines a case of citizens’ collective resistance against the 
occupation of their community park by an estate owner and the local government in 
succession in Green Neighborhood. 
With the development of PN district, the land value of Green Neighborhood 
has been steadily increasing due to its good geographic location. Many local power 
holders coveted and attempted several times to occupy part of the land of the 
community park. Therefore, from 1993 to 2003, residents in the north Green 
Neighborhood launched a community movement that intermittently lasted ten years to 
protect their community park from being occupied. The first phase of this movement 
was against a particular estate development company, and the second was directed at 
the local government.  
The resistance against the estate developer: the origin of a community movement 
The lack of trust and the failure of the initial collective resistance 
In July 1993, an estate developer, which was a state-owned development 






ground to build a twenty-six-storey residential building for sale. This project upset 
Mrs Fang, a retired teacher living in GII, because this new high building would shade 
many homes including hers from sunshine; and it would occupy a lot of land intended 
for a community park. Fang first expressed her concern through administrative 
channels, specifically to the GII RC and the W Street Office, which are supposed to 
represent residents’ interests. The latter would not risk offending the powerful estate 
development company and warned Fang not to “make trouble.” Angered by this, Fang 
was determined to lodge collective complaints (jiti shangfang) to higher level 
government because this is usually the only economical and effective way for 
powerless citizens to combat local power holders who violate their interests(see 
O’Brien & Li 1995; O’Brien 1996; Cai 2002). To mobilize other residents to 
participate in collective resistance, Fang had to solicit trust and cooperation from the 
community. Before this event, there was little collective action in GII and residents 
did not know each other. Therefore, Fang got acquainted with some heads of 
residents’ groups in the north Green Neighborhood to persuade them to mobilize 
residents to join in her resistance. At the outset, few people believed in her because 
they did not know her. Fang explained to them that she needed their participation 
simply because a collective complaint would be more effective; and she also assured 
them repeatedly that she would lead the future resistance and take on any potential 
risk herself. Due to Fang’s insistence and in view of the common problem residents 
would face, some residents finally agreed to participate in collective resistance.  
One day in September 1993, Fang led 37 residents to the PN District 
Government to complain about the project. However, the security guards at the 
government building refused to let them in. Fortunately, Fang happened to see one of 






told the official their problems; and the latter then ordered the guards to let Fang into 
the government office to express their appeal. Therefore, by her individual vertical 
ties, Fang succeeded to voice their concern to the District Government. 
After a few days, one of the top leaders of the Government instructed that the 
project should be canceled because it occupied the ground for greenery. This greatly 
inspired those resident protesters. More residents thus believed they also should 
participate in the struggle for their community interests. However, because the estate 
development company was affiliated to the Shanghai Municipal Government, the 
management did not treat the instruction of the PN District Government seriously at 
the beginning; and they went on constructing the project. Then, Fang and other 
residents lodged complaint to the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress. Encouraged 
by Fang’s initial success, more residents attended the collective complaint. One leader 
of the People’s Congress instructed that this matter should be investigated in case it 
would trigger unrest in the neighborhood.  
Due to the pressure from the high-level authority, the development company 
started to deal with the resistance seriously. On account of the importance of Fang in 
the movement, the development company attempted to prevent her from organizing 
collective resistance again. They believed that if they successfully disintegrated the 
residents’ protest, both the Municipal People’s Congress and the district government 
would turn a blind eye to their illegal occupation of the open ground since the 
company was a state firm of the municipal government. Therefore, they requested 
help from the W Street Office; the latter then ordered the GII RC to monitor Fang’s 
action. Meanwhile, the company attempted to discredit Fang in the community. They 
pretended to negotiate secretly with Fang herself, promising that they would provide 






resistance. It was said that Fang, due to the pressure of the RC and the temptation of 
new housing, agreed to concede. However, the company also spread a rumor that 
Fang was willing to compromise with them secretly because she had accepted big 
gifts from them. Due to their unfamiliarity with Fang and shaky trust in her, many GII 
movement participants were convinced of the rumor. Greatly angered at Fang’s 
“betrayal,” they declined further participation in collective resistance. As one former 
participant in GII told me, “I didn’t know her (Fang) before. She just came to my 
home and told me that the project would block our homes from sunshine. I worried 
about this. So I joined them (to the government). But later I heard that she just utilize 
us to make deal with the company. I was very angry. When she came to my home 
again to talk about this matter, I just told her to go out. After that, I didn’t participate 
in such thing any more.” Although Fang found that she had been cheated by the 
company and tried to organize resistance again, nobody would join her. Therefore, 
Fang had to withdraw from collective action since then. Furthermore, many activists 
in GII felt very disappointed and would not engage themselves in collective action 
again. The collapse of trust between movement activists and the leader in GII had 
resulted in the decline of social capital and the absence of further collective action in 
this sub-neighborhood. 
The transference of leadership in the community movement 
Before Fang’s final failure, some activists did not trust her very much. The 
latter realized that a reliable and able leader was most important for a successful 
resistance. Then, a protest activist from GI recommended one “trustworthy” neighbor, 
Mr. Tan, to lead their resistance. Tan was a low-ranking administrator of a plaza in his 






residents including Tan had been collectively resettled from the same downtown area 
there (jiti dongqian) by the government. Before moving to Green Neighborhood, 
these former neighbors had lived in one outmoded Shanghai-style lane, where the bad 
living conditions and the common requirement obliged neighbors to interact and 
cooperate with one another. As former researchers pointed out, the more people 
connect and cooperate with one another, the more they will trust one another (Gittell 
& Vidal 1998:15). In this instance, the long-term successful interactions and 
cooperation made neighbors know one another very well; they had thus gradually 
cultivated trust and dense networks of interaction among themselves. When Tan and 
his neighbors moved to Green Neighborhood, they still kept close interactions with 
one another frequently. This activist believed that Tan would be a good leader for 
their resistance, for Tan had experienced collective action many times during the 
Cultural Revolution; and he had many friends including some government officials 
who might be helpful in their future action. In addition, Tan was enthusiastic about 
helping others. The activists visited Tan and requested him to lead the movement. 
Actually, Tan moved to Green Neighborhood primarily because he had wanted to live 
near to a big park. He had a good friend who was a high-ranking official in the 
Shanghai Municipal Construction Planning Bureau (Planning Bureau), which was in 
charge of approving all construction plans under the jurisdiction of Shanghai City. 
This official told him the construction plan of Green Neighborhood before. Therefore, 
Tan knew that the developer’s project was not included in the construction plan. 
However, he was quite busy and was not involved in the movement at the outset.  
Persuaded by his neighbor activists, Mr. Tan agreed to lead the movement. He 
was very confident in getting support from his old neighbors in the future action. But 






developer. He discussed the development project with his neighbors. One of them, an 
estate expert, would assist him in organizing resistance. The resistance team found 
that the project might not conform to construction laws. Since the 1980s, the state has 
begun to emphasize the policy of “rule by law.” Like protest activists in rural China 
(see e.g. O’Brien & Li 1995; Ying 2001), these resistance leaders understood the 
importance of law and policy for ordinary citizens, in order to make salient claims 
against power holders. They believed that if they could provide strong evidence 
proving that the estate developer had violated the construction law or the 
neighborhood plan, they could urge high-level authorities to punish the developer and 
to suspend the project. Essentially, their strategy was similar to the strategies adopted 
by China’s rural protestors, a kind of protest labeled as “rightful resistance” (O’Brien 
1996) and “struggle by law” (Yu 2004). Tan approached his friend in the Planning 
Bureau for help. He also attempted to utilize his connections with old neighbors to 
mobilize local residents to participate in the resistance. As Tan pointed out when he 
spoke to me about their struggle strategy, “laws and ‘public relations’ (gongguan) are 
the most important things to resistance. If we can find evidence that local power 
holders violate laws, we will argue against them by citing the laws; if we cannot find 
such evidence, we will mobilize resistance though ‘public relations’ instead.”29 Tan 
also took many courses to learn more about laws and the skills of practicing “public 
relations” in the follow years. Actually, for these protesters, laws were only employed 
to legitimize the movement and to put pressure on government agencies while social 
                                                 
29 Chinese people usually relate “public relations” to the concept of guanxi. Actually, what Tan refers 
to here is the utilization of social networks. These networks include not only such “guanxi” as personal 
ties between relatives, colleagues, and friends, but also “public networks” like the mass media. 
Furthermore, for Tan and other activists, it is good thing to utilize personal connections for community 
and public benefit;  this is essentially different from the action that people take for personal interests 
through  guanxi. In other words, the concept of guanxi cannot cover the horizontal networks and 






capital was the main means through which they constructed their resistance. I will 
discuss this further in my description of the movement history. 
Due to Tans’ persuasion, many residents living in No.1 Building, especially 
his old neighbors who knew him well and trusted him very much, agreed to join him 
and became his loyal supporters during the later ten-year community movement. 
Some residents even contributed money to the leaders as movement funds. Therefore, 
networks among these old neighbors constituted the initial social capital to facilitate 
mobilization. A few GII activists also participated in the action launched by GI 
residents. Furthermore, with the help of a friend in the Planning Bureau, Tan got a 
copy of the original construction plan of Green Neighborhood, which proved that 
indeed the project was not included in the official plan. 
Collective action and the success of the resistance against the developer 
The movement activists reported the evidence to the district government 
agency in charge of construction administration; but the latter chose to shelter the 
development company because it was an auxiliary of the municipal government. On 
the evening of June 15, 1994, Tan and a number of activists demonstrated in the north 
Green Neighborhood. They informed residents through loudspeakers that they had 
obtained evidence proving the project was illegal, and they called on residents to 
destroy the project’s underground construction. More than one thousand residents 
joined the action and demolished the construction into pieces. To prevent the 
developer from resuming the project, residents also urged high-level authorities to 
revoke the project once and for all. They lodged complaints to the mass media, 
especially The WH Newspaper, and requested the paper to highlight the illegal nature 






government control on the mass media has slackened. The mass media can report 
some social problems including those involving local authorities. Such reporting may 
influence public opinion and thus provoke high-level government agencies to deal 
with such problems because of concerns about legitimacy or criticism from superiors. 
Certain media affiliated to high-level authorities even have power to require local 
government agencies to assist in investigating influential events; they may report 
these events in their “internal reference” (neican or qingkuang huibao), which are 
only distributed to high-ranking officials to spotlight important issues. Therefore, 
many people may petition the mass media to get attention from high-level authorities 
when they suffer injustices. Since the Shanghai Municipal Government had 
highlighted the importance of environmental issues before, the municipal-government 
affiliated WH Newspaper and other media investigated the project and broadcast its 
illegal nature. With the help of his official friends, Tan also obtained information on 
the responsibilities of the Planning Bureau’s departments and their work schedules. In 
the following days, he organized residents to swarm the Planning Bureau’s important 
departments repeatedly accusing the developer of its illegal project. Pressured and 
almost paralyzed by these citizens who held strong evidence, the head of the Planning 
Bureau promised to investigate the project as soon as possible. 
Although the development company tried to discredit Tan as they did to Fang 
before, residents did not believe rumors spread about Tan. Under pressure of the 
protestors and the media, the Planning Bureau conducted a quick investigation of the 
project and repealed it in early July 1994. Further official investigation revealed that 






management staff of the company were thus arrested and put into prison30. This case 
clearly shows that through horizontal networks among neighbors and vertical 
networks with friends in government agencies and the mass media, these citizen 
protestors succeeded in their collective resistance against local economic elites. 
 
The enhancement of social capital within the community 
The success of the resistance against the estate development company greatly 
inspired movement activists and other residents, and they believed that they deserved 
a big celebration for it. When the construction team of the company withdrew from 
the open ground, many residents set off a lot of firecrackers; and the whole north part 
of Green Neighborhood was filled in the atmosphere of joy. The success also 
convinced many residents of the low risk of such kind of collective resistance; and 
many residents believed that community public affairs were under their control. 
Although the estate development company had retreated from the open ground，the 
plan to construct a community park was not implemented for a long time. Some local 
organizations, such as the primary school of Green Neighborhood and the Street 
Office also tried to occupy part of the ground for their use with different excuses in 
succession. Due to their experience of resisting the developer, Tan and other 
movement activists frustrated all such attempts; and they also repeatedly complained 
to the mass media of such situation again and again. Some influential Shanghai media 
such as WH Newspaper, Xinminwanbao, Laodonbao, concurrently broadcasted on the 
circumstances of the north Green Neighborhood. The media warned that the open 
                                                 






ground should not be a piece of “Meat of Tang Monk (tangseng rou)” 31  to be 
occupied by anyone; and urged the local government to carry out the plan to build the 
community park. Under the demands of residents and the pressure from the media, 
relevant PN district government sectors finally constructed the planned community 
park in May 1995, planting a large field of grass and a bamboo forest within it. In the 
following two years, this beautiful park proved to be an excellent public space for 
local residents to spend their leisure time.  
The first phase of the community movement greatly affected community life. 
It improved various social relationships in the north Green Neighborhood, especially 
in GI, and promoted community solidarity. Specifically, the success of the collective 
resistance promoted the level of trust and cooperation within the community. Because 
Tan showed his leadership and efficiency in a series of collective action, many 
residents trusted him very much. At numerous community activities later, it could be 
seen that any viewpoints or directions articulated by Tan were accepted and followed 
without being questioned.  
Since many residents were involved in a series of collective actions, they 
gradually became familiar with one another and developed the sense of “groupness”, 
which gave rise to greater trust and cooperation among them on other matters. In the 
course of collective resistance, activists also formed informal networks in the 
community. In nearly every residential building near the park, a few activists of 
different class backgrounds emerged, which included engineers, teachers, white-collar 
workers, ordinary workers, house wives and retired people. They were not only very 
                                                 
31 “Tang Monk (tangseng)” is the protagonist of a classical Chinese literature of “The Buddhism Trip 
to the West (xiyouji)”. He was sent to request for Buddhism literature to the Buddha by the emperor of 
the Tang Dynasty. It was said that people who eat the meat of Tang Monk would never die. So many 
evil spirits tried to catch and eat him, but all of them failed finally. “Meat of Tang Monk (tangseng 







active in collective action, but also willing to be under the leadership of Tan as well. 
There were many more activists in GI than in GII. These informal networks allowed 
Tan to easily mobilize residents for collective action. In No.1 Building where Tan 
lived, the number of activists was the most outstanding. 32  In 1996, when the 
government called on residents to elect their representatives to constitute home-
owners’ committees (HCs), residents in No.1 Building actively established the HC of 
No.1 Building (the No.1 HC), and elected Tan as its head. 33 This position provided 
him more opportunities and legitimacy to organize collective action.  
Through the various collective activities, the norm of community participation 
gradually took shape and be consolidated. A “tradition” of rights defense by law was 
thus constructed in Green Neighborhood, especially in GI, and many of its residents 
regarded their participation in collective action as duty34. As some GI residents told 
me, “to participate in the things (collective action) is good for the interest of all people 
including myself!” Most importantly, through a series of collective complaints, Tan 
succeeded in seeking support from some media and high-level authorities, and he 
henceforth managed to establish personal networks with some officials and journalists.  
As Robert D. Putnam (1993) pointed out, such social capital as trust, norms 
and networks have the tendency to strengthen themselves. Such successful 
cooperation will develop networks and trust among people which in turn facilitate 
their future cooperation on other matters.  A series of successful collective action led 
                                                 
32 Among nearly six hundred residents in this building, there are more than forty core activists who 
frequently participated in collective action (I managed to interview sixteen of them). And many other 
residents also participated in the movement occasionally. 
33 Since the middle of the 1990s, the state began to implement home property and required residents to 
buy homes themselves instead of asking for homes from work units as before. Those who had homes 
allocated to them by their work-units before were required to pay for the property, usually at a very 
cheap price (See Wang and Murie 1996; Cao and Li 2000). 
34 According to the survey, 7.0% GI respondents reported that they would participate in collective 
actions in their community due to the group pressure from neighbors. In contrast, no GII respondents 






by Tan resulted in the emergence of new networks among movement activists 
themselves, of vertical connections between Tan and some municipal officials and 
journalists, and of the norm for community participation. This reinforced trust and 
cooperation among resident protestors themselves, and between resident protestors 
and outside supporters. Therefore, these collective actions contributed to the 
enhancement of both Tan’s individual social capital and collective social capital of the 
north part of Green Neighborhood, especially of GI, which constituted the dynamic of 
future cooperation among residents. The networks among protest participants 
themselves and the norm for community participation are “bonding social capital” 
while the vertical connections between protest activists and municipal officials and 
journalists are “linking social capital” in terms of characteristics. 
 
Collective resistance against the local government: the highlight of the movement 
The contest between administrative power and citizen rights 
At the end of 1997, without any proper authorization, the PN District 
Government decided to encroach on the park to construct an entertainment center for 
its senior cadre. In contemporary China, senior cadre is an exclusive social group. 
Unlike those who started work after the 1949 Revolution, they can not only receive 
preferential retirement benefits from the incumbent government because of their 
contribution to the communist revolution, but also be able to exert great influence to 
incumbent officials by their links with former subordinates.  Therefore, they are very 
influential in Chinese politics at all levels. To some incumbent officials, being 
connected with influential senior cadre means great chances to be promoted in the 






position of Green Neighborhood, several relevant departments of the district 
government undertook this project together with the W Street Office. The district 
government would provide the funding; and the latter was responsible for the 
construction. The Street Office had a strong incentive in the project for several 
reasons. First, it was not rational for it to offend the district government, which was its 
direct superior authority. Second, it would benefit from the project because the district 
government would make an investment of 10 million yuan on this project. Once 
constructed, the entertainment center would be counted as an important achievement 
of community building of the Street Office because it will be under the jurisdiction of 
the Office. In addition, the senior cadres were generally very old; the Street Office 
would retain the facilities after all those senior cadres have passed away. Actually, 
there was already a recreation center for elder residents of the neighborhood within 
the community park, which occupied approximately a space of 135 square meters. 
The government’s construction plan was to dismantle the recreation center and to 
build their entertainment center, which would cover 1300 square meters of the park 
and be only for the use of senior cadre. The Street Office then sent a construction 
team, which was said to bribe officials to get the construction contract, to destroy part 
of the park, and to build the planned entertainment center.  
Many residents in north Green Neighborhood were upset by this project. First, 
this project would adversely affect their neighborhood environment because it 
occupied part of the park. Since relevant laws had regulated that parks are not allowed 
to be demolished without legal approval, these residents believed that the local 
government should not destroy the park at will. Secondly, they believed that this 
project would violate their estate property rights. Due to housing reform, many 






held that the park was part of the public facilities auxiliary to their residential 
buildings, and should be the common property of local residents. Therefore, they 
maintained that the local government had no authority to occupy the land without 
legal approval. Furthermore, many residents believed that once the local government 
used the facilities for commercial purposes in future, the neighborhood would be 
turned into a business district and the quiet environment would be destroyed. In 
addition, Tan and other former movement activists believed that it was unfair for the 
local government to occupy the park because the latter had not supported the residents 
when they prevented the estate developer from occupying the ground.  
Therefore, Tan and other activists decided to launch resistance against the 
local government to defend their “rights of property and environment.” At the 
beginning, they voiced their concerns directly to the Street Office. But the latter just 
ignored them. The government agency claimed that the park was owned by the state; 
and that, as a representative of the state, the local government had the power to 
encroach upon the park. The Street Office also warned that those who dare to obstruct 
the project would be regarded as disturbing social order and be seriously punished. 
These activists recognized that their opponent this time was the enormously powerful 
local government35, and that any rash action would put them at risk. Their actions had 
to be justified. However, past success in earlier resistance granted great confidence to 
Tan and other activists.  Given the fact that this project violated regulations about 
residents’ housing property rights and greenery in public space, they believed that 
                                                 
35 In China’s administering system, bypassing their immediate superiors, some local government 
officials tend to establish direct links with higher ranking authorities by informal networks. If they 
succeed in doing this, they could ignore the authority of their immediate superiors and thus have more 
independence. In the case of the PN district, it is special in Shanghai in terms of its status. Since its 
opening, its district government has been granted much more power than other district governments. 
The central government instructed that public affairs should be dealt with in special ways in the PN 
district. Therefore, even some municipal governmental sectors, without the support of top leaders of the 
municipal government, have no authority to give orders to the PN District Government, and the latter 






success was possible if their strategies were appropriate. To eliminate residents’ fear 
of the local government, the activists comprehensively propagated relevant laws and 
regulations in the neighborhood and attempted to convince residents of the 
correctness of fighting for citizen rights. They hung many banners on high buildings, 
using slogans such as “protect our park and greenbelt by law,” “we can survive 
without meat, but we cannot live without the greenbelt.” Their claims convinced 
many residents,36 and the latter thus strongly supported collective action.  
Drastic civil resistance and coercion from the local authority  
    At that time, nine HCs, including the No.1 HC, were already established in the 
Green Neighborhood, and six of them were in GI and well organized. To enhance the 
legitimacy of their protest and to reduce the risk of being labeled as “mobs,” Tan 
decided to launch collective resistance under the name of these formal associations. 
He visited important members of the other HCs one by one and invited them to 
participate in the resistance. Tan was very eloquent, and he articulated many laws and 
regulations about relevant issues. Most main members of the other HCs were 
convinced by him. An informal alliance was thus established among these HCs, and 
their leaders often discussed struggle strategies and tactics together and coordinated 
collective action. Tan also visited The WH Newspaper to complain against the local 
government and its illegal project, and delivered the petition letter endorsed by the 
nine HCs.  The WH Newspaper then reported the case to the municipal government on 
18 Feb 1998. Concerned with the stability of the area, the latter ordered the local 
government to suspend the project.  
                                                 
36 When I conducted fieldwork in Green neighborhood, many people including some old residents with 






The Street Office then requested to negotiate with the HCs in April 1998. Both 
parties reached a consensus that the local government could continue the project; but 
the building should be open to both senior cadres and local residents, and that the 
occupied land area of the park should not exceed 650 square meters. However, the 
District Government nullified this agreement in December 1998. Without informing 
residents, they set a new construction plan that would build entertainment facilities 
only for senior cadre. It was to occupy 2000 square meters of the park. In April 1999, 
the Street Office restarted the project. One movement activist had a cousin working in 
the local government who secretly told him that the government had broken their 
negotiated agreement. The movement activists felt deceived and were very angry. 
They not only lodged complaints to high-level authorities but also reported the 
treachery of the local government to the mass media. The WH Newspaper hence 
restarted its investigation of the case again; and the Street Office had to release their 
real plan to its journalist on 20 May, 1999. However, ignoring the prohibition against 
the plan, by the Municipal Planning Bureau, the local government continued 
construction.  
The movement leaders realized that if they just voiced their resistance through 
conventional channels and this did not stop the construction, it would soon become a 
fait accompli; but if they engaged in violent conflicts with the local government, high-
level authorities would treat it as a serious event threatening local stability. The local 
government might very well be forced to concede to residents. Thus, residents 
decided to take more challenging action. On the evening of 25 May 1999, Tan led 
more than forty activists to destroy the construction foundation. At the beginning, the 
boss of the construction team was going to command the workers to fight the 






grasped him on the collar and shouted at him: “how dare you fight us residents!” The 
angry boss tried to hit her. But the residents just bellowed out: “you cannot hit a 
woman!” The boss then realized that it was a woman! And he gave up.37 The protest 
activists destroyed the construction foundation without damaging the construction 
equipment. According to the report of the construction company, the immediate 
financial loss in the event was more than 100 thousand yuan. Actually, before the 
action, Tan had discussed the plan with a public safety officer who was also an 
intimate friend. The officer advised that they might not be strictly punished by high-
level government as long as they did not damage the equipment, because high-level 
government officials usually interpreted the action of damaging equipment as 
“damaging state property.” The protestors remained within this boundary of action.  
After this event, the Street Office spread word to the public that the collective 
action was destructive by nature, comparable to the 1989 Tiananmen Event. The 
Street Office also threatened to arrest Tan and other activists. The latter then decided 
to lodge complaints to the Shanghai Municipal Government and to request it to 
prevent the local government from exerting vindictive action. By consulting his 
friends in government, Tan understood the importance of timing for the success of 
collective complaints. Usually, collective complaints launched on important political 
occasions such as National Day or the people’s congress, will draw the attention of 
high-level authorities, and be addressed quickly. At that time, the fourth of June was 
near. Due to the social memory of the 1989 Tiananmen Event, the dates close to 4 
June every year are sensitive ones. Any events happening on these dates would attract 
high attention from high-level government. But if the protestors went to the municipal 
government in the daytime or on dates too close to 4 June, the impact might be too 
                                                 






great, which would disgrace and infuriate the Municipal Government. Therefore, they 
must choose an optimal time so that the complaint would attract high attention from 
the government, but would not threaten its authority. The movement activists chose a 
relatively sensitive time to lodge a complaint to the municipal government’s 
Complaint Office - the evening of 1 June.38 This tactic turned out to be very effective. 
The Office immediately notified the local government about the complaint and urged 
them to deal with the matter carefully. Given the timing of the residents’ complaint, 
the local government was furious and scared because they could be blamed by high-
level authorities for their “inability to cope with local problems and to keep the local 
stable”. On the second day, several local officials accompanied by police visited the 
homes of the movement leaders, and warned them against lodging any more 
complaints to the municipal government. The home visit accompanied by police 
intensified the anger of movement activists. To prevent them from launching more 
collective complaints before 4 June, the local government had to order a number of 
officials and police to keep watch at the front of both No.1 Building and the municipal 
government. The Party Secretary of the PN district also instructed ambiguously that 
the controversy should be “dealt with according to the regulations of laws”.  
Since the collective resistance was organized under the name of HCs, the local 
government claimed that the type of citizen associations were becoming a “third 
force” threatening the authority of local governments and the rule of the party-state 
because they were well organized and advocated interests important to citizens. The 
local government concluded that HCs could be more dangerous than Falungong 
organizations. However, The WH Newspaper investigation report argued that the 
conflict was the fault of the local government, and the municipal government would 
                                                 






thus not believe the excuses of the latter. Therefore, the local government did not dare 
to punish movement activists and resume the project. But they were not willing to quit 
either. Because of Tan’s leading role in the movement, the local coalition tried to trap 
him into troubles. The boss of the construction team requested negotiating with Tan, 
promising to offer him a large sum of money, and the local government would arrest 
Tan once he accepted the money, which would be claimed to be the evidence of his 
blackmail. However, being cautious of such trap, Tan rejected the offer. 
The local government’s “soft” tactics and the splits within the community 
The local government understood that the networks among residents and their 
trust in Tan sustained the collective resistance. Therefore, the government tried all 
means to disrupt such networks and trust to crush the movement. Its officials sent 
presents to journalists and asked the latter to broadcast their claim that they were 
going to construct this building in order to provide entertainment facilities for local 
elderly residents. The Street Office also spread the rumor that Tan impeded the 
project because he wanted to blackmail them into allowing his friends to get the 
construction contract. They incited the GII RC to mobilize some elderly residents 
loyal to the RC to sign a petition letter to higher authority requesting to resume the 
project. Furthermore, the Street Office closed the whole park, which had been the 
main place for local residents to practice their physical exercises, to agitate the latter 
against movement activists. The leaders of the Street Office also attempted to build 
personal ties with several activists by giving them presents, and to draw the latter to 
their side. Moreover, they urged the RCs to disintegrate the alliance of HCs by 
fomenting discord between other HC leaders and Tan. In addition, the local 






to modify the construction plan of Green Neighborhood to adapt their project. By this, 
they tried to refute Tan’s claim that their project was an illegal one. 
Some of these tactics took effect. Due to the propaganda of the RCs and some 
media, many elderly residents in high-building area believed in the local government, 
and were thus very resentful of Tan and other movement activists. Most residents in 
the low-building area also agreed to let the local government resume the project, 
which was relatively far from their buildings and would not shade their homes from 
sunshine. The collective petition of elder residents gave the local government the 
excuse to claim that the majority of residents hoped to resume the project; that the 
objection of Tan and his supporters was unreasonable; that he just tried  “to incite one 
group of the mass against another”, and that he should be responsible for the 
instability in the neighborhood. Due to the lure of the Street Office, several former 
activists including the vice head of the No.1 HC who always trusted government 
agencies turned around to speak well of  the local government. They not only 
criticized Tan for his “radical” position publicly but also exposed his plan of action to 
the local government clandestinely.  
In September, 2000, the local government was going to resume the project. 
Tan asked two journalists in Shanghai TV Station to secretly investigate the matter 
and to report it on the news. If that was realized as planned, great pressure would be 
exerted on the local government. However, an anonymous former activist released 
this plan to the PN District Government secretly. The latter then requested the 
Propaganda Department of Shanghai Party Committee to prohibit the journalists from 
publishing the investigation report. This hit and frustrated Tan heavily. Hence after, 
he became more careful in organizing collective action. Furthermore, the relatives of 






importantly, Tan did not ask for agreement from most of other HC heads when he led 
in the collective action of destroying the construction framework in May 1999. Mrs. 
Li, the Secretary of GI Party Branch who had worked in the sub-neighborhood for 
many years and built personal connections with most HC heads told them that Tan 
and his partners had violated law and would be charged in court. 39 She asked them 
not to participate in the collective resistance organized by Tan any more. Due to her 
persuasion, most of the HC heads withdrew their participation in the resistance, 
believing that Tan was too radical. When Tan was going to initiate new collective 
complaints to high-level government agencies, they refused to endorse the complaint 
letters with the seals of their HCs. Therefore, the alliance between them and Tan 
collapsed.  
As a result, community solidarity was in a crisis. There were many conflicts 
and contradictions in the community due to this issue. Some elder residents often 
scolded Tan and other movement activists and refused to listen to the latter’s 
explanations. As one aging retired worker, Mr. Yang, who lived in No.1 Building, 
complained when he talked about the matter to me: “the government care about us 
elder people, and it was going to construct entertainment facilities for us. But those 
guys (Tan and other movement activists) just stopped the project because they wanted 
to blackmail the government. We are just a few old people; we cannot fight these 
young guys. I just do not understand why the government does not arrest them! The 
government is too weak!!” Mr. Yang even frequently quarreled with his son, who was 
also a Tan’s supporter. In one squabble about this matter, the son could not help 
shouting at him: “you fool old guy, do not you understand that the government is just 
                                                 
39 Usually, heads of RCs tend to built guanxi networks with community activists to facilitate their 






cheating you? The project will shade our building from sunshine!” But like many 
other elder residents, Mr.Yang insisted on believing in what the RC told them. 
Therefore, community solidarity had been seriously impaired, and Tan lost a number 
of supporters. This was a blow to the movement.                 
The countermeasures of protestors 
  Most movement activists, especially Tan, would not give up. As the leader of 
the movement, Tan worried about not only his personal reputation at stake, but also 
the interest of his supporters. As he told me in an interview, “if I quitted and lost the 
struggle, our resistance would be defined as illegal one, and they (the local 
government) would take revenge on me and other activists. We could not be able to 
live here any more. Furthermore, some journalists and officials supported us a lot in 
the struggle. If we lost, they would be believed to be on the wrong side by their 
supervisors and colleges…so, I could not quit and disappoint them. I also believed, if 
I insisted in the struggle, they would still support me! and we might win in the end. ” 
Fortunately, unlike Fang, even facing the tough situation, Tan still had ten plus loyal 
neighbors in his building who always trusted and followed him in the movement. 
They would not quit either. As one housewife told me, “we are neighbors for many 
years. We trust him (Tan), he is always right!” Another engineer put his words in this 
way, “I know him very well. He always deal with this kind of matters according to 
law. So it should be not very risky to follow him in the action. If I quitted, I would 
lose my friendship with him and others (activists). So I just went on attending the 
action.”  As Michael Schwartz and Shuva Paul (1992) pointed out, the primary groups 
of protestors based on their face-to-face interactions could be one key factor 






among these neighbor activists, they encouraged one another, and were determined to 
fight back. Some of Tan’s friends in government agencies would also help him in 
collective resistance. Since the alliance among the formal HCs had disintegrated, Tan 
and other activists sought to construct resistance through informal networks. On the 
one hand, they attempted to put pressure on the Street Office. After consulting their 
friends in government agencies, the movement activists realized the W Street Office 
had been concerned with its image very much. Its head was a relatively young 
political star in the District and would have great promotion opportunity in near future. 
The release of its scandal to the mass media and residents would destroy the 
reputation of the Street Office, which would impose heavy pressure on its leaders. 
Therefore, through vertical networks with friends in government agencies, Tan and 
other movement activists collected many documents about the real plans of the local 
government. Then, Tan released this evidence to journalists and local residents, and 
they refuted the claims of the Street Office. Having unmasked the “lies” of the local 
government, the movement activists accused it of violating relevant laws on 
environment and property rights. They also claimed that the local government did not 
represent the state on this issue; that residents should follow laws instead of the orders 
of the local government. They affirmed that their resistance was not to challenge the 
state, but to help it restrain the local government from engaging in illicit activities. 
Tan also claimed that, as head of the No.1 HC, he had the obligation to defend 
citizen’s rights which had been granted by law.  
The fighting back of the movement activists against the Street Office seriously 
damaged the reputation of the latter. Some journalists like Mr. Ge who had supported 
the local government before turned around to criticize it and express support for the 






Being a new political star, he was expected to get promoted in near future. But media 
disclosure of the illegal construction project led to a negative image of him. The 
media coverage also convinced many residents of the “rightness” of the resistance. 
Furthermore, some movement activists frequently flooded into the Street Office to 
urge the latter to withdraw the project. One day, “Small Li” led some activists to the 
Office again. They happened to see that its head was going out. “Small Li” then 
stopped his car and required him to resolve the problem right then. The head said that 
he was attending an urgent meeting, and he would have a dialogue with them later. 
But “Small Li” would not let him go. Bored of the issue and provoked by this 
“manly” woman, the young head could not help being furious. He got out of the car 
and shouted at the movement activists that it was the instruction of one high-rank 
Party official from the PN district that the project should be continued. His 
impoliteness and the information let out, together with the evidence displayed by Tan 
raised residents’ antipathy to the local government. Since then, deep disappointments 
and distrust to the local government had been pervasive among residents in the north 
Green Neighborhood. As many residents put it, “they are government agencies, but 
they deceived us on earth! We will never believe in them any more.” The fighting 
back of the movement activists discredited the local authorities successfully and won 
back more support for themselves. This constituted a strong basis for them to urge the 
municipal government to cancel the project. 
Through the network of activists, Tan also called 266 residents to sign another 
complaint letter in mid-September 2000. Through a friend, Tan delivered the letter to 
a vice head of Shanghai People’s Congress, who in turn required the head of the PN 
District Government to take care of this case. Movement activists also lodged 






HC, Tan drew on some of its financial resources to fund the movement40. Meanwhile, 
Tan’s journalist connections introduced him to the Shanghai Branch of the Xinhua 
News Agency (Xinhua Branch). The Xinhua Branch investigated the matter and 
believed what Tan had told them, and they warned the top municipal leaders that they 
would report this affair to the central government if they ignored residents’ 
complaints. Through his vertical networks, Tan also got their complaint letters sent to 
several central government agencies, and the latter instructed the Shanghai Municipal 
Government to deal with the matter seriously.  
Intervention from high-level government agencies 
         In the movement, some municipal government sectors, such as the Planning 
Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Garden and Forestry Management Bureau 
(Garden Bureau) supported citizen protestors considerably. Actually, there were 
contradictions between the deeds of some municipal government sectors and the PN 
District Government. Because the latter were granted much privilege, they often 
ignored the regulations of municipal government sectors. Therefore, these sectors 
were quite unsatisfied with the local government. Through their friends in “high 
places”, the movement leaders realized, and attempted to exploit such “splits” within 
the administrative system. In one instance, the local government placed its title in 
front of the position of the Planning Bureau on the project poster, a clear display of 
disrespect to the authority of the latter.41 Tan took photos of this poster and sent them 
to the Planning Bureau. The Bureau was outraged and petitioned the local government, 
                                                 
40 Mr. Tan also utilized part of the income to cover the fee for him to mobilize the movement, such as 
the tax fee for movement activists to lodge collective complaints. 
41 Normally, In China’s official culture, the “position” on circulars should be strictly identical with the 
authority of individuals or organizations in reality.  Images located behind other images, or on the back 






urging the poster be changed. In the movement, the activists also claimed that they 
launched the resistance against the local government to defend the authority of high-
level government bodies. Resentful of the fact that their authority had been impaired 
by the local government, some municipal government sectors thus stood on the side of 
resident protestors.  
In Feb 2000, due to the influence of Tan’s leading the long-term movement of 
protecting the park, one leader of the Garden Bureau, who was also Tan’s friend, 
proposed to grant him the honorary title of “the Guardian of Greenery.” This title has 
been annually granted to ten selected Shanghai citizens who have contributed greatly 
to the protection of greenery. Many TV stations and newspapers in Shanghai 
broadcasted the movement and Tan’s leading role, which made Tan more influential 
in the local scene. The encouragement and support of high-level authorities and the 
mass media greatly inspired Tan and other activists, and also granted the resistance a 
greater level of legitimacy. As some officials in the local government admitted: 
“Because they granted Tan the title, we could not use force against him directly”.  
Because of the pressure from the central government agencies and the Xinhua 
Branch, and of the support of some municipal government sectors to citizen protestors 
as well, a top leader of the municipal government required the heads of the Planning 
Bureau and the Garden Bureau to resolve the “problem” once and for all. The latter 
then went to the PN District Government together and had a meeting with its Party 
Secretary and administrative head in late-September 2000. As the result, the 






The challenge of local government to municipal authorities and the splits within 
itself  
However, although having signed the agreement with the municipal 
government sectors, the local government was not willing to carry it out. Instead, to 
confront the pressure from above, it turned round to play the card of “opinions of the 
mass.” Under the pretext of “Party organization”, the Street Office asked Aunt Ho, a 
retired factory cadre and an active old Party member living in No.4 High Building in 
GI, to organize elder residents to appeal for the resumption of the project. Because of 
her high education and active involvement in local public affairs, Aunt Ho was 
respected and trusted by some elder people in the neighborhood. Loyal to “the calling 
of the Party organization”, she mobilized more than 100 elderly residents to sign a 
petition requesting the continuation of the project to the Planning Bureau in 
November 2000. The top leader of the PN District Government thus argued that part 
of the project at least should be constructed. Tan was awfully angry with Ho’s action 
and the capriciousness of the local government. Therefore, together with other 
activists, he mobilized 427 residents to sign another complaint letter against the local 
government. The Garden Bureau was also very upset and strongly supported the 
residents’ protest. Its head indicated their determination to deal with the matter 
according to law and never to allow the construction of the apparent illegal project. In 
March 2001, the Bureau again conferred on Tan the honorary title, “the Guardian of 
Greenery”.  
Then, the local government tried to resume the project with other excuses. In 






and  attached a well-printed sample picture of the design (see chart 5.1) to every 
family in GI, GII, part of GIII, and part of GIV with the assistance of the RCs. 
Chart 5.1 Sample Picture of the Planning Park 
 
 
           In the letter the Office asked for the residents’ opinions (approval or 
disapproval) towards the project. The RC-constituents relations (see Read 2003a) 
helped the local authority a lot in this event. At the first glance, the sample picture on 
the letter looks very well. With the propaganda and persuasion of the RCs, most 
residents in Green Neighborhood believed that the project was well designed this time, 
and they thus supported the resumption of the project, as shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 the attitudes of local residents to the project described on the letter                
Q: do you support 
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Source: files from the W Street Office and the GI RC 
This Table displays the diverse attitudes of local residents towards the project. 
Actually, such attitudes were highly relevant to their interests and their relationships 
with the local authority. To most residents living in the low-building area, No.2, No.4, 
No.5 high buildings in GI, and in GIII and GIV, the project was relatively far from 
their residential buildings and would not protect their homes from sunshine (see the 
map in Chapter Two). Therefore, they did not care much about its adverse effect and 
just supported the RCs and the local government in this matter. On the other hand, for 
most GII residents, the project was just near their buildings. However, as our survey 
indicated, there was low civicness within this sub-neighborhood (see Chapter Four). 
Although a few GII residents (4.3%) objected to the project, most of them (93.1%) 
supported the local authority in this matter. However, the attitudes of GI residents 
living in No.1 Building were greatly unlike those mentioned above. Many movement 
activists ignored the letter. For those who replied to the letter, 69.1% of them objected 
to the project and 5.4% of them kept a neutral position although 25.5% supported the 
need to resume the project. This table also reflects the split between residents living in 
No.1 Building and other residents in Green Neighborhood, and the split within the 






Referring to the statistical result of the feedback, the Street Office claimed that 
the problem had been resolved in a democratic manner, given that more than 98% of 
residents in Green Neighborhood supported the resumption of the project. In addition, 
the Office claimed that this was an important project relevant to the local community 
building. These claims put Tan and other movement activists in an awkward position. 
The result was that many residents in the GI low-building area and other sub-
neighborhoods blamed them for their “unreasonable” objection to the project.  
            On his part, having carefully studied the public letter and the sample picture 
attached to it, Tan believed that the local government had played a trick on this issue. 
With background knowledge of construction, Tan judged that the Street Office could 
have intentionally drawn the sample picture with an unbalanced proportion, thus 
hiding the real construction plan; that the facilities would occupy a large piece of 
ground of the park once they were built according to the picture. Furthermore, in the 
picture, there was a long corridor outside the entertainment center. But Tan claimed 
that it was not necessary to build such a corridor and that the local government could 
convert it into business shops. Tan also argued that the authoritative rule guiding the 
construction of community buildings should be laws instead of “the opinions of the 
masses”; that is, as agent of the state, the local government should deal with the 
matter according to law. He blamed the Street Office for “inciting one group of the 
mass against another”, warning that they should be responsible for the instability in 
the neighborhood. Tan not only publicized his study in the neighborhood, but also 
complained to the municipal government agencies by citing laws. This was a blow to 
the local government. 
The persistent resistance of movement activists led to splits within the local 






including some local Party members realized that they had been cheated by the Street 
Office again; they were thus resentful of the Office and the RCs. The relations 
between residents in No.1 Building and the GI RC became strained. As Secretary Li 
told me, “some Party members just blamed me: ‘Secretary Li, you should not cheat us 
residents in this matter!’” A RC staff also reported that many residents in No.1 
Building would scold them once they walked in this building. Some heads of the 
residential groups in the building also became Tan’s supporters. Therefore, the RC 
could not exercise its effective management there.  Although Secretary Li succeeded 
in collapsing the alliance among the HCs, she failed to disintegrate Mr. Tan’s 
personal networks with other movement activists; as she told me: “it is difficult to win 
over residents in No.1 Building. Tan always won struggles and was very popular 
among them. Party members there supported him instead of our Party branch! ” The 
Street Office was quite dissatisfied with Secretary Li’s inability to deal decisively 
with disgruntled activists. Party Secretary of the W Street Office complained when 
she talked to me about Mrs. Li:  
“She does not have good thoughts about her job, and she is not qualified 
for neighborhood management under the new social context. As a 
secretary of Party Branch, she lacked political responsibility, and was 
negative in this issue (the residents’ unrest); and she always tried to 
withdraw from the conflicts between us and the resident protestors. If it 
is always we Street Office that directly confront residents, there will be 
tension between us and them. If the grassroots Party Branch and the RC 
had taken some responsibility, the situation would have been better. But 
each time we needed her to do something, she always declined…she was 
just scared of resident protestors like Tan!”  
 
However, Mrs. Li was aggrieved for the RC and herself because she believed 






claimed that she would not support the Street Office in this issue any more. The 
contradiction between the two parties resulted in her job transfer at the beginning of 
2001, with Mrs. Long being appointed to take her place.  
But Tan and other movement activists persisted in their resistance. The Garden 
Bureau maintained their support for the activists and granted Tan the honorary title of 
“the Guardian of Greenery” in spring 2002 for the third time. Under pressure from 
many parties, the Street Office had to negotiate, and to compromise, with movement 
activists. However, the PN District Government was dissatisfied with their inability to 
complete the project, leading to the job transfers of the vice head of the Street Office 
who took care of this project, and later the young head himself as well.  
Compromise among the both parties  
The contradictions between the local administrative system and residents, 
together with the splits within both groups themselves, resulted in the decline of 
neighborhood governance. The continuing poor state of the project adversely affected 
the neighborhood environment and undermined residents’ trust in the local 
government. The dissatisfaction and non-cooperation of many residents with the GI 
RC led to a serious decline of local governance in GI. Not surprisingly, it was 
deprived of the honorary title of “Model Quarter” in April 2001. Very much worried 
about the situation, the Street Office decided to concede to the demands of the 
movement activists. As the new vice head of the Office who took care of this project 
told me: “We did not care about face or interests any more. We just want to negotiate 
with them and resolve the problem once and for all!” On the other hand, Tan who also 
faced huge pressure from some residents supporting the local government deciding to 






RC, several officials of the Street Office had a meeting with Tan and other HC heads. 
They negotiated and reached an agreement on several issues: the local government 
can resume the project; the building will be open to all local residents; the occupied 
land area should not exceed 670 square meters; the corridor around the building 
should not be built. According to the memorandum of the meeting, “(The officials of) 
the Street Office were sincere (in the meeting); the RC staff were enthusiastic at it; 
and Mr. Tan was reasonable…” Afraid of residents’ complaints again, the District 
Government approved this agreement in May 2005. After obtaining legal approval, 
the Street Office started the construction at the end of 2002 and rebuilt the park by 
June 2003. Therefore, the movement activists won the resistance in the end. 
Social Capital and the Dynamics of Ordinary Social Movements  
In contemporary China, there have emerged many collective resistances 
against local authorities, and this has become an important issue in grassroots politics.  
Mass dissatisfaction, the “split” within the administration system and civil 
resistance 
The existence of widespread dissatisfaction among citizens is the prerequisite 
for the emergence of civil resistance. One main source for discontent is the reform of 
state-owned enterprises which has caused many workers to be laid off, resulting in 
dropping in the standard and quality of living for workers and their families (Lee 
2000b; Chen 2000; Liu 2004). Another is the conflicts between citizens and local 
political and economical power holders, which is primarily reflected in urban renewal 
and home resettlement projects.42 Many citizens with different class backgrounds are 
                                                 
42 According to an investigation report, the main problems that China citizens presently complain of to 
the central government are laid-off by state-owned enterprises, forced resettlement by local 







involved in such conflicts. The aforementioned problems are often related to the 
corruption of local officials (eg. Lu 1999；Chen 2000), and resulted in the general 
reduction of citizens’ trust in local authorities.43 If this trend continues, it may make 
many urban citizens psychologically inclined to participate in protest.  
The rationalization of administration along with social transformation 
provided the “political opportunity structure” for citizen protestors to exploit for their 
resistance. Almost all movement activists admitted that they would never win the 
resistance against the local government if the socio-political situation was like that of 
the Maoist era, and that they would not dare to participate in such resistance at that 
time since the coercion from the state would be very strict. Furthermore, the “split” 
within the administration system also presented opportunity that could be exploited to 
facilitate collective resistance. In contemporary China, there is institutional necessity 
and feasibility for powerless citizens to employ informal means of social capital. Due 
to the authoritarian nature of the state, the legal system within it does not work well. 
Usually, when power holders break laws or state regulations, they are seldom 
punished in accordance with the law (Lubman 1999；Bao & Lu 2004). Therefore, in 
this movement, when facing local power holders who had violated citizens’ interests, 
it was difficult for powerless citizens to resolve their problems in court.  
The fragmented nature of the administrative system provides “opportunities” 
for citizens to utilize social networks to generate support from within the state. This 
case shows that the intervention of high-level government had great impact on the 
process and consequence of the movement against local authorities. As Lieberthal 
(2004:187) has suggested, although the Chinese regime is still a highly authoritarian 
                                                 
43 There is a Chinese saying spread in many areas: “the central government is citizens’ benefactor; the 
province government is like citizens’ relatives… the local government is citizens’ enemy”(also see 






state, it is not monolithic, and its “actual authority is in most instances fragmented.” 
Due to the diverse concerns of government agencies at different levels, there are a lot 
conflicts and gaps within the administrative system (Lieberthal & Lampton 1992; 
Bernstein &Lu¨ 2000；Ying 2001).  In time of reform, due to the redistribution and 
renegotiation of interests, the number of conflicts has increased, thus, local 
government interests are not always identical to those of high-level government 
sectors, especially in situations where the projects of the former violate the 
regulations of the latter. Therefore, the “gaps” among government agencies at 
different levels allow powerless citizens to mobilize at least some high-level 
government agencies to support resistance in local contexts (Shi & Cai 2006). 
However, not all civil protesters can exploit such “splits” because it is usually hidden 
from ordinary citizens, or citizens do not know how to exploit it even if they know it 
exists. Therefore, citizens need links and intercessors through which they can know 
the existence of such “splits,” and learn to exploit these weaknesses. Through 
personal vertical networks with government officials, the movement activists in GI 
were very aware of, and hence fully able to exploit the gaps between municipal 
government agencies and the local government. The support from the municipal 
government agencies not only instilled confidence in the protestors, but also led to the 
withdrawal of the local government from its project in the end.  
Social capital as a weapon of powerless citizens in the community movement 
The differences between neighborhoods towards the movement  
The community park was the focus of the movement. Actually, the larger part 
of this contested park was located in GII, and it was therefore more relevant to the 






quite differently to the community movement. Furthermore, the collective resistance 
in GII was short lived and failed while that of GI lasted and succeeded in the end. In 
other words, the success of the movement was mainly due to the efforts of GI 
residents. In comparing these two sub-neighborhoods to each other, it becomes 
apparent that social capital accounts for the discrepancy between them. Firstly, as 
mentioned in Chapter Four, there were sparse networks and weak trust among the GII 
protestors, as a consequence their resistance was easily disintegrated by the developer. 
This also resulted in their indifference to further collective action and cooperation, 
which also impeded possibilities of building social capital in this sub-neighborhood. 
In contrast, many GI protestors had been old neighbors with one another before they 
moved to GI, and the networks and trust among them were very strong due to long-
term interactions and cooperation, and they were thus more active in the movement. 
The early success in the resistance against the estate developer promoted the increase 
of social capital in GI, which further sustained the movement against the local 
government for many years. Secondly, another significant difference between GI and 
GII was the number of HCs in them. In GI, there were six well organized and active 
HCs, which facilitated the mobilization of and granted legitimacy to the collective 
resistance. In contrast, there were only two HCs in GII, and they were not so well 
organized to lead any collective action. Thirdly, compared to Fang, Tan not only had 
stronger horizontal connections with movement participants, but was also more 
“skillful” in employing vertical networks to muster support from high-level 
authorities and the mass media. His leadership was important for the resistance. 
However, strong leadership alone was not enough for the success. As Tan himself 
highlighted in my interviews, without the high solidarity among his neighbors and the 






all. His leadership was important for the resistance. However, strong leadership alone 
was not enough for the success. As Tan himself highlighted in my interviews, without 
the high solidarity among his neighbors and the support from high-level authorities to 
their “just” resistance, they could not succeed at all. Therefore, because there was a 
greater quantity of bonding social capital (horizontal networks and HCs) and linking 
social capital (vertical networks) in GI, and residents could wield social capital better 
than GII residents, the former were thus more active and successful in the movement. 
In other words, social capital fuels collective action, and its quantity influences the 
consequences of resistance. 
Bonding social capital and linking social capital in residents’ construction of their 
resistance 
Existing studies on rights defense movements highlight the pivotal role of 
leaders in such collective action, who emerge due to various reasons: concern for their 
own interests, a sense of justice, community pressure and self-confidence; and these 
studies also suggest that horizontal social networks are very important in mobilizing 
ordinary citizens to participate in collective action (O’Brien & Li 1995; Li & O’Brien 
1996; Lee 2000b; Ying 2001; Cai 2002).  In this community movement, Tan’s leading 
role was very important for its success. However, except for his neighbors’ request, 
Tan agreed to lead the movement also because he believed that they could succeed. 
He had confidence in the dense networks and high-level solidarity among neighbors. 
In fact, Tan’s success in mobilizing residents was very much dependent upon the 
existence of these networks. Therefore, horizontal networks are responsible not only 
for mobilizing citizens to participate in ordinary social movements, but also for 






The fact that horizontal networks play an important role in ordinary social 
movements is also one consequence of social change in urban China. Before the 
1990s, the basic unit of China’s grassroots governance was the work-unit in which 
most members were of similar economical and social status. Citizens were integrated 
into different work-units and their collective action was based on and bounded by 
these work-units (Walder 1986; Lu & Perry 1997).  Therefore, there was little 
interaction and cooperation among citizens from different work-units or class 
backgrounds. However, with the disintegration of the work-unit system and the shift 
to neighborhood governance, both the state and citizens attach greater importance to 
residential neighborhoods, and more and more collective action has come to be 
neighborhood-based. Neighborhoods have residents of different economic and social 
statuses, and people can participate relatively equally in community life. This 
promotes cooperation and trust, and the growth of horizontal connections among 
residents across classes (Dai & He 2000; Xu ed 2000).  When ordinary social 
movements break out, these horizontal connections serve as the main dynamic of 
community mobilization, and the movements can incorporate members from different 
classes.  
Vertical networks between citizen protesters and officials also affect ordinary 
social movements significantly because they help the former generate support from 
within the state in several ways. This case shows that, firstly, such networks could 
serve as bridges for protestors to approach state agencies to express their concerns. In 
this movement, due to the help from friends in government, the protestors had access 
to municipal government agencies, the Xinhua Branch and central government 
agencies. Secondly, vertical connections can be utilized by protestors to seek advice 






networks to find out, and to exploit, the “boundaries” of collective resistance. In 
contemporary China, although civil resistance is relatively tolerated, there are certain 
boundaries that are not allowed to be crossed, such as when it is believed to lead to 
political instability or to disgrace high-level government. However, such boundaries 
are usually flexible. Therefore, it is very important for citizen protesters to be aware 
of such boundaries and to make sure that they do not overstep them. However, with 
appropriate tactics, citizen protestors can also exploit the boundaries to exert pressure 
on their local target to facilitate collective action (Ying 2001; Cai 2002), as was the 
case in this movement. Thirdly, personal vertical networks may be employed to 
enhance the legitimacy of civil resistance. Due to the proposal of his friend, a leader 
at the Garden Bureau, Tan was granted the honorary title of “Guardian of Greenery” 
three times, which gave him the “authority” to organize the resistance. Fourthly, 
vertical networks can also be utilized to collect information or evidence to facilitate 
collective action. With the help of their friends in government, the protest activists 
collected much important evidence about the illegal projects of the local authorities 
and their decision making (also see Shi & Cai 2006). The officials and journalists 
supported the movement due to various concerns, such as a sense of justice, conflicts 
between their agencies and the local government, personal ties including friendships 
between themselves and protestors. Furthermore, they provided constant help to the 
movement activists also because they trusted the latter and believed that the activists 
had fought for the benefits of the community instead of themselves. Although not 
willing to confront the powerful local government directly, these officials and 
journalists supported the protestors in diverse ways.  The existence of vertical 
networks also instilled confidence in the minds and hearts of ordinary participants and 






during the duration of the movement.  
Except for personal vertical networks, some “public vertical networks” such as 
mass media can also wield much influence in ordinary social movements. Previous 
studies have shown that the media is vital for mobilization in social movements 
(Gamson 1989; Gamson & Meyer 1996).  From recent successful cases of collective 
resistance in contemporary China, we can find that they experienced similar process 
of struggle to that of this movement: local power holders violated the interests and 
rights of ordinary citizens; the latter petitioned the mass media to voice their 
grievances; the media broadcast urged high-level authorities to punish the local power 
holders for their illicit actions. 44 These cases suggest that the relatively free mass 
media not only affects public opinion and exerts pressure on local authorities directly, 
but also works as a vertical network and communication channel that links ordinary 
citizens with the state. 45This kind of “public vertical network” can thus serve as 
linking social capital bridging citizens and the state. Through these vertical networks, 
the state and citizens may cooperate to restrain local power holders from engaging in 
illegal activities. Therefore, vertical networks are vital to the success of collective 
resistance.  
Trust is also key in ordinary social movements. There are generally three 
levels of trust that can contribute to the success of movements. The first is special 
trust at the individual level (Huang 2003). This movement has shown that individual 
trust between protest leaders and ordinary participants is indispensable for the former 
to lead collective action. The second level of trust is among citizen groups of different 
                                                 
44 Such as the very influential Incident of the Jiahe expropriation and resettlement (.see CCTV shehui 
jilu  “social record”: “Jiahe chaiqian zhi tong” (The Pain of Expropriation and Jiahe Resettlement). 25 
May 2004.  
45 Local officials are generally very afraid of media disclosures of facts that they violate citizens’ 






class backgrounds (Fukuyama 1995b). In GI, the initial successful collective 
resistance against the estate developer further promoted the level of trust among local 
residents of different class backgrounds. The third level of trust can be called 
institutional trust (Luhmann 1979; Fukuyama 1995b; Mishler and Rose 2001). 
Specifically, in contemporary China, institutional trust comes from citizens’ faith in 
laws and central authorities (e.g. Ying 2001; Li 2004). In Shanghai, while many 
citizens are dissatisfied with local authorities due to a lot of specific problems, most 
of them trust high-level government because of economic and social development.46 
In the movement to protect the park space, protest activists believed that if they 
followed the law in their actions, they would not be taking on too much risk, and they 
might even obtain state and mass media support. Therefore, trust promotes the 
mobilization of ordinary social movements in a variety of ways. 
In sum, horizontal networks are helpful in mobilizing movement leaders and 
participants into collective action; vertical networks facilitate citizens’ ability to voice 
their grievances and to generate support from high-level authorities; trust “lubricates” 
collective action. Therefore, social capital plays an important role at all “junctures” of 
ordinary social movements. The nature of the social capital as well as its quantity has 
the power to greatly influence the mobilization and consequences of ordinary social 
movements. 
 
                                                 
46According to the survey conducted by Social Investigation and Consultation Center of Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences in June 2000, 79.8% Shanghai citizens were satisfied with economic 
development; 87.6% were satisfied with political stability; 87.2% were satisfied with urban renewal 







Consequences of the community movement  
The community movement resulted in both positive and negative 
consequences for local governance. Its one immediate and obvious positive 
consequence was that it protected the community park from being occupied. The 
improvement of neighborhood environment contributed to the rise of the value of 
local estate. Also, this collective resistance positively affected local decision-making. 
The active role of HCs in the movement made the local government agencies endorse 
the important position of this kind of newly-formed civil associations in the local 
political field. Without doubt, the movement led to the change in ways by which 
public power was exerted in the neighborhoods and the transformation of community 
power structure from the integral one to an intercursive one.  
Most importantly, the community movement greatly affected the state of 
civicness and the quantity of social capital in Green Neighborhood, especially GI, 
which would in turn promote local governance. Firstly, the movement resulted in the 
vibrancy of associational life in the community, which centered on the HCs. Secondly, 
the movement promoted citizens’ consciousness of the laws. Due to the propaganda 
of Tan and other movement activists, many residents familiarize themselves with laws, 
particularly those about greenery and property rights. The movement activists’ 
success in using the laws against the administrative orders of the local government 
also made local residents realize the influence of laws in contemporary socio-political 
life. The enhancement of citizens’ consciousness of the laws not only helps them to 
protect their civil rights, but also facilitates the efforts of the state to expand its 
authority in grassroots communities. Thirdly, the success of community movement 






found that the quantity of social capital in the protestors’ communities was affected 
by the consequences of collective resistance. The successful collective action in turn 
strengthened the ties among movement participants and contributed to the increase of 
social capital in GI. Conversely, in GII, the failure of collective action resulted in the 
reduction of local social capital. The changes of the quantity of social capital in GI 
and GII were highly related to the situation of the community movement. In addition, 
the final resolution of the big problem in the neighborhood also helped to reduce the 
tension among all parties in Green Neighborhood. After the success of the movement, 
the GI RC began to reconcile with Tan and other movement activists in No.1 Building. 
Both parties cooperated with each other in many matters relevant to the management 
of the building and other community building issues, which greatly promoted local 
governance (more in the next chapter). Susan S. Fainstein and Clifford Hirst 
(1995:200-201) argued that the greatest impact of urban movements in Western states 
was to make local decision making more democratic. Unfortunately, increased citizen 
participation in the movements “has not dramatically changed the outcomes of urban 
processes beyond decisions on immediately mobilizing issues.” However, this case 
showed that it not only made local decision-making more democratic, but also 
changed neighborhood politics in many respects.  
Aside the positive impact of the community movement, it also brought about 
some negative consequences to local governance. The experiences of conflict with the 
local government made Tan and some movement activists tend to distrust the latter. 
Because of the splits within the community triggered by the collective resistance, 
some residents disliked one another. Due to the confrontational stance adopted by GI 






center near the residential buildings of GII. Although some GII residents were 
uncomfortable with this and complained to the Street Office, the latter just ignored 
them. Given low civicness in GII, the residents failed to initiate a formidable protest; 
they just remained very resentful of the Street Office. After the entertainment center 
was built, it was open to all local residents, with a token fee for access being charged. 
Some elderly residents, especially Mr. Yang, who strongly supported the local 
government in the movement, found that the latter had reneged on its promise that the 
center would be freely accessed. Though complained to the RC and the Street Office, 
they were ignored. Since they were previously against Tan and other movement 
activists, it was impossible for them to obtain support from the latter. These elder 
residents were very disappointed and isolated. A typical case was Mr. Yang, who 
refused to reconcile with Mr. Tan and other movement activists; and, angry with the 
Street Office, he has never entered the community park. Everyday, he just walked 
around the roads near to his home. Most significantly, due to the outstanding role of 
some individual movement leaders like Mr. Tan in the movement, they became more 
and more self-righteous and bossy in dealing with public affairs and other residents, 
thus triggering increasing dissatisfaction from the latter.  The splits and distrust 
among these parties have become potential problems to local governance. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
This study examines the dynamics of China’s ordinary social movements. It 
suggests that widespread dissatisfaction among citizens and “political opportunity 
structure” is not adequate for citizens to take collective action. Social capital, in its 






to pave the way for success. In particular, horizontal networks can promote solidarity 
within communities and provide financial and social support to movement activists. 
Without this kind of strong bonding social capital, it is difficult for movement 
activists to mobilize other residents to put pressure on authorities, and sustain the 
resistance. Moreover, this study brings to light the key role of vertical networks 
between citizens and high-level authorities in ordinary social movements. It finds that 
movement activists could master resistance tactics well by consulting government 
officials through personal vertical networks. Furthermore, such vertical networks are 
also helpful for movement activists in approaching state agencies, in collecting 
information, and in enhancing the legitimacy of their resistance. In other words, 
vertical networks help citizen protestors excavate channels through which support can 
be gathered from within the state. Therefore, social capital is vital to the mobilization 
and consequences of ordinary social movements. The exploration of the role of social 
capital, especially adding the aspect of vertical networks, in collective resistance and 
of the biographical consequences of the movement is crucial contribution to current 
theories on social movements and social capital.  
This study also identifies the institutional contexts where social capital 
functions. It suggests that social capital functions in the above ways because of the 
authoritarian but fragmented nature of the Chinese state. Specifically, it reveals the 
necessity for powerless citizens to utilize the means of mobilization outside the formal 
institutional structures. Furthermore, the existence of “split” within the administrative 
system makes it feasible for citizens to employ vertical networks to generate support 
from within the state.  
  Furthermore, by integrating this study with existing studies on rights defense 






2000b; Ying 2001; O’Brien 2002; Cai 2002；Read 2003b；  Yu 2004), we can 
conclude that there are some important common characteristics of contemporary 
China’s grassroots movements. These collective resistance face similar “political 
opportunity structures” such as “splits” within the administration system, the 
relaxation of government control over the mass media, the gradual improvement of 
legislation, and the government’s relative tolerance of collective resistance. At present, 
most of them focus on defending specific interests of citizens while there is also a 
tendency for movements to aim at promoting grassroots democracy. The citizen 
protestors usually avoid direct confrontations with the central state, but utilize high-
ranking authorities to resist local governments. The grassroots movements deploy 
divergent resources such as laws, formal civil associations and informal networks, etc. 
to facilitate their collective action. Most of them are limited within the boundary of a 
single community (village or neighborhood) while some extend to other communities. 
They are usually under the coordination and leadership of a few activists. Most of 
their participants are weak groups, but more and more middle-class citizens are 
coming to participate in collective action. These movements have impacted greatly on 
local governance; however, whether or not they will affect the social structure at large 
is yet to be seen. The frequent recurrence of these grassroots movements implies that 
in present day China, what civil society can do is not to challenge the powerful central 
state, but to utilize linking social capital to cooperate with the state to resist local 
authorities who violate citizen’s rights. Only in this way, will local public space be 
expanded, and citizens’ rights and interests be defended and enhanced gradually. 
    This study also explores the consequences of the community movement. It 
finds that the informal collective resistance not only improved visual neighborhood 






many dimensions. Most importantly, it greatly promoted the enhancement of 
civicness and social capital in the community, which would in turn sponsor local 
governance. Therefore, the community movement could make neighborhood politics 
more democratic. However, it has also triggered some problems that may adversely 
affect local governance. Consequently, the kind of collective action changed 
neighborhood politics itself.  
Moreover, this study contains implications for the possible political influence 
of social capital on macro politics. As discussed above, not only can it be employed to 
facilitate civil resistance and to promote the expansion of local public space, but it can 
also be utilized to build bridges between citizens and high-level government.  Due to 
the fragmented administrative authority of contemporary China, the state cannot 
superintend local governments efficiently. One of the consequences will be that local 
governments may be engaged in illicit interest-oriented activities at will, which is 
reflected in a number of reported cases of collective corruption. This will be harmful 
to the legitimacy and autonomy of the state. Through the use of linking social capital, 
the state could employ citizens to keep watch on local government agencies. This will 
facilitate the induction of state constraints on the latter. Therefore, social capital can 
help promote the legitimacy and autonomy of the state.  
The findings of this case study are counter to the totalitarian paradigm and 
clientilism model that highlight coercion or integral power structure. The significant 
role of the movement leader and individual ties in collective action also challenges the 
applicability of the group theory that focuses on functions of political groups and 
formal channels. Furthermore, the study also disagrees with the civil society paradigm 






cooperate with high-level government to prevent local growth coalition from violating 
their civil rights.  
In addition, this study has also sought to inspire reflection on the approaches 
to the study of governance. Unlike the existing research on local governance that 
highlight the link between community cooperation and social capital (e.g.Putnam 
1993; Woolcock 1999, 2001), this study contends that the shared experience of 
participants in conflicts with political forces outside their community could also result 
in the enhancement of social capital within the community, as shown in the case of GI. 
In turn, the movement affected local decision-making and thus served as one agent for 
community development and contributes greatly to local governance. Therefore, 
community conflicts such as collective resistance should be scrutinized in the study of 
local governance. This study thus proposes a more inclusive approach in which we 
not only pay attention to social cooperation, but also examine the influence of social 
conflicts on local governance. 
Furthermore, it seems that the legacy of the movement has greatly influenced 
on the political situations in relevant neighborhoods. HCs were so influential in the 
movement that the local government had already required Party branches in the sub-
neighborhoods and RCs to make use of their ties with communist activists to 
intervene in the 2004 HC elections so that the local government could control these 
civil associations. However, some residents strongly resisted such control demanding 
that the elected HCs be independent and act on behalf of the interests of residents. The 
exploration of the role of HCs in neighborhood politics and its political consequences 







Chapter Six: Civil Associations, Faction Politics and Neighborhood Governance 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Five has illustrated the impact of contention politics at the 
neighborhood level: some citizens may be able to protect their interests by launching 
collective actions. However, most residents usually tend to express their concerns 
through formal neighborhood associations like residents’ committees and 
homeowners’ committees. In the existing literature on local governance, many 
researchers highlight the role of civil associations. Robert Putnam (1993b: 90) argued 
that civil associations constitute the social structure of cooperation and contribute to 
local governance  
“Both because of their ‘internal’ effects on individual members and 
because of their ‘external’ effects on the wider polity. Internally, 
associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and 
public-spiritedness; externally …‘interest articulation and interest 
aggregation’ are enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations. ”  
 
He suggested that civil associations such as choral societies and bird-watching 
clubs are equally important to local governance. However, some researchers disagreed 
with him on the effect of civil associations on local development. Amber Seligson 
(1999), based on her study on the relations between civil associations and local 
governance in Latin America, found that only those associations closely relevant to 
the substantial interests of local residents attract the latter to positively take part in, 
and thus effectively affect, community governance.  
After the 1949 Revolution, except state-sponsored “mass organizations” like 
RCs, trade unions, communist youth leagues and women’s federations, which were 






communities was banned in urban China. The 1980s economic reform, as Deborah 
Davis (1995:19) argued, failed to lead to the emergence of societal associations “with 
the moral and institutional power to limit state coercion consistently rather than at 
intermittent moments of crisis.” She also claimed that Chinese urban residents should 
“use their new wealth and autonomy to enlarge the non-state sphere and to develop 
organizations able to nurture a nascent civil society” in the new era (ibid). As 
mentioned before, community building has resulted in the revitalization of RCs and 
the formation of HCs. In contemporary urban China, these two kinds of civic 
associations are the main formal channels by which citizens participate in 
neighborhood politics and affect grassroots governance (Read 2000; Li 2001; Li & 
Shi 2002; Read 2003a, 2003b). However, very little research has been conducted to 
illustrate how civil associations affect neighborhood governance. In my previous 
research on the ‘democratic’ reform of several RCs in Shanghai, I found that the 
reform was manipulated by local government agencies instead of residents. Due to 
path dependence of institutional change, local governmental agencies actually ‘fix’ 
the domination relations between them and the RCs. Therefore, the main aims of the 
RC reform have not been achieved, and it failed to lead to neighborhood 
democratization and good governance (Shi 2005). 
The formation of HCs implies a drastic change in neighborhood politics. 
Existing research suggest that, compared to the RCs, the HCs which are beyond the 
direct manipulation of government agencies are more likely to be an engine of 
neighborhood democratization (Gui 2001; Li & Shi 2002; Read 2003b). Therefore, 
this chapter examines the role of HCs in neighborhood governance and the 
mechanisms of their operation. In particular, it provides an empirical description of 






years, by which the dynamics of their development will be disclosed. This chapter 
addresses the following questions: How are the HCs formed? Why do people join in 
the HCs? To what extent do they constitute independent associations? How do they 
wield power in the neighborhood? How do they express their concerns and interact 
with other actors in the neighborhood? Do they encourage the participation of many 
ordinary residents or are they exclusive to the latter? To what extent do they represent 
the interests of residents? What is their influence on local governance and 
democratization? Is there any prospect for them to promote the emergence of civil 
society? 
In the next sections, I first discuss existing research on housing politics. Based 
on a case study in Green Neighborhood, I then examine the processes of HC 
formation and explore their particular functions in neighborhood politics. Finally, I 
discuss political consequences of the rise of HCs. 
Housing Property, Civil Associations and Local Politics 
There have been many research on housing arrangements and homeownership, with 
researchers engaged in a heated debate on their socio-political consequences, 
especially on homeowners’ everyday social interactions, community involvement and 
political participation. Some researchers argued that, compared to renters, 
homeowners are friendlier to, and interact more with, their neighbors (Fischer 1982); 
and they are more likely to participated in local affairs and community associations 
(Cox 1982; Blum and Kingston 1984；Rohe and Basolo 1997; Dipasquale and 
Glaeser 1998). Other previous research also suggested that “Homeowners tend to be 
more politically active than non-owners,” and they tend to participate in politics at 






2003b:41; also see Rossi and Weber 1996; Dietz 2003). Furthermore, a few 
researchers claimed that housing arrangements affect the initiation and consequences 
of urban social movements (Castells 1983; Harrison and Reeve 2002). 
However, other researchers defied some of the above-claimed socio-political 
effects of homeownership. They found that renters are more active in interacting with 
their neighbors than homeowners, and homeownership “was not found to be a 
significant predictor of the total number of (local) meetings attended.” (Rohe & 
Stegman 1994:163) Many research also suggested that community attachment and 
local participation of residents are primarily related to their age, socio-economic 
status, length of residence, residential stability, family structure, neighborhood 
networks and local identity, rather than homeownership (Kasarda & Janowitz 1974; 
Sampson 1988; Reingold 1995; La Grange and Yip 2001). 
Till now, there has been little research that has systematically examined the 
effects of the housing reform and homeowners’ associations on China’s local 
governance. Benjamin L. Read’s (2003:33) suggested that HCs in new neighborhoods  
“vary in the degree to which they genuinely represent homeowners and 
elicit broad and democratic participation. Nonetheless, their actions 
show that owners of costly new homes are often not content to accept the 
management arrangements that are imposed upon them by developers 
and the state… this illustrates one way in which China’s relatively 
wealthy strata are beginning to assert themselves, defending their 
material interests in ways that have important political implications at 
the micro level.”  
He claimed that homeowners are generally prudent when dealing with local 
authorities (ibid.p,56). And he concluded that “for most residents of Chinese cities, 






little to change the opportunities for participation available to them.”(ibid. p,42) 
Read’s investigation was, however, limited to the new condominium complexes. 
Based on their research on a neighborhood of “sold public homes,” Cao 
Jingqing and Li Zongke (2000) examined the role of HCs in the management of this 
kind of neighborhoods which are still main components of the Shanghai city.  
Contrary to Read’s conclusion about the effects of housing reform on such 
neighborhoods, they found that some HCs, due to the vital role of their leaders, 
positively affect local governance. But like Read’s study, their research also focused 
on the relations between HCs and property management companies. The relations 
between HCs and other actors in the field of neighborhood politics like government 
agencies, RCs and ordinary residents as well as the internal operation of this kind of 
civil associations have not been examined. Therefore, this chapter extensively 
explores the dynamics of these important newly-emerging civil associations. 
Homeowners’ Committees and Local Governance in Green Neighborhood 
The Formation of Homeowners’ Committees  
The formation of HCs started with the housing reform in urban China. In 1994, 
the state enacted a law “Methods for Managing New Urban Residential 
Neighborhoods” to encourage urban residents who own their homes to form elected 
associations to protect their interests. According to Read (2003b:43), the authority 
enacted the law in response to the emergence of spontaneous homeowners’ 
organizations. However, although HCs were empowered to select property 
management companies, their independence was limited by the law, which ordered 
that HCs be formed “under the direction of the housing administrative agencies” and 






agencies, every relevant administrative agency and the People’s Government of the 
area in which the neighborhood is located”. 47  In 1997, the Shanghai housing 
management authority enforced a regulation that HCs should be established in every 
property management unit (an independent high building or a sub-neighborhood 
composed of tens of low buildings, including sub-neighborhoods of “sold public 
homes”) with certain conditions.48 Every committee was to be constituted by 3 to 7 
members and under the coordination of a head. With the enforcement of these laws, 
the high-ranking governments promoted the extensive establishment of these 
grassroots self-governance associations and empowered the local housing 
administrative agencies to direct them. Up to 2004, 5189 HCs have appeared in 
Shanghai sub-neighborhoods.49 
In the mid-1990s, few people realized the impact that these civil associations 
could have on neighborhood governance and community power structure. Property 
management companies were initially required to be responsible for establishing HCs 
in the areas under their jurisdiction. They fulfilled this task in quite simple ways. 
While some companies sent notices to all homeowners and asked them to nominate 
someone to be one member of their HC by letter, others called on some homeowners 
to get together to elect HC members on the site. In both situations, residents who were 
relatively well-known among their neighbors were nominated and constituted HCs. 
Some property management companies did not bother to notify most homeowners 
about the matter and just asked a few homeowners with whom they had good 
relationships to constitute HCs. According to the law, every HC is responsible for 
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managing a large sum of maintenance fund of the residential buildings under its 
jurisdiction; it can utilize the maintenance fund and the income from other public 
facilities attached to their buildings such as car parks. Therefore, HCs can be 
independent from the local authorities since they do not need any resources and 
support from the latter. But through the beginning, few HC members knew their 
duties. Some HCs managed to operate smoothly, holding regular meetings and 
positively monitoring their property management companies, and their members also 
learned the relevant laws about property management. However, as Read (2003b: 49) 
found out, that there should be at least one exceptionally dedicated organizer who 
need spend much more time, energy and money than others keeping the association 
working. As a result, few people would take the responsibility of the organizer 
without receiving wage for the hard work so that many HCs failed to operate regularly. 
Some HC members seldom attended activities of their associations. After years, they 
had even forgotten how they were selected to the positions.  
In Green Neighborhood, the ways that the HCs had been established and their 
influence varied in different sub-neighborhoods. In most buildings, the residents 
moved from different places or work units and knew few of their neighbors. As a 
result, the property management company manipulated the establishment of the HCs. 
Because it was difficult to mobilize residents who were not familiar with one another 
to participate in local affairs, many HCs constituted by them could not operate on a 
regular basis. The head of one GII HC complained,  
“After the first meeting on the day of the establishment of our HC, we (he and 
other HC members) have never met together again. They just do not care 
about this matter. I do not know them well and cannot persuade them to work 
with me .Since I have to be responsible for everything, I’m so tired. I just hope 






These were the situation in GII, GIII and GIV. Consequently, most HCs and 
their members in these sub-neighborhoods were only known to a limited number of 
residents. During my fieldwork in GII, GIII and GIV in 2000, I found that few 
residents knew who were the members of their HCs. Even the RCs only knew their 
heads; and they did not know what the HCs had done after their formation. According 
to the laws, HCs should be elected every two years. 50  However, the property 
management companies did not bother to do so. Once a well-organized HC was 
formed, the companies came under its strict supervision and they then had to work 
hard. Due to the “break-up” of most HCs in GII, GIII and GIV, residents there 
suffered much from the inefficiency of their property management companies; and 
they were very dissatisfied with property management, as disclosed in Chapter Four.  
The situation in GI was however quite different from the above. In most 
buildings located in GI, some residents, more or less, moved from the same 
downtown area and elected a few neighbors whom they were familiar with to 
constitute HCs. For example, in No.4 High-building, Mr. Xue Yuan and Mr. Dong 
Lin, who were middle ranking government officials in the district government, 
employed their personal relationships with leaders of the district government to get 
some public facilities such as telephones and gas channels installed in their building 
earlier than planned. With the support from their neighbors who worked for the same 
government agency, they were nominated to lead the HC in the building. Although 
some HC members in GI were not so active by themselves, they were mobilized by 
their neighbors. As a HC member in No.5 High-building told me, “I did not want to 
join the HC. But Uncle Lin (vice head of the No.5 HC) insisted that I should join 
them. I cannot hurt his feeling; so I joined them”. Therefore, social networks were 
                                                 






important for the formation of the GI HCs. Generally, people joined HCs with diverse 
attitudes and motivations. Mr. Xue Yuan and Mr. Dong Lin told me, “we just wanted 
to utilize our ‘guanxi’ with leaders of the district government to do something for our 
neighbors.” A HC member in No.2 High-building expressed his motivation in joining 
the HC in this way: “I heard that the HC would be closely related to our home 
interests. I joined it just to see how it works.” 
 
The Rising Influence of HCs and the Transformation of Community Power 
Structure in GI  
As mentioned in Chapter Five, in the community movement against the local 
government, Mr Tan, Head of the No.1 HC, managed to establish an alliance among 
local HCs. They agreed to organize a forum and to meet every month to discuss 
movement strategies and other issues related to property management. Since then, all 
GI HCs have strengthened their own organizations. They have enacted many self-
governance regulations and divided the homes in their buildings into groups. The HC 
members held meetings every month or every several months and called meetings of 
homeowner representatives every year to discuss management issues of their 
buildings. In No.4 and No.5 High-buildings, there were even regular HC elections 
held every two or three years. Most importantly, the HCs in GI cooperated with one 
another and closely monitored the property management company. Once residents in 
these buildings had any problems related to property management, they could report 
to their HCs, which would discuss the issues with the property management company 
on their behalf.  






community movement caused caution and antipathy of the local authorities toward 
them. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Street Office had urged Ms. Li Qun, the then 
secretary of the GI Party branch, to collapse the alliance among the HCs. Due to their 
good relationships with her and concern with political risk, most of the heads of the 
other HCs stopped their “illegal meeting” with Tan, and the forum was terminated. 
However, since she was unable to totally collapse the movement, the Street Office 
appointed Ms. Long Jun to replace Ms. Li as the secretary of the GI Party branch in 
early 2001. At that time, partly due to the disintegration of the HC forum, the 
monitoring of GI HCs on the property management company was relatively relaxed. 
As a result, the property management in GI was not as effective as before, and there 
was problem with public sanitation. Therefore, the sub-neighborhood was deprived of 
the honorary title of “Model Quarter” by the municipal authority, thus disgracing the 
Street Office. The latter required Secretary Long to improve governance in GI in 
order to get back the title. To achieve this objective, Ms. Long had to utilize HCs to 
urge the property management company to improve its work. She proposed to resume 
the property management forum with the participation of the RC, the HCs, the 
property management company, and the policemen who would ensure security in the 
sub-neighborhood. At the beginning, due to the local government’s antipathy to Mr. 
Tan Xin, Secretary Long decided to exclude him from the forum. However, the head 
of the No.5 HC, who had had good relationship with Tan rejected Long’s decision, 
insisting that he would not participate in the forum unless Tan was invited to join 
them. Secretary Long had to concede and subsequently invited Mr. Tan to attend the 
forum. Since then, the meetings to discuss property management and other local 
public issues have been organized among these parties every month.  






HCs and participated by all influential organizations in the sub-neighborhood, local 
governance has been greatly advanced in several ways. Firstly, the forum enabled the 
people and organizations which constitute the “local governance web” to 
communicate with one another so that they could share knowledge, experience and 
information about local affairs. Secondly, the forum has promoted democratization of 
local decision-making to some extent. During the community movement, Mr. Tan and 
other HC heads urged Secretary Long to voice their concerns on the issue of the 
community park to the local government on their behalf. Long then requested some 
officials of the Street Office to attend the forum to negotiate with these HC heads 
directly. The two parties finally reached the agreement (see Chapter Five). 51 
Furthermore, they also regularly discussed important issues relevant to local routine 
governance on the forum. In many of the meetings that I sat in, I found that every 
participant at the forum equally discussed these issues and made decisions together, 
which were usually entrusted to the property management company and relevant 
parties. The results of implementing these decisions were then discussed in the next 
meetings.  
Thirdly, the forum has also promoted self-discipline of these HCs. In support 
this point, one member of the No.4 HC commented, “Now we have to be more careful 
of our management. If we do worse than other HCs, we will be blamed by the 
residents in our building.”  Moreover, due to the pressure from the forum, the 
property management company had to gradually improve their management and 
services. Therefore, the residents in GI received better services from their property 
management company than their counterparts in other sub-neighborhoods. In addition, 
the HCs in GI have also actively organized to maintain the lifts in their buildings and 
                                                 






to decorate their buildings, thereby greatly improving their living conditions and 
community image.  
Due to the efficient operation of HCs and their cooperation with other 
neighborhood organizations, local governance has been greatly improved in GI; 
residents there were thus quite satisfied with their community. In contrast, in the other 
sub-neighborhoods, without effective work of HCs, the services that the property 
management company provided were quite poor, and the buildings looked 
increasingly shabby. This adversely affected the value of the homes in these sub-
neighborhoods, which in turn brought about residents’ dissatisfaction with the 
communities. As a GII resident complained on a local meeting,  
“The buildings in GI look very bright and clean, but ours look so shabby. 
Every time we look at our building from outside, we get discouraged (due to 
the bad image); when we go inside, we get even more upset because the 
lobbies and corridors look dark and untidy, and the lifts squeak! Few people 
want to buy or rent homes in our building.”  
Clearly, the rising influence of HCs in GI has led to the transformation of 
community power structure. The role of GI residents and HCs in the community 
movement has indicated their influence in local decision-making through informally 
participating in collective action. The participation of HCs in the property 
management forum and their equal dialogues with the state-sponsored neighborhood 
organizations in local decision-making have officially confirmed their status as one 
pillar of power in the sub-neighborhood. Their rising influence has transformed the 
integral hierarchy of community power structure from an integral one to an 
intercursive one. Furthermore, the influence of GI HCs has gradually been expanded 
to the whole Green Neighborhood. In GII, the RC began to organize regular meetings 






residents their concerns. In GIV, the heads of the HCs also asked the RC and the 
property management company to meet with them regularly.  
Residents in GI have felt the structural transformation, with many of them of 
the view that HCs and residents were influential in local decision-making. In my 
survey investigation on the influence of both the RCs and the HCs on the everyday 
life of residents, local residents were asked to answer the following two questions: “Is 
there any influence of the RC on your everyday life?”(Q54) “Is there any influence of 
the HC on your everyday life? ” (Q58) The following table shows GI respondents’ 
answers to these questions. 
Table 6.1 Influence of the RC and the HCs on the everyday life of residents 
  much influence a little influence no influence 
The RC 10.20% 50.00% 39.80% 
The HC 16.90% 53.90% 29.20% 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the percentage of the respondents who believed 
that the HC affected their everyday life “much” or “a little” was 70.8% while less of 
them (60.2%) confirmed the influence of the RC. Therefore, in GI, compared to the 
state-sponsored RC, the civil association of HC was attached with great importance 
by more local residents.  
 
The Problems with Homeowners’ Committees 
Will the rising influence of HCs in some neighborhoods lead to complete 
democratization of grassroots politics? My investigation showed that the 






the society, there are many problems that prevent HCs from becoming an engine of 
neighborhood democratization. Some HC members are self-interested in dealing with 
local affairs: they seek their own interests by controlling the associations. For 
example, some HC members would accept presents from, and make deals with, 
property management companies. Some HC heads even commit corruption in 
managing the maintenance fund of their buildings. To maintain their control, many 
HC heads just try to satisfy only a small number of supporters with favor exchanges 
rather than to elicit the participation of most residents. For instance, to get support 
from homeowner representatives to consolidate their power, HC heads sometimes 
distribute small presents to the latter. In Green Neighborhood, most well-organized 
HCs used to allocate presents to all homeowner representatives on every annual 
meeting at the expense of public fund. In addition, some residents who are concerned 
with power and interests also compete to join the associations, resulting in 
contradictions in the neighborhoods.  
These problems have triggered many conflicts among HC members 
themselves on the one hand, and between HC members and other residents on the 
other, thereby impairing community solidarity. One typical issue that underscores this 
problem is the occupancy of public spaces by HC members. In the high buildings in 
GI and GII, there are public corridors on every floor as shown in chart 6.1. 















































Many residents living in Room 01, 03, 06, and 08 tend to surround some 
public corridors with iron fences (usually at A, B, C or D points) for their personal use. 
But some residents living in other rooms oppose this and often complain to the 
property management company, citing the law that public corridors are not allowed to 
be occupied for personal use. Usually, in response, the property management 
company dismantles such fences. However, in GI, all HC heads except Mr. Tan have 
surrounded public corridors with iron fences. The property management company 
would not offend them by dismantling the fences. Many other residents then also 
occupied public corridors. This has resulted in many conflicts among residents, which 
is a big problem to neighborhood governance.  
 On the other hand, the rising influence of the civil associations of HCs in 
neighborhoods makes local state-sponsored organizations and commercial 
organizations feel that their authority and interests are threatened by the civil 
associations. In particular, for property management companies, the monitoring of 
HCs stands in their way as they are unable to reap extra profits. Local government 
agencies are often upset because the independent civil associations are beyond their 






the residents better than the RCs. Therefore, there are conflicts between HCs and the 
local authorities. For example, the active role of GI HCs in the community movement 
created tension between the civil associations and the local government. The latter has 
been sensitive to them since then and has begun to cope with the challenge of HCs, 
primarily through the channels of informal networks.  
Usually, property management companies buy off important HC members, 
especially their heads; they attempt to establish good personal guanxi with HC heads 
so that the latter will not be so strict with them. Chinese people used to establish 
guanxi by sending presents and offering meals (see Yang 1994; Yan 1996; Bian 2001). 
In GI, the property management company often sent presents to the key members of 
the HCs and invited them to banquets; its manager often played majiang game with 
some HC heads. It was also said that the company had sold several sets of apartments 
to the heads of two GI HCs at cheaper price than normal. The company had thus good 
relationships with most HC heads in GI, who would turn a blind eye to its ineffective 
management practices; the company then failed in rendering efficient services to 
residents sometimes. A GI HC member told me: “The property management company 
just bought them off. They made many deals with the company, got benefits, and 
relaxed their monitoring on the company in return for favor.” Many residents became 
dissatisfied with the HCs. During my investigation in GI in 2004, there were more 
residents who expressed their dissatisfaction with their HCs than in 2002 although a 
few of them were quite satisfied with the HCs before.  
To impose control over neighborhoods, local government agencies attempt to 
divide and rule these civil associations through informal networks. Through residents 
who have good relationships with the RC, local government agencies are always 






such situations to control the HCs. This kind of attempt began from 1998 in Green 
Neighborhood, when the HC-sponsored movement was very popular. The local 
government was eager to collapse the alliance among the HCs. At that point, there 
was a problem between some residents in No.4 High-building and the head of their 
HC. It was said that Aunt Ho, the old lady who was always actively involved in local 
affairs, had wanted to join in the HC for power, which was denied by its head, Mr. 
Xue Yuan. Aunt Ho thus resented Xue. Beside the entrance to every high-building in 
GI and GII, there was a small room for guards to sit inside to watch the building. In 
the 1998 summer, Mr. Xue and Mr. Dong charged the property management company 
to build a hut in the entrance lobby of No.4 Building to enable the guards to sit there 
so that they could watch the building better; the guard room was also to be converted 
into a small shop. Believing that the HC had the power to make the decision, they just 
did so by themselves without holding any meeting with other residents. Aunt Ho 
decided to take revenge on Mr. Xue on this matter. She claimed that the hut would 
obstruct the pass for fire engines once the building was on fire. So she persuaded 
about 80 residents, many of whom had good relationships with her, to endorse a 
complaint letter that was to be sent to local authorities, including the RC. She 
demanded that the present HC quit and an election of the HC be organized.52  
Party Secretary of the Street Office then ordered the secretary of the GI Party 
branch to take this opportunity to control the HC. The former told me:  
“At that time, some residents in No.4 Building demanded election of 
their HC. Then I told her (Ms. Li), ‘As the secretary of the Party branch, 
you have the responsibility to intervene in the election to control the HC. 
Only by this, can you stabilize the situation in GI.’”  
 
                                                 






Then Ms. Li did as required; she supported the nomination of two residents 
with the Party membership to be the head and the vice head of the No.4 HC 
respectively. However, due to Ms. Li’s “being scared of movement activists like Tan”, 
Party Secretary of the Street Office appointed Mr. Long Jun to replace her. The 
Secretary explained to me,  
“I distributed two tasks to her (Ms. Long): ‘you should manipulate the 
important affairs relevant to property management; the primary mean of 
achieving this is to control the HCs and to establish authority of the 
Party branch among them. But if you are impatient for success, they 
may not accept your position at the outset. So, you’d better organize 
some entertainment activities in GI first so that you can win support 
from the residents.’”  
 
Furthermore, the local government also institutionalized their requirement to 
control HCs. According to the law enacted by the Shanghai People’s Congress in 
1997, the election of HCs should be performed by homeowners themselves, with the 
guildance of professional government agencies. Since they do not have power over 
HCs directly, the PN District Government then tended to wield authority of “Party 
organization” with the excuse that “the Party should direct everything.” As one 
important official in the government told me,  
“We now face the problem of HCs trying to challenge the authority of 
RCs. There is no way for that to be allowed. So we have enacted a 
regulation that grassroots Party branches should positively direct all 
associational activities of the masses, including the HCs, and they 
should intervene in HC elections; RCs should play an active role 








In Regulations of the PN District Government on Strengthening the Directing 
and Management of Homeowners’ Committees enacted in early 2001, the government 
required that Party branches play a leading role in community building at the sub-
neighborhood level and be responsible for instructing those Party members who hold 
HC posts. The W Street Office further required Party branches under its jurisdiction to 
urge its members to join HCs in order to manipulate the associations. 
Following these instructions, Long started her management in GI. She set up 
several hobby groups under the supervision of the RC and organized many 
entertainment activities; and she also attempted to penetrate HCs. On the one hand, as 
mentioned before, she undertook to resume the property management forum; on the 
other hand, she managed to establish personal networks with different factions among 
the residents and within HCs. For example, Long not only positively contacted Mr. 
Tan and cooperated with him in some local affairs, but she also frequently visited 
those residents in No.1 Building who were unhappy with Tan. Long’s tactics were 
quite effective, and she managed to forge good relationships with many residents in 
No.1 Building. Furthermore, with the excuse of “protecting the interests of residents”, 
Long also succeeded in manipulating the re-election of the No.2 HC by exploiting the 
splits among resident factions in the 2003, supporting a Party member to take the 
place of its former head who had previously sponsored the community movement. 53   
Due to the above problems, the contradictions and conflicts among the 
factions related to HCs became increasingly sharper, reaching a peak in the 2004 HC 
election in Green Neighborhood. There were generally two main factions in many 
buildings, who competed violently with each other in the election through all kinds of 
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means. This seriously impaired community solidarity. The No.1 HC to which I next 
discuss was a typical case. 
Case Study: the Evolution of the No.1 HC in GI 
When the No.1 HC was established in 1996, Mr. Tan Xin and Mr. Gong Fei 
were elected by the residents as its head and vice head respectively due to their 
leading role in the community movement against the estate development company. 
However, when the movement came against the local government, they differed from 
each other in their standpoints. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the W Street Office 
succeeded in dividing the alliance between them by informal networks. Therefore, Mr. 
Gong seldom participated in HC affairs; neither did other HC members for diverse 
reasons. Because of the noticeable role of “Small Li” in the movement and her 
personal character of being “fierce”, Tan sought her help to deal with HC affairs. He 
utilized her to do unfair things that he would not do in public, by offering her presents 
like cigarettes, which she cherished; hence, “Small Li” always followed his 
instructions. As a result, Mr. Tan almost “monopolized” the operation of the No.1 HC 
including the management of millions of maintenance fund and other income. Besides, 
he never disclosed the records of the HC bank account to other residents. In the 
following years, Tan refused to re-elect the HC, maintaining the headship of the No.1 
HC for ten years.  
Mr. Tan always attributed the importance of the neighborhood environment to 
the rise of the value of their homes. In 2002, he planned to have a small garden 
surrounding No.1 Building and to decorate the building in order to improve their 
“small environment”, with the cost estimated to be more than two hundred thousand 
yuan. Tan also invited some residents in the building and Secretary Long to discuss 






details from them. Since residents knew little about construction matters, he 
convinced them to agree to the plan. Tan then hired a construction company to 
construct a garden and a high iron railing around it to protect “outsiders” from 
entering the garden.  
It turned out that the construction of the garden led to many conflicts in Green 
Neighborhood. Some residents in other buildings were resentful because the garden 
was only open to residents living in No.1 Building, but Tan did not care about such 
complaints. He argued that the garden was the property of the residents in No.1 
Building and thus should be exclusively used by them. Therefore, the issue 
concerning the garden isolated residents in No.1 Building, especially Mr. Tan, from 
many other local residents. In February 2004, when the W Street Office was going to 
organize a congress of residents, it required every RC to nominate two representatives 
from the sub-neighborhood under its jurisdiction. At that time, Secretary Long was 
still in a relatively good relationship with Mr. Tan. She and Mr. Hu, the head of GI 
RC, were dissatisfied with the Street Office on some issues. Thinking that the Office 
was a little scared of Tan, they appointed him as a representative to articulate their 
concerns to the congress. Mr. Tan was glad to accept the appointment. However, a 
resident in one of the low buildings in GI put up a poster in the neighborhood to 
protest against the appointment, claiming that Tan was too selfish to be a resident 
representative.54 Due to the resident’s complaint to the Street Office, Secretary Long 
and Mr. Hu had to ask residents to elect their representatives. Since many people in 
other buildings disliked Tan, he lost the election and was annoyed. When he had 
problem with Secretary Long in the later HC election, he even regarded this event as 
evidence that she tried to tease him. 
                                                 






Mr. Tan and “Small Li” also became increasingly self-righteous and bossy in 
dealing with public affairs and other residents in their own building. Tan was laid off 
by his work unit in 2003. He later worked as an insurance salesman. He often boasted 
of his skill in dealing with his customers and told his neighbors that he had thus had 
high income.  Tan also claimed that all local residents owed much to him because of 
his great contribution to organizing the community movement and improving the 
environment of the neighborhood at the cost of his spare time, which he could have 
used to make a large sum of money. He actually manipulated the management of the 
HC affairs and millions of yuan of the maintenance fund. His flaunting behavior and 
oligarchy in the HC led to much dissatisfaction from his neighbors. Since he often 
bought quite expensive presents for his family, they suspected that he could have 
obtained a rebate from the construction company that had built the garden and that he 
and “Small Li” had often accepted presents from the person who rented the public 
facilities of the HC and thus gave privileges to the latter. Therefore, they asked Tan to 
publicize the records of the HC bank account so that they would know the truth. 
Furthermore, because of small disputes, Tan also had many problems with a few 
former movement activists who had always supported him. They complained that Tan 
was not so easy-going as before, and that the “atmosphere” in the building was 
increasingly cold. A typical case was Ms. Sun Bao, who was in her seventies, one of 
the three heads of resident groups in No.1 Building. She tried to persuade Tan to 
publicize the bank records as required by other residents, but this triggered his 
antipathy. Another movement activist was angry because Tan had refused to allow 
him to use a spare room of the HC temporarily while always permitting his own 
daughter to use the room. In addition, the neighbors living next to Tan’s home hated 






against Tan on HC affairs, focusing the issue of the bank records. Being resentful of 
them, Tan refused to publicize the records, explained that he had raised the fund for 
the garden partly at the expense of government and that the secret would be exposed 
to residents in other buildings once he publicized the bank records. But Tan’s 
explanation failed to satisfy his opponents, who thereafter had many quarrels with 
him and his loyal followers like “Small Li”. There was rising tension between the two 
factions.  
The formation of factions among residents provided an opportunity for local 
governments to carry out their divide-and-rule tactics. 2004 was the year when most 
HCs were to be re-elected. The Street Office decided to manipulate the whole process. 
In its paper instructions to RCs, the Office required that “this election should be 
performed under the direction of the Street Office…and Party branches should strictly 
have control over the policy pass, the election pass and the approval pass (to protect 
those trouble-makers from being elected).” The Office required all secretaries of Party 
branches to take charge of the election committees of HCs under their jurisdiction 
respectively to ensure that the newly-elected HC members, especially their heads, 
were politically satisfying. In addition, they required that at least 50% of the members 
of a HC should be Party members.  The Office also divided the election process into 
three phases: the establishment of election committee, the election of homeowner 
representatives and the election of HC members. Every election committee was 
constituted by the secretary of the Party branch, two officials of the Street Office and 
four homeowners, and it was to be responsible for organizing the election of the HC 
before November 2004.  
In May 2004, every RC began to advertise the HC election. Having talked to 






No.1 Building. She thought it was a good opportunity for her to reorganize its HC. 
Both the Street Office and many residents disliked Tan. Once she succeeded in 
replacing him with a Party member, she would get praise. Long undertook to set up an 
election committee. In grassroots elections, election committees are very important 
because they can influence the outcome of elections. In other sub-neighborhoods, the 
secretaries of Party branches could just appoint members of the election committees. 
Secretary Long understood that GI residents were quite sensitive to this kind of affairs, 
so she had to consult Mr. Tan on the matter. Tan thought that the situation was under 
his control; he recommended Mr. Lu and Mr. Lee, both of whom were close to him, 
and himself to be members of the committee. Through negotiations, he also agreed to 
allow Ms. Sun Bao to be a member of the election committee.  Secretary Long then 
publicized the list of names of the election committee in No.1 Building, with Mr. Lee 
and herself as the vice-head and the head respectively. Mr. Tan found that he was just 
an ordinary member of the committee and at the last position on the list. He believed 
that those residents who read between lines would suppose that he had been deprived 
of power and that he would not be elected the head of the HC anymore if Secretary 
Long succeeded to manipulate the election.  
Mr. Tan decided to fight back by resorting to the laws. He checked all relevant 
laws and found that the re-election of a HC should be organized by the present HC 
and that only residents with homeownership have the right to serve on the election 
committee. He also found out that Ms. Sun did not have homeownership because her 
home belonged to her husband. Tan attempted to utilize the evidence obtained to 
collapse the election committee. He showed them to Secretary Long and required her 
to deal with the election in accordance with the laws. He further instructed “Small Li” 






and that Long appointed Ms. Sun to be a member of the committee so that the latter 
could take advantage of this position to be elected a member of the new HC. “Small 
Li” succeeded in fanning up suspicion against Secretary Long and her supporters. Ms. 
Sun and other Long’s supporters felt huge pressure. Mr. Lee also decided to handover 
his position as vice-head of the election committee to Mr. Tan so that the latter would 
not cause troubles any more. Secretary Long agreed to this. However, Tan insisted 
that “Small Li” should be elected as one of the homeowner representatives. But this 
was beyond the tolerance of Long and Sun. As it sounded like that Mr. Lee wanted to 
withdraw his support, Long secretly mobilized support from several other retired 
officials and Party members living in No.1 Building who disliked Tan.  
To put more pressure on Long and his other opponents, Tan promised to 
convert the corridor of the small garden into several shops to be rented to some laid-
off workers in No.1 Building to obtain their support. Furthermore, he also publicized 
the instructions of the Street Office about the HC election and relevant laws so that 
residents would understand that there were contradictions between the administrative 
order of the local government and the laws. Moreover, he organized an assembly to 
collect donation for a former movement activist living in No.1 Building who had 
cancer, and to consolidate his relationships with other former activists. Tan and his 
followers also took the opportunity to express their views about the election. His 
followers told residents that the RC and the property management company had been 
trying to replace Tan with a crony. In the meeting with officials of the Street Office 
and Secretary Long, Tan requested that the election be delayed so that the No.1 HC 
could organize residents to study the relevant laws. Due to his influence in the 
neighborhood, the officials agreed to this. Therefore, Tan organized several meetings 






followers were accepted by many residents. The residents thus blamed Long and other 
Tan’s opponents for their attempt to replace him. In addition, “Small Li” even tried to 
lead several dogs to scare Ms. Sun and her aged husband, thereby making the couple 
escape from their home for several days.  
In September 2004, believing that he had control over the situation again, Mr. 
Tan agreed to organize the election. Then the election committee organized residents 
to elect the representatives of the homeowners. Tan’s opponents persuaded Mr. Gong 
to join them to compete with him. They claimed that it was inappropriate for Tan to 
continue to manipulate the HC. The election rule that Tan agreed on indicated that 
eight families on every floor of the building should elect only one representative. 
Besides, HC members were to be elected from twenty five representatives. Due to 
Tan’s problems with the neighbors on his floor, he only won three votes while one of 
his neighbors who disliked him won four votes. Therefore, Tan lost the opportunity to 
be a both representative and a HC member. This was a blow to Tan. He undertook to 
challenge the election results, claiming that the neighbor wanted to join the HC just to 
obtain material benefits. He also mobilized 197 residents in the building to sign on a 
poster supporting him. On 8 December 2004, the election committee called a meeting 
of the twenty five representatives to elect HC members. Tan and his followers went to 
protest against the election. At that time, the People’s Congress of Shanghai had 
revised the relevant law with effect from Nov 1, 2004, indicating that the election of a 
HC be presided by the present HC. Based on this, Tan demanded that the present 
election committee be dismissed and a fresh election re-organized. He also required 
the Street Office and the RC not to intervene in the election. Mobilized by Tan and his 
followers before, many representatives seconded Tan’s proposal. Then the election of 






Building had always consulted Tan also attempted to resist Secretary Long’ efforts to 
manipulate the elections.  
Due to the strong resistance from these HCs, Secretary Long felt very 
depressed and tired; she could not help crying after a failed election meeting. 
Therefore, she would not continue to manipulate the elections. With the withdrawal of 
Secretary Long, one faction in No.4 Building that she had supported conceded while 
the other faction manipulated the election. In No.1 Building and No.5 Building, 
neither faction conceded. Long then suggested to the Street Office to cope with the 
matter in accordance with the new law and to allow the present HCs to preside over 
the elections. Realizing that there was rising consciousness of rights among citizens 
and that they could use the laws to resist manipulation, the Office agreed to her 
suggestion.  
In May 2005, the Street Office issued a notice that all homeowners in No.1 
and No. 5 buildings could volunteer to join the election committees and that the 
Office and the RC would just ensure that the elections were conducted democratically. 
This was to be publicized in the main lobbies of the buildings so that all the residents 
could read it. Tan’s opponents ignored the notice at the first place. Later they found 
that Tan and his followers registered to join the election committee and that the new 
election committee completely constitute by Tan’s faction. Then they complained to 
the Street Office that Tan had put up the notice on a non-noticeable corner of the 
building so that most residents had not read it. But they were told that Tan and his six 
supporters had been appointed members of the new election committee and that they 
could monitor the election process. Tan’s opponents believed that it was unfair to 






“According to the old regulations, he has lost the election. That was 
why he sought to deal with the matter in accordance with the new 
regulations. If the old regulations had been beneficial to him, he 
would definitely have adopted them. He just considers everything 
completely in accordance with his own interests.”  
Both factions not only put up many big-character posters in the building, 
attacking each other about all kinds of issues, but were also engaged in physical 
fights.55 Therefore, the tension between the two factions in the building has been 
rising. Now that he is in charge of the new election committee, Tan is likely to 
manipulate the election. He just attempts to delay the process with many excuses in 
order to discourage his rivals, and he is going to nominate the members of the election 
committee to constitute the new HC without election so that he can keep control over 
the association.56.  
Homeowners’ Committees, Community Development and Quasi-faction Politics  
This chapter examines the formation of HCs and the political consequences. It 
is found that, due to the housing reform, residents are concerned with the value of 
their homes, and many of them have begun to pay more attention to relevant 
community affairs. The formation of HCs has provided opportunities for them to 
articulate their concerns. But there are also many problems with these community 
associations.  
 
                                                 
55 During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Chinese people used to put up big-
character posters in public to criticize and attack others. Since the 1980s, it has been regulated that it is 
illegal to do so. 






Homeowners’ Committees and Community Development  
The emergence of HCs has changed the situation of community participation 
in urban China. In the neighborhoods where HCs operate well, some active residents 
tend to utilize these civil associations to participate in local politics, such as 
improving community management and promoting grassroots democracy, which in 
turn bring them the feeling of empowerment and community satisfaction. The 
research also suggests that the formation and operation of HCs is affected by law and 
social networks. Benjamin Read (2003b) argued that the formation of HCs is a way in 
which China’s middle class have acquired power in their new residential 
neighborhoods through both their own mobilization and the policies of the central 
government. This research indicates that the statement can be generalized to ordinary 
citizens who live in the relatively old neighborhoods of “sold public homes.”  
Except for the relations between HCs and property management companies, 
this research also examines their interactions with local administrative authorities like 
the Street Office and the RC. It finds that, wielding state policies, some of these 
associations do not hesitate to directly argue with the local authorities to articulate 
their interests. Based on their “rightful resistance” (O’Brien 1996), well-organized 
HCs can be positively engaged in local decision-making and officially approved as a 
pillar of the community power structure, as was the situation in GI. Therefore, this 
study concludes that housing reform has also begun to affect local participation and 
community development in old neighborhoods. In addition, it finds that, when dealing 







Guanxi, Homeowners’ Committees and Quasi-faction Politics 
As shown above, there are also many problems with vibrant HCs. Existing 
research has indicated some limitations of civil associations. As Robert Michel (1949) 
pointed out, although many mass organizations proclaim to promote democracy, most 
of them will finally shift to the “oligarchy” of a few elites. Benjamin Read (2003b:51) 
also reminded us that  
“Research on homeowners’ associations in American housing 
complexes—close analogues to the Chinese homeowners’ committees—
gives us reason to be cautious about concluding that these organizations 
are incubators for an engaged, participatory citizenry. According to 
some studies, the US associations tend to be dominated by a small 
‘oligarchy’ of enthusiasts who do little to encourage political activity on 
the part of ordinary residents. They have also been found to tyrannize 
over fellow homeowners by rigidly enforcing restrictions on the use of 
the property, creating conflict and enmity.”  
 
This research confirms that China’s HCs face a similar problem, and they are 
usually dominated by a few enthusiasts who compete against one another for power. 
For example, in GI, some residents joined in HCs due to their concerns with personal 
interests or power; as Mr. Tan admitted when talking with me about his fights against 
the local authorities and some residents, “I just like to challenge those guys who think 
that they are cleverer than me!” Generally, enthusiasts like Tan differ from ordinary 
residents in the following aspects: first, they attach much importance to their power 
and “face” in the neighborhood, and thus enthusiastically engaged in the contest for 
the positions in neighborhood associations such as HCs, which can help to legitimize 
their leadership in the neighborhood. Secondly, they are quite knowledgeable about 






convincing others. Thirdly, they are quite skillful in communicating and building 
networks with others. Fourthly, they generally have relatively good job and high 
social status which get them respect from ordinary residents. With these capabilities, 
they can call on many followers to form a faction, and, sometimes, get support from 
the authorities. Therefore, the oligarchy of neighborhood enthusiasts further leads to 
the formation of quasi-faction politics. Hence, with the development of HCs to some 
extent, the primary problem facing neighborhood governance has gradually shifted 
from the conflicts between homeowners and local pro-image coalition towards those 
among resident factions. These quasi-factions are built on personal networks of 
guanxi among a leader and followers. In the case of No.1 HC, although Tan always 
tried to resort to laws, he usually adopted the regulations supporting his points of view 
while ignoring those against his agenda. More often, he tended to utilize informal 
networks to realize mobilization. Such networks are usually based on common 
interests or the exchanges of small favors involving little personal emotion. A typical 
case is the relationship between Tan and his followers like “Small Li”. 
The formation of quasi-faction politics has adversely affected neighborhood 
governance and impeded complete local democratization. Firstly, these quasi-factions 
are bonded by diverse principles or networks, which leads to the intersection of 
factions along many lines of different issues. As a result, conflicts among them will 
result in many social splits in neighborhoods. In GI, those who had had different kinds 
of problems with Tan bonded them together to form a quasi-faction. Due to the 
conflicts between them and Tan, the followers of the latter were also involved in the 
disputes. Therefore, the personal problems have finally resulted in splits among 
groups. Secondly, factions are not really much concerned with the well-beings of the 






of one faction in No.4 Building commented, “there will be no faction if everyone is 
concerned with the benefits of the whole public.” An official in the W Street Office 
also told me, “they often come to complain about their opponents, but what they 
highlight are always personal problems among them.” The ceaseless conflicts among 
quasi-factions make it hard for agreements beneficial to the whole community to be 
achieved. In the GI HC election, the conflicts and the long delay have resulted in the 
rising of distrust and splits, and the decline of positive social capital in the community. 
Thirdly, the existence of quasi-factions makes it feasible for local authorities to adopt 
a divide-and-rule strategy to impose control, as shown in the election of No.2 HC. 
Fourthly, those quasi-factions failed in competition cannot equally voice their 
concerns. In the election of the No.4 HC, the faction had conceded could not 
participate in HC affairs any more; and the new No.4 HC manipulated by the other 
faction proved to be not so effective. Hence, there is a dilemma in the development of 
HCs in urban China. On the one hand, most people will not bother to spend time 
participating in HC affairs, which results in collapse of this kind of civil associations 
in many neighborhoods.  On the other hand, some homeowners join in HCs just to get 
material benefits or power, as was the situation in GI. Therefore, in the developed 
neighborhoods like GI, even though residents are able to resist against local 
authorities outside of their communities with their own associations, they also face the 
“inside” problem of factionalism and the “oligarchy” of faction leaders. 
 
Interest-based Society, Small ‘Radius of Trust’ and Civil Associations 
This research also explores the institutional and cultural factors responsible for 






interest-based society, few people would care about the public benefits of the 
community. Furthermore, there was a lack of institutions developed enough to 
regulate the matters of HCs. As a consequence, in everyday life, actors in the local 
governance web attempt to pursue their interests through these civil associations by 
exploiting institutional gaps. In the election, many present HC heads concerned with 
power and “face” will not withdraw from the associations, which results in the 
problem of replacement. The competition of interest among these actors will 
adversely affect the further development of HCs. In addition, HCs also have the 
problem facing all kinds of associational activity. As Portes and Landolt (1996) 
pointed out, associational activity can be divisive and exclusionary. Fukuyama (1999) 
also claimed that there is potential problem with associational activity—low level of 
trust. According to him, associational activity usually just unites a few like-minded 
people, and thus has a small “radius of trust”. This study on HCs confirms these 
findings. Since many people are just concerned with their personal interests, they tend 
to distrust one another; and they do not believe that others may work for the benefits 
of the public. As one HC head in GI complained, when discussing with me about 
whether HCs could lead to good governance,  
“No way in neighborhoods like ours. These petty guys (xiao shimin) 
are always making troubles. They find that officials of the government 
are always committing corruption, then they suspect that HC heads 
who manage the public property like me are also doing the same things. 
They never trust that you will work for the community without being 
concerned with personal benefits; and they always suspect that you are 
utilizing the post to make money!”  
 
The small ‘radius of trust’ in civil activities will result in the decline of 






community solidarity with that at the time of the community movement, Mr. Tan 
maintained that  
“At that time, the general situation was good, although there were 
some residents against us. But the present situation is quite bad. The 
mass in China are always like this, splits will follow success. Just like 
the Taiping Rebel (of peasants in the Qing Dynasty), there were big 
splits among those rebelled in the end! ”  
Therefore, civil activities of HCs in China seem to be characteristic of small 
“radius of trust” and final divisions.  
Conclusion  
This chapter looks at the impact of civil associations in neighborhood 
governance. It focuses on the influence of the housing reform and of related rise of 
HCs, their achievements and problems in particular, on neighborhood politics. In 
particular, exploring the dynamics that the governance performance in GI was better 
than that of other sub-neighbourhoods, it is found that the reform of homeownership 
has affected community participation to some extent. Especially, it has led to the 
formation of HCs which play a vital role in local governance in some neighborhoods 
and have greatly affected everyday life of residents and neighbourhood politics. In 
many respects, HCs have begun to challenge authority of existing state-sponsored 
institutions. Those well-organized HCs have developed as a pillar of community 
power structure and promoted the expansion of social space, which confirms 
Putnam’s conclusion (1993a) about the external effect of civil associations on the 
wider polity. 
On the other hand, this chapter explores the problems of HCs—the tendency 
towards ‘oligarchy’ of a few enthusiasts and quasi-faction politics. The existence of 






Putnam’s conclusion (1993a:90) about the internal effect of civil associations that 
they “instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-
spiritedness”. Therefore, even vibrant HCs will not necessarily result in neighborhood 
democratization. Although their formation has greatly promoted neighborhood 










This study has explored the dynamics of neighborhood politics and grassroots 
governance by investigating community building in Shanghai. It provides a detailed 
description of socio-political changes at the neighborhood level under the context of 
rapid macro social transformation in urban China. In particular, it examines several 
main dimensions of neighborhood politics: the domination of local pro-image 
coalitions of local government and business groups, collective resistance from citizens 
against the coalitions, elections of civil associations and local faction politics. It 
focuses on looking at the outcome of community building in terms of local 
democratization and the rule of the regime: 1. the empowerment of citizen, i.e. 
whether or not they have “voice” option and “exit” option in neighborhood politics, 
and how they are involved in neighborhood politics; 2. community autonomy and 
power structure, i.e. whether or not China’s neighborhoods can be autonomous and 
represent the interests of residents, and how decisions are made in neighborhoods; 3. 
state making, i.e. whether or not the state builds up its legitimacy based on the 
neighborhood system. The systematic examination on these issues also raises 
reflections on some related bigger questions about the contemporary trajectory of 
China’s development: how is the transformation of local governance related to macro 
political development? How does the domination of local pro-image coalitions and 
civil resistance impact on the rule of the authoritarian state? How does the state deal 
with the selectively obstinate local pro-image coalitions on the one hand and the 
increasingly disgruntled citizens on the other? The exploration on these issues should 






governance in general, and of the contemporary practice and trend of communist rule 
in urban China in particular.  In the next section, I summarize the main findings of 
this study, and provide preliminary explanations for them. Thereafter, I discuss the 
prospect for local governance in urban China and its implications for the macro socio-
political development. Finally, I will identify the limitation of this study. 
Community Building and the Formation of “Quasi-civic Community”  
The achievements of local governance  
Civil engagement and the empowerment of citizens  
As well as examining changes in formal institutions, this study pays much 
attention to the agency of citizens’ engagement in neighborhood politics. Existing 
research has shown that active civil participation is necessary for democracy and good 
governance (e.g. Almond & Verba 1963; Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 2000). Concerning 
citizens’ engagement in grassroots politics, students of China classified urban citizens 
in work-units and neighborhoods into two big groups of activists and non-activists, 
depending on their relations with the administrative authorities (Walder 1986；Read 
2003a).  
However, this study finds that this dichotomy is too vague for us to understand 
civil engagement in neighborhoods of contemporary China. In accordance with 
citizens’ concerns and their actual involvement in neighborhood affairs, we may 
classify them into the following groups: 1.The group responsive to the calling of the 
party-state and government agencies. Most residents of this group have benefited 
from the communist rule, and some of them are also committed to the communist 
ideology. These residents usually respond actively to the call of the regime and keenly 






Green Neighborhood who genuinely supported the local government in the 
community movement. 2. The group committed to help others. They devote their time 
and energy to help others in need. 3. The group concerned with sociability. They 
enjoy communicating with others and attending group activities. These three groups 
of residents, also called “neighborhood activists” by former researchers (e.g. Read 
2003a), often cooperate with local government agencies, especially with RCs. Most of 
them are retired or laid-off workers, and are appointed by RCs to be heads of 
residents’ groups to help the RCs administer other residents in their respective 
residential buildings. Their motivation to cooperate with RCs could be generalized as 
“local voluntarism” (Read 2003a).  
4. The group negatively responsive to local affairs. Most of those in middle-
age and young residents belong to this group. Some of them may be a little concerned 
with community development, but have no time to be involved in public affairs. 
Others are just indifferent to community participation because of their utilitarian 
calculating of time consumption. Most residents of this group have regular jobs, and 
they occasionally cooperate with the RC due to their “thin reciprocity” relations with 
the latter (Read 2003a).  
5. The group concerned with “face” and human relationships. They would not 
voluntarily lend a hand to others; but they seldom refuse to help people who request 
small favors because they would not like to “lose face” or break up their relationship 
with the latter. Actually, in the community movement and the later HC election, many 
residents, once requested, would sign on the posters of both contestants to show their 
support just because of their unwillingness to offend either party. 6. The group 
seeking power and interests. The residents of this group are very enthusiastic in being 






HCs, or in building networks with local authorities, in order to serve their personal 
needs and interests. For instance, in the HC elections, a few enthusiasts violently 
competed against one another for the leadership of the associations. 7. The group 
concerned with citizens’ rights or community development as a whole. Most of them 
are well-educated, and have relatively high social status. They may not regularly 
participate in conventional local affairs. But once there is any violation of citizens’ 
rights or anything that adversely affects the community, they spare no efforts to fight 
for their community. For example, in the community movement, a few intellectuals in 
GI also actively participated in the resistance.  
Generally, with the initiation of community building, more and more citizens 
were engaged in local affairs. As shown in Chapter Four, more than half of the 
residents in both GI and GII participated in various community activities either for 
personal interests or collective welfare. In other words, they had a “voice” option in 
neighborhood politics. However, there were also many residents who did not 
participate in any public community activities, which suggests that they had an “exit” 
option. Contrary to the situation of limited “voice” option and “exit” option in work 
units before the Reform (Henderson and Cohen 1984), the situation of participation in 
neighborhoods implies that Chinese citizens have been much more empowered at 
individual level than before. In the process of community participation, the 
consciousness of citizens’ rights has also been enhanced among them.  
However, except for contained community participation such as those 
mobilized by RCs, citizens also openly launch “boundary-spanning contention” like 
collective resistance to challenge the existing local authority, which has led to 
expansion of social space at the community level.  






Existing research suggested that although citizens in contemporary urban 
China have personal freedom and “exit” option, they can not affect public affairs 
(Davis et al 1995). Fulong Wu (2002:1090) also claimed that “the reformation of 
urban communities on a territorial basis reflects continuity rather than transition” 
because most of the territorial administrative entities “have their origin in the 1950s, 
but have been modified during the past two decades”; and the party-state system has 
also been strengthened in community building.  
However, this research finds there have been considerable changes in 
community power structure. On the one hand, local governments tend to establish 
pro-image coalitions with business groups. Being self-centered, the coalitions tend to 
exploit institutional gaps and establish their domination in neighborhoods, which 
violates the interests of both the state and residents. On the other hand, in some sub-
neighborhoods with abundant quantity of social networks like GI, residents are 
gradually able to influence neighborhood politics by launching collective “boundary-
spanning contention” with horizontal and vertical networks. The establishment of 
civil associations like HCs and the initiation of “boundary-spanning contention” have 
led to changes in ways by which public power is exerted in neighborhoods, thus 
transforming community power structure. This can be illustrated by the transition in 
GI. Before the community movement, local government agencies and the RC 
dominated local public affairs. Later, due to the existence of initial quantity of social 
capital in GI, their residents began to actively participate in the movement. In this 
process, social capital and civicness were enhanced within the community, leading to 
the success of their resistance against the powerful local government and positively 






The community movement also influenced the recognition of the relevant 
local political actors. Many residents learned many things in the movement and were 
thus increasingly concerned with laws and citizens’ rights in dealing with local public 
affairs. This in turn enhanced their initiative to react to government policies. These 
residents realized that they could protect their rights and interests by reacting to 
government policies positively, and the success of their collective action in turn 
enhanced their subjective sense of empowerment. The local government also realized 
that public opinions should be one potential resource of authority. The active role of 
HCs in the community movement made the local government agencies confirm the 
important position of this kind of civil associations in neighborhoods. Afterwards, the 
local pro-image coalition was more careful in dealing with HCs and would have 
dialogues with the latter on issues relevant to the community and formulate local 
political agenda, which had been semi-institutionalized, as shown in Chapter Six.  
Therefore, community power structure in GI has changed from the integral 
one to an intercursive one, and the sub-neighborhood has been relatively autonomous 
from the local authorities. The “boundary-spanning contention”, like the community 
movement, has altered the outcomes of neighborhood politics and operated as an 
engine for change, thus helping citizen challengers to become polity members (see 
O’Brien 2003:58). Along with this process, local governance in GI has been greatly 
improved. Similarly, community building could promote positive social capital 
among citizens in many neighborhoods, hereby facilitating their autonomy. The state 
making of modern China in the early twenty century resulted in the dismantlement of 
“cultural nexus of power” in village communities, which further ruined local 
governance (Duara 1988). But contemporary community building seems be able to 






from misusing their public power. Furthermore, the existence of opportunities for 
citizens to initiate “boundary-spanning contention” at the local level also reduces the 
risk of individual dissatisfaction towards the authorities , which could develop into 
large-scale violent social movements (see Zhou 1993). 
 
The change of community power structure and social transformation  
This research suggests that social transformation in contemporary China is 
responsible for the change of community power structure in neighborhoods. This is 
clearly seen in the transition from command economy to market-oriented economy. 
As mentioned above, during the time of the command economy, the Party-state not 
only instilled communist ideology into the citizens through propaganda, but also 
purged dissents through violent means such as class struggle to remake the society. 
Furthermore, the state monopolized economic resources and career opportunities; it 
entrusted its local management agencies to control grassroots communities and to 
demand political loyalty from citizens by distributing the scare resources. At work-
units, management could grant rewards to activists by promoting them. In 
neighborhoods, although Street Offices and RCs could not directly provide activists 
with jobs, they could recommend the latter and their relatives to state-owned factories. 
Without their recommendation and approval, it was hard for citizens to look for jobs 
in state-owned workplaces by themselves.  
At that time, there were many constraints that prevented citizens from 
initiating collective resistance to voice their concerns. First, since the state 
monopolized all career opportunities, the cost for citizens to participate in collective 
resistance, which might result in their being fired by their work-units, was too high for 






the grassroots to monitor and to report ordinary citizens’ behavior and utterances 
(Walder 1986; Davis 1995; Read 2003a); this also enhanced the risk for the latter to 
act. Thirdly, the patron-client networks that the Party-state developed also created 
social cleavages among activists and non-activist citizens, inhibiting collective 
resistance against the authorities (Walder 1986). Fourth, because the state 
monopolized the mass media, ordinary citizens “had little reliable information on 
which to base potential political action and no intermediary communities to help 
organize their action even if they had wanted to act” (Whyte & Parish 1984:295). As a 
result, it was very hard for citizens to initiate collective resistance at that time.  
Since the 1980s, there have been fundamental changes in social conditions. 
With the initiation of economic reforms and the reduction of state control over local 
governments and society, the latter have acquired their own resources and the ability 
to negotiate with one another, thus enabling them to forge new power relations. With 
the initiation of community building and the devolution of state power, local 
governments have more space to wield influence at the local level. Due to their strong 
drive to promote local economic growth and image building, many local officials 
utilize all available channels, including informal ones, to achieve that. As a result, 
some local governments have possessed many economic resources and the ability to 
negotiate with higher-level governments. Furthermore, the initiation of community 
building has also led to the shift of many regulatory functions to local governments. 
These have made relations between local governments and the state more complicated 
than before. As Wu Fulong (2002:1087) pointed out, “Rather than responding to 
commands from ‘hierarchical’ government departments as it did in the past, the Street 
Office can now act as a ‘comprehensive’ and ‘territorial’ entity”. Usually, they 






implementing state policies or directives. Due to the relatively limited capability and 
constraints of the system, it is quite difficult for the state to ensure close supervision 
over local government agencies (Lu 1997; Ying 2001; Bernstein & Lu 2003). 
Therefore, local governments have become more powerful.  
Commercial organizations have been operating in the best development 
environments since the CCP came to power, as the state encourages them to be 
involved in local development, and local governments support them due to their own 
drive to promote local economic growth and image building. Many commercial 
organizations have forged alliances with local governments to facilitate their 
businesses through guanxi networks. Therefore, they also wield much influence in 
neighborhood politics.  
The changes in social conditions have also made it possible for citizens to 
voice their concerns and to argue against local pro-image coalitions that violate their 
interests. The constraints on citizens which impeded their ways to initiating collective 
resistance have been shaken since the 1990s. First, because of economic reforms, 
there have been increasing career opportunities in cities; some citizens are not so 
afraid to be fired by their work-units. Second, the gradual disintegration of the work-
unit system has resulted in the decline of patron-client networks between local 
administrative authorities and citizen “activists,” making the informal monitoring 
system of ordinary citizens less effective than before. Thirdly, there have been more 
and more accessible information resources for citizens, such as newspapers, radios 
and internet. Other social changes have also facilitated the citizens’ collective 
resistance against local authorities. The state prefers to achieve economic 
development and social stability by legal means instead of brute coercion. This 






citizens (Cai 2002).  
As mentioned above, there have been increasing splits within the 
administrative system. When the interests and power of local governments conflict 
with those of higher-level government agencies, the latter may try to create a 
counterbalance of citizens by imposing constraints on local governments in case the 
actions of local governments adversely affect their authority and the legitimacy of the 
state. In recent years, the state has passed many laws to prevent local government 
from abusing power at will, enabling citizens to report illegal actions of local 
governments to higher-level government agencies. Therefore, citizens could 
sometimes generate support from within the state.  
Thirdly, government control of the mass media has been relaxed. Citizens can 
voice their concerns through the mass media. Most importantly, the state has also 
instituted some laws to empower citizens to articulate and exercise their political and 
financial rights. A typical instance is the new laws empowering residents to elect their 
own representatives to constitute RCs and HCs. These social changes constitute 
“political opportunity structures” and the institutional context for citizens to voice 
their concerns and to shape neighborhood politics. Therefore, when viewed in a broad 
historical perspective, we can conclude that the present neighborhood politics greatly 
differs from that that characterized the earlier totalitarian or clientilist period.  
 
State and social networks: institutional and cultural factors affecting neighborhood 
governance  
 
Earlier researchers in the study of local governance believe that social capital 






In his examination of urban politics in Shanghai, Tingwei Zhang (2002) also argued 
that  
“Local government is still the strongest among the main four parties: 
the central and local governments, the marketplace, and the 
community power,”(p,491) and “with no election power to leverage 
government officials, community groups are the weakest of the four 
players in urban development.” (p,495) 
On the one hand, this study partly confirms the importance of social capital in 
local politics in urban China. As discussed above, in some sub-neighborhoods, with 
well-developed civil associations and informal social networks among citizens, they 
can negotiate with or even resist the absolute power of local authorities to promote 
community autonomy. On the other hand, this study rejects the previous optimistic 
argument on the role of local government in the governance of China. Since local 
officials are not elected by citizens, they just act selfishly and misuse pubic resources, 
thereby hampering neighborhood governance. It further notes that the state itself plays 
a leading role in urban governance. As Bourdieu (2002: 66) pointed out, it is the state 
that primarily affects the cognition of the people in depth in modern societies. This 
study shows that the party-state can affect comprehensively the cognition and actions 
of citizens, including their consciousness of rights by means such as legislation and 
propaganda. As a result, citizens can launch “boundary-spanning contention” by 
employing laws and state discourses and even complaining to high-ranking 
government agencies directly in order to argue against local authorities. Furthermore, 
the state influences neighborhood politics by empowering local government agencies 
and appointing or replacing local officials. All these amount to direct intervention in 






However, due to the limitation of the state in monitoring local governments 
and its reluctance to completely empower citizens, its specific role in neighborhoods 
is contextual. Consequently, neighborhood governance greatly depends on the 
negotiation between citizens and local pro-image coalitions; and there is space for 
guanxi networks to be utilized to wield influence. In sum, both state authority and 
social capital are key factors that influence neighborhood politics. In the contests for 
community power, the more support one party gets from the higher ranking governing 
bodies, or the more social capital the party accumulates, the more powerful the party 
becomes in the neighborhoods.  
 
The problems with community building  
The limitation of neighborhood democratization  
            The change of community power structure and the expansion of political space 
in neighborhoods do not suggest the practice of full local democracy. Presently, 
neighborhood democratization is limited in several ways.  
            First of all, the Party-state is ambivalent in developing grassroots democracy. 
Although it desires to improve local governance through grassroots elections, it is 
afraid that citizens could be out of control if grassroots democracy is fully developed. 
Due to its authoritarian nature, the state attempts to control the citizens’ participation, 
and block many channels which the citizens could have used to voice their concerns 
freely. In other words, the state only encourages “managed participation” (Cai 2004b). 
Local government agencies and commercial organizations tend to forge alliances 
through guanxi which are very instrument-oriented rather than affection-involved. 






few Street Offices willingly support the democratic reforms of RCs and HCs; many 
Offices even clandestinely manipulate the elections.  
Secondly, in most neighborhoods, there is lack of solidarity and cooperation 
among residents. During the command economy, citizens could not express their 
views through local political participation; they were indifferent to local public affairs. 
The legacy of such indifference could still influence citizens’ attitudes to local 
participation. Also, due to the domination of local pro-image coalitions, many 
residents do not believe that they can influence decision-making in neighborhoods; 
the feeling of powerlessness impedes community participation. Further, because of 
the large-scale migration, residents are not familiar with one another in new 
neighborhoods, thus hindering cooperation among them. Yet another issue is the over-
prevalence of utilitarianism, which prevents citizens from engaging in public affairs 
which are not directly related to their own interests; in other words, they tend to be 
indifferent. All these negatively affect neighborhood democratization. 
In neighborhoods where residents are familiar with one another, they may 
cooperate with others who have good guanxi with them; the cooperation may promote 
community autonomy to some extent. Due to the informal and exclusive nature of 
guanxi, such cooperation among residents may also result in the rise of what I refer to 
“quasi-faction politics”. As mentioned before, Chinese politics is full of factional 
competitions at various levels. A “quasi-faction” shares most of the characteristics 
with a faction in high-level politics. Faction is built on clientilist ties between a leader 
and followers of low status and power. Once the leader distributes substantial rewards 
to the latter for their support, factions are thus relatively stable (e.g. Nathan 1973). In 
contrast, quasi-faction is built on personal ties of guanxi between a leader and 






exchanges of small favors between the two parties, relations with each other are 
relatively fluid and flexible.  
“Quasi-faction politics” impedes local democratization. Generally, the leaders 
of factions tend to monopolize power (Nicholas 1965; Nathan 1973). Furthermore, 
Nathan (1973) has observed, “To weaken their rivals, factions try to discredit 
opposition faction members, dislodge them from their posts, and buy away their allies. 
This leads to a politics of personality in which rumor, character assassination, bribery 
and deception are used.” (p49) Previous chapters have shown that most of these 
scenarios can be found in neighborhood politics. These negative activities impair trust 
among residents and reduce the quantity of positive social capital at the community 
level. Interestingly, Eric Oliver (2001: 93) suggested that community conflicts are 
very important to build lively local politics that arouse interest and active participation 
of residents. Indeed, my study on the community movement also illustrates the 
positive consequences of community conflicts. The earlier community movement 
against the local pro-image coalitions outside the community promoted the 
development of positive social capital inside GI. However, as discussed in Chapter 
Six, subsequent aggressive factional conflicts among residents themselves that 
involved rumors, deception and threatening use of violence instead of fair competition 
resulted in negative consequences such as bitter splits in the community, the rise of 
antagonism of citizens and the decline of positive social capital. A typical case was 
that “Small Li” in No.1 Building urged her dogs to scare her elderly rivals (see 
Chapter Six).  Furthermore, unlike the community movement, this kind of internal 
factional conflicts focus on the personal interests of a few leaders at the expense of 
the interests of the community. Hence, active community participation does not 






residents, sub-neighborhoods like GI do not fully represent the interests of most other 
residents. Clearly, while community building could be “harbinger of a civil society,” 
(Derleth & Koldyk 2004), it does not necessarily lead to the formation of a 
democratic civil society in urban China at the grassroots level.  
Unlike an ideal “civic community” described by Putnam (1993a), there are many 
problems with a relatively autonomous “quasi-civic community” in urban China like 
GI. First, citizens do not generally trust and tolerate one another. Instead, they tend to 
be hateful when differing on substantial matters. Therefore, community solidarity and 
civicness are not very high. Secondly, they do not share equal rights and obligations 
in public affairs. Some enthusiasts just want others to follow them without questions. 
Thirdly, community participation and solidarity is more based on guanxi networks 
rather than positive social capital. Furthermore, local authorities are not so 
accountable to the citizens. In addition, commercial organizations are not sensitive to 
public interests. Consequently, the welfare of citizens can not be guaranteed.  
State involution 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, due to the relatively weak monitoring 
capability of the state, its local agents tend to be increasingly “profit-oriented”. The 
domination of local government over neighborhoods and their self-centered actions 
have impaired local governance and triggered dissatisfaction among citizens, leading 
to “state involution” in terms of its legitimacy. Daura (1988) notes that state 
involution happens when both state and citizens can not benefit from the 
augmentation of wealth. Existing China studies tend to investigate the expansion of 
state power with the extension of local institutions and the increasing number of 
bureaucrats (see Zhang 2001). Researchers examined the tension between community 






local communities, which are claimed to be characteristics of modern state making 
(ibid.);. However, the present research finds a different type of state involution: both 
state authority and community autonomy are impaired by the “profit-oriented” actions 
of local pro-image coalitions which are primarily concerned with their groups’ 
interests in economic growth.  
 
Guanxi serves as the foundation of the “local governance web” instead of positive 
social capital 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, social capital refers to social networks, 
norms of reciprocity and trust while guanxi constitutes by private and informal ties 
that are also based on norms of reciprocity and trust; and these two concepts overlap 
with each other in many aspects. Guanxi can be regarded as one type of social capital 
at the individual level. The primary distinction between guanxi and positive social 
capital, however, lies in the level of trust. In the present urban neighborhoods, actors 
tend to promote their interests by employing informal networks, as was illustrated by 
the coalitions of local government agencies and business groups in Chapter Three. 
Many residents participate in neighborhood politics largely because they are 
mobilized by RCs or faction leaders, instead of the commitment to the common 
benefits of their community. In other words, most social networks that support all 
these cooperation are very instrumental guanxi instead of positive social capital; and 
guanxi play an increasing role in neighborhood politics.  
Existing research on guanxi has drawn attention to its positive political 
consequences. In particular, Mayfair Yang (1994) implied that guanxi in China 
constitutes a kind of social space, similar to civil society, which can help citizens to 






constitutes exclusive private ties, its prevalence may also impede the development of 
inclusive positive social capital at community level. Guanxi can be utilized to serve 
particular interests of every political force in the neighborhoods; which may lead to 
diverse socio-political consequences. As shown in Chapter Five, it can facilitate 
citizens’ “boundary-spanning contention” and the autonomy of communities to some 
extent because citizens can use guanxi to resist local pro-image coalitions and defend 
their own rights. On the other hand, the frequent use of personal guanxi instead of 
positive social capital may result in the domination of local pro-image coalitions and 
the oligarchy of a few privileged citizens to the exclusion of ordinary citizens. The 
cases shown in Chapter Three and Six illustrate that the extensive deployment of 
guanxi by neighborhood actors has led to the exercise of many kinds of exploitation, 
and thus conflicts among them. Hence, the influence of guanxi on local governance is 
contextual. Therefore, the existing theories on the relations between social capital and 
local governance are not exactly applicable to China’s situation.  
The dominance of guanxi in the “local governance web” is highly related to 
the transformation of social context. On coming to power, the CCP believed that 
guanxi could not only conflict with the communist ideology but also prevent people 
from cooperating with one another to build a communist society since it is built on 
particular personal ties. The Party therefore proclaimed a kind of “comradeship,” 
which was assumed to be based on generalized trust, instead of the exclusive guanxi 
(Vogel 1968). However, Andrew Walder (1986) found that the practical 
administration system in work-units enabled the administrators to utilize scare 
resources to cultivate personal ties between themselves and citizen activists, resulting 






economic reforms, guanxi has prevailed in every domains of social life including 
local politics (Yang 1994; Brunn 1995; Yan 1996; Wank 1995, 1999). As shown in 
the previous chapters, the initiation of community building has enhanced 
neighborhood-based social ties, constituted primarily by private guanxi rather than 
positive social capital. But it is difficult for these individual networks to be developed 
into positive social capital due to different levels of trust involved. 
In contemporary China, the difficulty of generalized and institutional trust to 
be developed can be attributed to four reasons. First, usually, Chinese people tend to 
trust particular individuals whom he/she knows well instead of strangers. Secondly, 
due to the prevalence of utilitarianism and the relatively unfair social distribution 
system in contemporary China, many people tend to maximize their benefits as soon 
as possible by all kinds of means, that obstructing generalized trust among social 
members. Even among those with relatively good relations with each other, the 
relations are more instrument-oriented and involve less affection than before. 
Therefore, it is hard for this kind of personal guanxi to develop into positive social 
capital. Thirdly, under the authoritarian system, the gap between the authorities and 
citizens could also prevent institutional trust from being developed. Thus, 
neighborhood actors tend to cooperate with others through private ties instead of 
institutional trust. Fourthly, the existence of quasi-factions and the divide-and-rule 
strategy of local pro-image coalitions also have resulted in splits and distrust within 
neighborhoods. In fact, the prevalence of informal guanxi impairs the enforcement of 
formal institutions. For example, property management companies reduce their 
services to the community and evade other obligations due to their informal alliances 






performance of local governance is determined by the larger social contexts such as 
the political system and local culture.  
In sum, in post-Deng China, guanxi is important in neighborhood politics. 
Community building and neighborhood governance thus exhibit the characteristics of 
rationalization of “modern” societies like the enforcement of laws and the 
empowerment for citizens to express their concerns on the one hand, and the 
prevalence of “traditional” guanxi on the other hand. Both processes interact with 
each other and affect neighborhood governance. The social structure of this type of 
neighborhoods can thus be referred to as “quasi-civic community”. Though they can 
resist the absolute power of local authorities, they face the problem of oligarchy of a 
few privileged citizens. The main difference between them and the ideal “civic 
community” is that community solidarity is based on guanxi networks and social 
capital respectively. The primary problem facing the “quasi-civic community” is the 
need to promote generalized trust among residents and the development of positive 
social capital. For most other China’s neighborhoods, their political structure range on 
the continuum from total domination by local authorities to relatively autonomous 
“quasi-civic community”; their primary problem is to fight for community autonomy.   
 “State-society Synergy”, Linking Social Capital and Local Governance in China 
The failure of the 1989 Tiananmen movement suggests that it is difficult for 
China’s civil society to initiate large-scale political movements to directly challenge 
the powerful authoritarian state. As one consequence, the movement almost delayed 
the path of China to further Opening and Reform. However, grassroots boundary-
spanning contentions have promoted local governance to some extent and partly 
released the grievances of citizens. Therefore, under the context of globalization, the 






market liberalization. Actually, in recent years, the central state has been trying, or 
claiming, to protect the socio-economic interests and rights of citizens to strengthen 
its legitimacy while it attempts to consolidate its authoritarian rule. At the local level, 
irresponsible local pro-image coalitions have always tryed to exploit citizens, which 
resulting in heightening tension between them and citizens, and triggered collective 
resistance. Since these grassroots movements generally focus on defending specific 
citizen rights and are directed at irresponsible local pro-image coalitions, the central 
government is relatively tolerant to this kind of resistance. However, these fragmented 
local resistance could extend to bigger area very quickly and affect state policies. New 
technological tools like the internet and mobile phones can facilitate this kind of 
movement mobilization. A case in point is the “Not-to-buy-housing” movement 
initiated at China this year. During the recent few years, housing price in urban China 
has been increasing rapidly, partly due to coalitions of local governments and estate 
developers manipulating of local estate markets. The consequence is that many 
ordinary urban citizens have to borrow large sums of money to buy houses, resulting 
in much dissatisfaction among them. On April 26, 2006, Mr. Zou Tao, a Shenzhen 
citizen published a public letter on the internet proposing that citizens stop buying 
new housing to boycott the estate coalitions. His proposal has been seconded by tens 
of thousands of people all over the country through the internet; and hundred of 
forums have been formed on the internet to sustain the resistance.57 According to an 
investigation on 8938 respondents, 79.1% of them supported the movement. 58 
Alarmed by the mass dissatisfaction, the relevant central government agencies held a 
meeting in May 2006 to discuss the problem of housing price and imposed some 
                                                 
57 See http://bt.xinhuanet.com/2006-06/23/content_7336356.htm; and 
http://www.zoutao.com/bbs/Boards.asp 






regulations on real estate market manipulation.59 Although this kind of movements 
are still under the control of the central state presently, they help participants to learn 
mobilization skills and promote cooperation among citizen groups through extensive 
areas, which may form a basis for potential large-scale movements addressing bigger 
socio-political issues like democratization.  
Presently, civil society activities including boundary-spanning contentions in 
urban China can generally focus on local issues. As Braathen and May (2004:5) have 
pointed out, that the common problem for community development is how social 
capital “can be transformed into political power by taking sustainable institutional 
forms.” With a bottom-up perspective, Putnam (1993a, 2000) highlighted civil 
activities while ignoring the role of state authority. With a top-down perspective, 
Evans (1996) proclaimed a “state-society synergy” relationship and emphasized the 
role of government in enhancing social capital. Further he argued that “state-society 
synergy” can be a catalyst for local development. Integrating both perspectives, this 
study highlights the efforts of both the state and citizens. Migdal (1994, 2001) has 
pointed out that the power relations between the state and the society are not always a 
zero-sum conflict, and that the state and social forces may be mutually empowering. 
Bridger and Alter (2004:20) also claimed that “the creation of linkages across interest 
lines is central to community development.” Furthermore, the experience of some 
former communist societies can be used for reference. For example, in the Russian 
society, there are vibrant social life and strong informal networks. But they are based 
on exclusive trust among relatives and close friends (Rose 1995). Tamas Pal (2005:5) 
also observed that the feeling of bonding together inside these primary groups 
“influences the style of behavior and empowers mutual trust, but outside of it there 
                                                 






are no general rules.” This is similar to the situation in China. However, since the 
1990s, in some local communities of Russia, public and private sectors have started to 
establish something similar to mutually supportive relations with one another 
(ibid.p,6). 
Due to the fact that the state has relatively limited capability to monitor local 
pro-image coalitions and the fact that a few privileged enthusiasts would ignore state 
authority and violate the interests of ordinary citizens, this research advocates the 
synergy and creation of linking social capital between the central state and ordinary 
citizens in order to impose constraints on the “middle” groups. Fortunately, the state 
has been implementing this kind of cooperation through the relatively formal 
complaint system (xinfang) (see Diao 1994). However, this system is not enough for 
the new situation (Ying 2001; Dong 2005). Therefore, the main task for 
neighborhoods in contemporary China is not what civil society advocates claimed, 
that is, to resist the intervention of the state (see Davis et al 1995), but to resist the 
absolute power of local pro-image coalitions on the one hand, and the “oligarchy” of 
privileged citizens on the other.  
To achieve this, positive social capital, especially the linking ones, needs to be 
developed within and beyond neighborhoods. In Shanghai, the Municipal Garden 
Bureau invites and honors citizens who report those who destroy greeneries to satisfy 
their interests, most of whom are usually powerful local governmental agencies. In the 
recent big social conflicts between local pro-growth coalitions and citizens, the mass 
media have begun to act as a linkage between the state and citizens. The cooperation 
between the state and citizens can enhance state legitimacy and consolidation of the 
regime on the one hand and improve the welfares of citizens on the other. 






been set up by the central state is partly responsible for the “performance”-oriented 
actions of local pro-image coalitions, it has to reflect upon and restructure the 
inappropriate urban management system. In the long term, the state faces the task of 
building positive social capital among citizens, business groups, local government 
agencies and itself in order to promote urban governance, and this could be an agent 
for social transformation. 
Conclusion  
This study has found that the local administration in urban China has generally 
become rationalized as demonstrated in the increasing negotiations between the 
authorities and citizens instead of coercion. However, due to the authoritarian and 
utilitarian political institution, the restructuring of urban management system has led 
to the establishment of local pro-image coalitions, and further state involution. 
Community-building has also resulted in the empowerment of citizens and the 
enhancement of civicness, which further facilitates neighborhood governance. The 
urban reforms provide “political opportunity structures” so that some citizens can 
initiate “boundary-spanning contentions” to defend their rights and interests through 
guanxi networks. But further community development is hampered by the exclusive 
nature of guanxi, and the lack of positive social capital and high civicness in 
neighborhoods. Therefore, even though neighborhoods can be autonomous, they are 
unable to represent the interests of ordinary citizens. Faced with the problems of local 
pro-image coalitions and “oligarchy” of a few privileged citizens, there is a need to 
develop linking social capital between the state and ordinary citizens in order to 
promote local governance. 
This research has some specific contributions to make to the study of 






five years, it provides detailed descriptions of the main dimensions of neighborhood 
politics, including interactions among all the main political forces in the 
neighborhoods and within these groups themselves. These detailed descriptions can 
help us understand the changing socio-political life in contemporary China’s 
neighborhoods. Theoretically, it first suggests a broader and more inclusive approach 
incorporating social conflicts into the conventional approach which merely focuses on 
social cooperation in studying governance. Secondly, my exploration for the role of 
guanxi networks in neighborhood politics discloses both causal effect and 
mechanisms between social networks and local governance, and their contextual 
relations. This challenges earlier theories that suggest a positive link between social 
capital and good governance. Thirdly, complementary to Robert Putnam’s (1993a) 
model of “civic community”, the idea of “quasi-civic community” is developed as a 
conceptual tool to reflect local governance in an authoritarian polity like China, which 
is radically different from democratic states. Furthermore, my investigation on the role 
of social capital in the community movement and the biographical consequences of 
the movement adds to the existing literature concerning contentious politics. 
However, there are some limitations with the present research. The 
quantitative data is not very adequate. In the 2002 survey, due to limited resources, 
the sample was quite small and restricted to the high-rise building areas in GI and GII; 
and the number of indicators measuring the performance of neighborhood governance 
was not large enough to comprehensively reflect community development. Another 
problem concerns the subject of this research itself. As Putnam (1993a) pointed out, it 
usually takes decades for the effects of institutional changes to fully reveal themselves. 
The large-scale urban reforms were initiated at the beginning of the 1990s, and 






is required in order to ascertain their impact on neighborhood governance. Therefore, 
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